2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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{- git-annex file content managing
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2010-10-27 20:53:54 +00:00
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-
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2022-01-07 17:17:43 +00:00
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- Copyright 2010-2022 Joey Hess <id@joeyh.name>
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2010-10-27 20:53:54 +00:00
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-
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2019-03-13 19:48:14 +00:00
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- Licensed under the GNU AGPL version 3 or higher.
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2010-10-27 20:53:54 +00:00
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-}
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2010-10-14 07:40:26 +00:00
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2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
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{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
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2011-10-04 04:40:47 +00:00
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module Annex.Content (
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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inAnnex,
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2015-04-09 19:34:47 +00:00
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inAnnex',
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2011-11-09 22:33:15 +00:00
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inAnnexSafe,
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2013-07-18 17:30:12 +00:00
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inAnnexCheck,
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2018-12-04 16:20:34 +00:00
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objectFileExists,
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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lockContentShared,
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2015-10-09 19:48:02 +00:00
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lockContentForRemoval,
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ContentRemovalLock,
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2018-06-21 17:34:11 +00:00
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RetrievalSecurityPolicy(..),
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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getViaTmp,
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2018-03-13 18:18:30 +00:00
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getViaTmpFromDisk,
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2022-01-07 17:17:43 +00:00
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verificationOfContentFailed,
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2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
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checkDiskSpaceToGet,
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2020-07-03 17:41:57 +00:00
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checkSecureHashes,
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2014-07-29 22:40:40 +00:00
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prepTmp,
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2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
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withTmp,
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2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
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checkDiskSpace,
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2017-11-30 20:08:30 +00:00
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needMoreDiskSpace,
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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moveAnnex,
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2015-12-22 20:22:28 +00:00
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populatePointerFile,
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2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
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linkToAnnex,
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linkFromAnnex,
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2021-07-27 17:01:30 +00:00
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linkFromAnnex',
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2015-12-04 18:20:32 +00:00
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LinkAnnexResult(..),
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2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
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unlinkAnnex,
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2015-12-11 19:13:36 +00:00
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checkedCopyFile,
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2016-01-07 18:51:28 +00:00
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linkOrCopy,
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linkOrCopy',
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2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
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sendAnnex,
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2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
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prepSendAnnex,
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2021-06-25 17:04:17 +00:00
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prepSendAnnex',
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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removeAnnex,
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moveBad,
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2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
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KeyLocation(..),
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2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
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listKeys,
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2012-01-02 18:20:20 +00:00
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saveState,
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downloadUrl,
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2012-01-19 21:05:39 +00:00
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preseedTmp,
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2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
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dirKeys,
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2013-11-24 01:58:39 +00:00
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withObjectLoc,
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2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
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staleKeysPrune,
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2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
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pruneTmpWorkDirBefore,
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2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
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isUnmodified,
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2018-10-25 20:38:04 +00:00
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isUnmodifiedCheap,
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2021-07-29 17:36:19 +00:00
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verifyKeyContentPostRetrieval,
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2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
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verifyKeyContent,
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2021-08-17 16:41:36 +00:00
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VerifyConfig,
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VerifyConfigA(..),
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2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
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Verification(..),
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unVerified,
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2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
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withTmpWorkDir,
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2022-01-13 17:24:50 +00:00
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KeyStatus(..),
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isKeyUnlockedThin,
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getKeyStatus,
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getKeyFileStatus,
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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) where
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2010-10-14 07:40:26 +00:00
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2012-03-11 22:04:58 +00:00
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import System.IO.Unsafe (unsafeInterleaveIO)
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2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
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import qualified Data.Set as S
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2011-11-10 01:45:03 +00:00
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2016-01-20 20:36:33 +00:00
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import Annex.Common
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2020-11-16 15:21:33 +00:00
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import Annex.Content.Presence
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import Annex.Content.LowLevel
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import Annex.Content.PointerFile
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2021-07-27 18:07:23 +00:00
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import Annex.Verify
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2011-06-30 17:16:57 +00:00
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import qualified Git
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2010-10-14 07:40:26 +00:00
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import qualified Annex
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2011-10-04 04:40:47 +00:00
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import qualified Annex.Queue
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import qualified Annex.Branch
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2013-09-28 18:35:21 +00:00
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import qualified Annex.Url as Url
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2020-11-16 15:21:33 +00:00
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import qualified Backend
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import qualified Database.Keys
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2016-01-05 21:22:19 +00:00
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import Git.FilePath
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2012-04-21 20:59:49 +00:00
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import Annex.Perms
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2013-04-02 17:13:42 +00:00
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import Annex.Link
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2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
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import Annex.LockPool
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2020-11-16 15:21:33 +00:00
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import Annex.UUID
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import Annex.InodeSentinal
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2021-07-27 17:01:30 +00:00
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import Annex.ReplaceFile
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2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
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import Annex.AdjustedBranch (adjustedBranchRefresh)
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2015-04-04 00:38:56 +00:00
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import Messages.Progress
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2021-08-17 16:41:36 +00:00
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import Types.Remote (RetrievalSecurityPolicy(..), VerifyConfigA(..))
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2015-10-08 20:55:11 +00:00
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import Types.NumCopies
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annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
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import Types.Key
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2020-11-16 15:21:33 +00:00
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import Types.Transfer
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import Logs.Transfer
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import Logs.Location
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2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
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import Utility.InodeCache
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2020-11-16 15:21:33 +00:00
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import Utility.CopyFile
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import Utility.Metered
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2019-12-11 18:12:22 +00:00
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import qualified Utility.RawFilePath as R
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2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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2019-12-18 20:45:03 +00:00
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import qualified System.FilePath.ByteString as P
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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{- Prevents the content from being removed while the action is running.
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- Uses a shared lock.
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-
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make sure that lockContentShared is always paired with an inAnnex check
lockContentShared had a screwy caveat that it didn't verify that the content
was present when locking it, but in the most common case, eg indirect mode,
it failed to lock when the content is not present.
That led to a few callers forgetting to check inAnnex when using it,
but the potential data loss was unlikely to be noticed because it only
affected direct mode I think.
Fix data loss bug when the local repository uses direct mode, and a
locally modified file is dropped from a remote repsitory. The bug
caused the modified file to be counted as a copy of the original file.
(This is not a severe bug because in such a situation, dropping
from the remote and then modifying the file is allowed and has the same
end result.)
And, in content locking over tor, when the remote repository is
in direct mode, it neglected to check that the content was actually
present when locking it. This could cause git annex drop to remove
the only copy of a file when it thought the tor remote had a copy.
So, make lockContentShared do its own inAnnex check. This could perhaps
be optimised for direct mode, to avoid the check then, since locking
the content necessarily verifies it exists there, but I have not bothered
with that.
This commit was sponsored by Jeff Goeke-Smith on Patreon.
2018-03-07 18:13:02 +00:00
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- If locking fails, or the content is not present, throws an exception
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- rather than running the action.
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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-}
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2015-10-08 20:55:11 +00:00
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lockContentShared :: Key -> (VerifiedCopy -> Annex a) -> Annex a
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lockContentShared key a = lockContentUsing lock key notpresent $
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2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
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ifM (inAnnex key)
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( do
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u <- getUUID
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withVerifiedCopy LockedCopy u (return True) a
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, notpresent
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)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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where
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2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
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notpresent = giveup $ "failed to lock content: not present"
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lock _ (Just lockfile) =
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( posixLocker tryLockShared lockfile
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, Just (posixLocker tryLockExclusive lockfile)
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)
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lock contentfile Nothing =
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( tryLockShared Nothing contentfile
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, Nothing
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)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#else
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lock = winLocker lockShared
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#endif
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{- Exclusively locks content, while performing an action that
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- might remove it.
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2018-11-15 19:38:55 +00:00
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-
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- If locking fails, throws an exception rather than running the action.
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2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
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-
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2022-01-11 21:01:11 +00:00
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- If locking fails because the the content is not present, runs the
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- fallback action instead. However, the content is not guaranteed to be
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- present when this succeeds.
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2014-08-21 00:08:45 +00:00
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-}
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2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
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lockContentForRemoval :: Key -> Annex a -> (ContentRemovalLock -> Annex a) -> Annex a
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lockContentForRemoval key fallback a = lockContentUsing lock key fallback $
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2015-10-09 19:48:02 +00:00
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a (ContentRemovalLock key)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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where
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lock _ (Just lockfile) = (posixLocker tryLockExclusive lockfile, Nothing)
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2022-01-11 21:01:11 +00:00
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{- No lock file, so the content file itself is locked.
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- Since content files are stored with the write bit
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- disabled, have to fiddle with permissions to open
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- for an exclusive lock. -}
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lock contentfile Nothing =
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let lck = bracket_
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2022-01-11 21:01:11 +00:00
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(thawContent contentfile)
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(freezeContent contentfile)
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(tryLockExclusive Nothing contentfile)
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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in (lck, Nothing)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#else
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lock = winLocker lockExclusive
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#endif
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{- Passed the object content file, and maybe a separate lock file to use,
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- when the content file itself should not be locked. -}
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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type ContentLocker = RawFilePath -> Maybe LockFile -> (Annex (Maybe LockHandle), Maybe (Annex (Maybe LockHandle)))
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
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2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
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posixLocker :: (Maybe FileMode -> LockFile -> Annex (Maybe LockHandle)) -> LockFile -> Annex (Maybe LockHandle)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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posixLocker takelock lockfile = do
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mode <- annexFileMode
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modifyContent lockfile $
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2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
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takelock (Just mode) lockfile
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#else
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winLocker :: (LockFile -> IO (Maybe LockHandle)) -> ContentLocker
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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winLocker takelock _ (Just lockfile) =
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let lck = do
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modifyContent lockfile $
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void $ liftIO $ tryIO $
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writeFile (fromRawFilePath lockfile) ""
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liftIO $ takelock lockfile
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in (lck, Nothing)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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-- never reached; windows always uses a separate lock file
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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winLocker _ _ Nothing = (return Nothing, Nothing)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#endif
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2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
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{- The fallback action is run if the ContentLocker throws an IO exception
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- and the content is not present. It's not guaranteed to always run when
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- the content is not present, because the content file is not always
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2022-01-11 21:01:11 +00:00
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- the file that is locked. -}
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lockContentUsing :: ContentLocker -> Key -> Annex a -> Annex a -> Annex a
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2022-01-20 15:33:14 +00:00
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lockContentUsing contentlocker key fallback a = withContentLockFile key $ \mlockfile -> do
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2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
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contentfile <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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let (locker, sharedtoexclusive) = contentlocker contentfile mlockfile
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2014-08-21 00:08:45 +00:00
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bracket
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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(lock locker mlockfile)
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(either (const noop) (unlock sharedtoexclusive mlockfile))
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2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
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go
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2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
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where
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2016-11-16 01:29:54 +00:00
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alreadylocked = giveup "content is locked"
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failedtolock e = giveup $ "failed to lock content: " ++ show e
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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lock locker mlockfile = tryIO $ locker >>= \case
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Nothing -> alreadylocked
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Just h ->
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delete content lock file safely on drop, keep after shared lock
This seems to be the best that can be done to avoid forever accumulating
the new content lock files, while being fully safe.
This is fixing code paths that have lingered unused since direct mode!
And direct mode seems to have been buggy in this area, since the content
lock file was deleted on unlock. But with a shared lock, there could be
another process that also had the lock file locked, and deleting it
invalidates that lock.
So, the lock file cannot be deleted after a shared lock. At least, not
wihout taking an exclusive lock first.. which I have not pursued yet but may.
After an exclusive lock, the lock file can be deleted. But there is
still a potential race, where the exclusive lock is held, and another
process gets the file open, just as the exclusive lock is dropped and
the lock file is deleted. That other process would be left with a file
handle it can take a shared lock of, but with no effect since the file
is deleted. Annex.Transfer also deletes lock files, and deals with this
same problem by using checkSaneLock, which is how I've dealt with it
here.
Sponsored-by: Dartmouth College's Datalad project
2022-01-13 17:58:58 +00:00
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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case mlockfile of
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Nothing -> return h
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Just lockfile ->
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ifM (checkSaneLock lockfile h)
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( return h
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, alreadylocked
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)
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#else
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return h
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delete content lock file safely on drop, keep after shared lock
This seems to be the best that can be done to avoid forever accumulating
the new content lock files, while being fully safe.
This is fixing code paths that have lingered unused since direct mode!
And direct mode seems to have been buggy in this area, since the content
lock file was deleted on unlock. But with a shared lock, there could be
another process that also had the lock file locked, and deleting it
invalidates that lock.
So, the lock file cannot be deleted after a shared lock. At least, not
wihout taking an exclusive lock first.. which I have not pursued yet but may.
After an exclusive lock, the lock file can be deleted. But there is
still a potential race, where the exclusive lock is held, and another
process gets the file open, just as the exclusive lock is dropped and
the lock file is deleted. That other process would be left with a file
handle it can take a shared lock of, but with no effect since the file
is deleted. Annex.Transfer also deletes lock files, and deals with this
same problem by using checkSaneLock, which is how I've dealt with it
here.
Sponsored-by: Dartmouth College's Datalad project
2022-01-13 17:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2020-07-25 15:54:34 +00:00
|
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go (Right _) = a
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go (Left e) = ifM (inAnnex key)
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( failedtolock e
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, fallback
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)
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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unlock sharedtoexclusive mlockfile lck = case (sharedtoexclusive, mlockfile) of
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-- We have a shared lock, so other processes may also
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-- have shared locks of the same lock file. To avoid
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-- deleting the lock file when there are other shared
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-- locks, try to convert to an exclusive lock, and only
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-- delete it when that succeeds.
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--
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-- Since other processes might be doing the same,
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-- a race is possible where we open the lock file
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-- and then another process takes the exclusive lock and
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-- deletes it, leaving us with an invalid lock. To avoid
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-- that race, checkSaneLock is used after taking the lock
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-- here, and above.
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(Just exclusivelocker, Just lockfile) -> do
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liftIO $ dropLock lck
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exclusivelocker >>= \case
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Nothing -> return ()
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Just h -> do
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whenM (checkSaneLock lockfile h) $ do
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cleanuplockfile lockfile
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liftIO $ dropLock h
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-- We have an exclusive lock, so no other process can have
|
2022-01-20 18:00:19 +00:00
|
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-- the lock file locked, and so it's safe to remove it, as
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-- long as all lock attempts use checkSaneLock.
|
2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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_ -> do
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delete content lock file safely on drop, keep after shared lock
This seems to be the best that can be done to avoid forever accumulating
the new content lock files, while being fully safe.
This is fixing code paths that have lingered unused since direct mode!
And direct mode seems to have been buggy in this area, since the content
lock file was deleted on unlock. But with a shared lock, there could be
another process that also had the lock file locked, and deleting it
invalidates that lock.
So, the lock file cannot be deleted after a shared lock. At least, not
wihout taking an exclusive lock first.. which I have not pursued yet but may.
After an exclusive lock, the lock file can be deleted. But there is
still a potential race, where the exclusive lock is held, and another
process gets the file open, just as the exclusive lock is dropped and
the lock file is deleted. That other process would be left with a file
handle it can take a shared lock of, but with no effect since the file
is deleted. Annex.Transfer also deletes lock files, and deals with this
same problem by using checkSaneLock, which is how I've dealt with it
here.
Sponsored-by: Dartmouth College's Datalad project
2022-01-13 17:58:58 +00:00
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maybe noop cleanuplockfile mlockfile
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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liftIO $ dropLock lck
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2013-08-04 17:12:18 +00:00
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#else
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2022-01-13 18:54:57 +00:00
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unlock _ mlockfile lck = do
|
delete content lock file safely on drop, keep after shared lock
This seems to be the best that can be done to avoid forever accumulating
the new content lock files, while being fully safe.
This is fixing code paths that have lingered unused since direct mode!
And direct mode seems to have been buggy in this area, since the content
lock file was deleted on unlock. But with a shared lock, there could be
another process that also had the lock file locked, and deleting it
invalidates that lock.
So, the lock file cannot be deleted after a shared lock. At least, not
wihout taking an exclusive lock first.. which I have not pursued yet but may.
After an exclusive lock, the lock file can be deleted. But there is
still a potential race, where the exclusive lock is held, and another
process gets the file open, just as the exclusive lock is dropped and
the lock file is deleted. That other process would be left with a file
handle it can take a shared lock of, but with no effect since the file
is deleted. Annex.Transfer also deletes lock files, and deals with this
same problem by using checkSaneLock, which is how I've dealt with it
here.
Sponsored-by: Dartmouth College's Datalad project
2022-01-13 17:58:58 +00:00
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-- Can't delete a locked file on Windows,
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-- so close our lock first. If there are other shared
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-- locks, they will prevent the file deletion from
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-- happening.
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2015-10-12 19:48:59 +00:00
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liftIO $ dropLock lck
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2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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maybe noop cleanuplockfile mlockfile
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2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
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#endif
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2011-11-10 01:45:03 +00:00
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2022-01-20 18:00:19 +00:00
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cleanuplockfile lockfile = void $ tryNonAsync $ do
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thawContentDir lockfile
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liftIO $ removeWhenExistsWith R.removeLink lockfile
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liftIO $ cleanObjectDirs lockfile
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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|
2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
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{- Runs an action, passing it the temp file to get,
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- and if the action succeeds, verifies the file matches
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- the key and moves the file into the annex as a key's content. -}
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2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
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getViaTmp :: RetrievalSecurityPolicy -> VerifyConfig -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> (RawFilePath -> Annex (Bool, Verification)) -> Annex Bool
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getViaTmp rsp v key af action = checkDiskSpaceToGet key False $
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getViaTmpFromDisk rsp v key af action
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2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
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{- Like getViaTmp, but does not check that there is enough disk space
|
|
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- for the incoming key. For use when the key content is already on disk
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- and not being copied into place. -}
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2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
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getViaTmpFromDisk :: RetrievalSecurityPolicy -> VerifyConfig -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> (RawFilePath -> Annex (Bool, Verification)) -> Annex Bool
|
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getViaTmpFromDisk rsp v key af action = checkallowed $ do
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2015-10-01 18:07:06 +00:00
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tmpfile <- prepTmp key
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2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
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|
resuming <- liftIO $ R.doesPathExist tmpfile
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
(ok, verification) <- action tmpfile
|
2018-03-13 18:50:49 +00:00
|
|
|
-- When the temp file already had content, we don't know if
|
|
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|
-- that content is good or not, so only trust if it the action
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-- Verified it in passing. Otherwise, force verification even
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-- if the VerifyConfig normally disables it.
|
|
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let verification' = if resuming
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|
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then case verification of
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Verified -> Verified
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|
_ -> MustVerify
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|
|
|
else verification
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if ok
|
2021-07-29 17:36:19 +00:00
|
|
|
then ifM (verifyKeyContentPostRetrieval rsp v verification' key tmpfile)
|
2020-12-11 15:33:10 +00:00
|
|
|
( pruneTmpWorkDirBefore tmpfile (moveAnnex key af)
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
, do
|
2022-01-07 17:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
verificationOfContentFailed tmpfile
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
-- On transfer failure, the tmp file is left behind, in case
|
|
|
|
-- caller wants to resume its transfer
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
else return False
|
2018-06-21 17:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
-- Avoid running the action to get the content when the
|
|
|
|
-- RetrievalSecurityPolicy would cause verification to always fail.
|
|
|
|
checkallowed a = case rsp of
|
|
|
|
RetrievalAllKeysSecure -> a
|
2021-07-27 18:07:23 +00:00
|
|
|
RetrievalVerifiableKeysSecure -> ifM (isVerifiable key)
|
2020-07-29 19:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
( a
|
|
|
|
, ifM (annexAllowUnverifiedDownloads <$> Annex.getGitConfig)
|
2018-06-21 17:34:11 +00:00
|
|
|
( a
|
|
|
|
, warnUnverifiableInsecure key >> return False
|
|
|
|
)
|
2020-07-29 19:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-01-07 17:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
{- When the content of a file that was successfully transferred from a remote
|
|
|
|
- fails to verify, use this to display a message so the user knows why it
|
|
|
|
- failed, and to clean up the corrupted content.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- The bad content is not retained, because the transfer of it succeeded.
|
|
|
|
- So it's not incomplete and a resume using it will not work. While
|
|
|
|
- some protocols like rsync could recover such a bad content file,
|
|
|
|
- they are assumed to not write out bad data to a file in the first place.
|
|
|
|
- Most protocols, including the P2P protocol, pick up downloads where they
|
|
|
|
- left off, and so if the bad content were not deleted, repeated downloads
|
|
|
|
- would continue to fail.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
verificationOfContentFailed :: RawFilePath -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
verificationOfContentFailed tmpfile = do
|
|
|
|
warning "Verification of content failed"
|
|
|
|
pruneTmpWorkDirBefore tmpfile
|
|
|
|
(liftIO . removeWhenExistsWith R.removeLink)
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Checks if there is enough free disk space to download a key
|
|
|
|
- to its temp file.
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- When the temp file already exists, count the space it is using as
|
|
|
|
- free, since the download will overwrite it or resume.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- Wen there's enough free space, runs the download action.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
|
|
|
checkDiskSpaceToGet :: Key -> a -> Annex a -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpaceToGet key unabletoget getkey = do
|
2020-11-05 15:26:34 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp <- fromRepo (gitAnnexTmpObjectLocation key)
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
e <- liftIO $ doesFileExist (fromRawFilePath tmp)
|
2015-01-20 20:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
alreadythere <- liftIO $ if e
|
|
|
|
then getFileSize tmp
|
2012-04-20 18:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
else return 0
|
2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ifM (checkDiskSpace Nothing key alreadythere True)
|
2012-04-20 18:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
( do
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
-- The tmp file may not have been left writable
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
when e $ thawContent tmp
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
getkey
|
import metadata from feeds
When annex.genmetadata is set, metadata from the feed is added to files
that are imported from it.
Reused the same feedtitle and itemtitle, feedauthor, itemauthor, etc names
that are used in --template.
Also added title and author, which are the item title/author if available,
falling back to the feed title/author. These are more likely to be common
metadata fields.
(There is a small bit of dupication here, but once git gets
around to packing the object, it will compress it away.)
The itempubdate field is not included in the metadata as a string; instead
it is used to generate year and month fields, same as is done when adding
files with annex.genmetadata set.
This commit was sponsored by Amitai Schlair, who cooincidentially
is responsible for ikiwiki generating nice feed metadata!
2014-07-03 17:46:09 +00:00
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|
|
, return unabletoget
|
2012-04-20 18:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
prepTmp :: Key -> Annex RawFilePath
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
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|
prepTmp key = do
|
2014-02-26 20:52:56 +00:00
|
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|
tmp <- fromRepo $ gitAnnexTmpObjectLocation key
|
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
|
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|
createAnnexDirectory (parentDir tmp)
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
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|
return tmp
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Prepares a temp file for a key, runs an action on it, and cleans up
|
2014-07-29 21:17:41 +00:00
|
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|
- the temp file. If the action throws an exception, the temp file is
|
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|
|
- left behind, which allows for resuming.
|
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|
|
-}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
withTmp :: Key -> (RawFilePath -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
|
|
|
withTmp key action = do
|
2011-07-15 07:12:05 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp <- prepTmp key
|
2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
|
|
|
res <- action tmp
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
pruneTmpWorkDirBefore tmp (liftIO . removeWhenExistsWith R.removeLink)
|
2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-07 18:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Moves a key's content into .git/annex/objects/
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
2015-12-09 19:25:14 +00:00
|
|
|
- When a key has associated pointer files, the object is hard
|
|
|
|
- linked (or copied) to the files, and the object file is left thawed.
|
2011-04-29 00:41:40 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- What if the key there already has content? This could happen for
|
|
|
|
- various reasons; perhaps the same content is being annexed again.
|
|
|
|
- Perhaps there has been a hash collision generating the keys.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- The current strategy is to assume that in this case it's safe to delete
|
|
|
|
- one of the two copies of the content; and the one already in the annex
|
|
|
|
- is left there, assuming it's the original, canonical copy.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- I considered being more paranoid, and checking that both files had
|
|
|
|
- the same content. Decided against it because A) users explicitly choose
|
|
|
|
- a backend based on its hashing properties and so if they're dealing
|
|
|
|
- with colliding files it's their own fault and B) adding such a check
|
|
|
|
- would not catch all cases of colliding keys. For example, perhaps
|
|
|
|
- a remote has a key; if it's then added again with different content then
|
|
|
|
- the overall system now has two different peices of content for that
|
|
|
|
- key, and one of them will probably get deleted later. So, adding the
|
|
|
|
- check here would only raise expectations that git-annex cannot truely
|
|
|
|
- meet.
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- May return false, when a particular variety of key is not being
|
|
|
|
- accepted into the repository. Will display a warning message in this
|
|
|
|
- case. May also throw exceptions in some cases.
|
2011-04-29 00:41:40 +00:00
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
|
|
|
moveAnnex :: Key -> AssociatedFile -> RawFilePath -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
moveAnnex key af src = ifM (checkSecureHashes' key)
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
( do
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
withObjectLoc key storeobject
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
)
|
2012-12-07 18:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
2019-12-11 18:12:22 +00:00
|
|
|
storeobject dest = ifM (liftIO $ R.doesPathExist dest)
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
( alreadyhave
|
2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
|
|
|
, adjustedBranchRefresh af $ modifyContent dest $ do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ moveFile
|
|
|
|
(fromRawFilePath src)
|
|
|
|
(fromRawFilePath dest)
|
2021-10-27 18:11:34 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Freeze the object file now that it is in place.
|
|
|
|
-- Waiting until now to freeze it allows for freeze
|
|
|
|
-- hooks that prevent moving the file.
|
2021-10-26 19:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
freezeContent dest
|
2021-06-15 13:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
g <- Annex.gitRepo
|
|
|
|
fs <- map (`fromTopFilePath` g)
|
|
|
|
<$> Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
|
|
|
|
unless (null fs) $ do
|
2021-07-27 16:29:10 +00:00
|
|
|
destic <- withTSDelta $
|
|
|
|
liftIO . genInodeCache dest
|
2021-06-15 13:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ics <- mapM (populatePointerFile (Restage True) key dest) fs
|
2021-07-27 16:29:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key
|
|
|
|
(catMaybes (destic:ics))
|
2013-02-18 06:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
alreadyhave = liftIO $ R.removeLink src
|
2011-07-15 07:12:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-03 17:41:57 +00:00
|
|
|
checkSecureHashes :: Key -> Annex (Maybe String)
|
2020-07-29 19:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
checkSecureHashes key = ifM (Backend.isCryptographicallySecure key)
|
|
|
|
( return Nothing
|
|
|
|
, ifM (annexSecureHashesOnly <$> Annex.getGitConfig)
|
2020-07-03 17:41:57 +00:00
|
|
|
( return $ Just $ "annex.securehashesonly blocked adding " ++ decodeBS (formatKeyVariety (fromKey keyVariety key)) ++ " key"
|
|
|
|
, return Nothing
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2020-07-29 19:23:18 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-07-03 17:41:57 +00:00
|
|
|
checkSecureHashes' :: Key -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
checkSecureHashes' key = checkSecureHashes key >>= \case
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> return True
|
|
|
|
Just msg -> do
|
|
|
|
warning $ msg ++ "to annex objects"
|
|
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
data LinkAnnexResult = LinkAnnexOk | LinkAnnexFailed | LinkAnnexNoop
|
2021-08-02 17:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
deriving (Eq)
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Populates the annex object file by hard linking or copying a source
|
|
|
|
- file to it. -}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
linkToAnnex :: Key -> RawFilePath -> Maybe InodeCache -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
2020-07-03 17:41:57 +00:00
|
|
|
linkToAnnex key src srcic = ifM (checkSecureHashes' key)
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
( do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
dest <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
modifyContent dest $ linkAnnex To key src srcic dest Nothing
|
|
|
|
, return LinkAnnexFailed
|
|
|
|
)
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-07-27 17:01:30 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Makes a destination file be a link or copy from the annex object.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- linkAnnex stats the file after copying it to add to the inode
|
|
|
|
- cache. But dest may be a file in the working tree, which could
|
|
|
|
- get modified immediately after being populated. To avoid such a
|
|
|
|
- race, call linkAnnex on a temporary file and move it into place
|
|
|
|
- afterwards. Note that a consequence of this is that, if the file
|
|
|
|
- already exists, it will be overwritten.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex :: Key -> RawFilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
2021-07-27 17:01:30 +00:00
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex key dest destmode =
|
2021-08-02 17:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
replaceFile' (const noop) (fromRawFilePath dest) (== LinkAnnexOk) $ \tmp ->
|
2021-07-27 17:01:30 +00:00
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex' key (toRawFilePath tmp) destmode
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- This is only safe to use when dest is not a worktree file. -}
|
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex' :: Key -> RawFilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex' key dest destmode = do
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
src <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
|
|
|
srcic <- withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache src)
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
linkAnnex From key src srcic dest destmode
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data FromTo = From | To
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Hard links or copies from or to the annex object location.
|
|
|
|
- Updates inode cache.
|
2015-12-04 17:39:14 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
2018-09-05 19:27:22 +00:00
|
|
|
- Freezes or thaws the destination appropriately.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- When a hard link is made, the annex object necessarily has to be thawed
|
|
|
|
- too. So, adding an object to the annex with a hard link can prevent
|
|
|
|
- losing the content if the source file is deleted, but does not
|
|
|
|
- guard against modifications.
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- Nothing is done if the destination file already exists.
|
2015-12-04 17:39:14 +00:00
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
linkAnnex :: FromTo -> Key -> RawFilePath -> Maybe InodeCache -> RawFilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
linkAnnex _ _ _ Nothing _ _ = return LinkAnnexFailed
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
linkAnnex fromto key src (Just srcic) dest destmode =
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache dest) >>= \case
|
2015-12-29 20:26:27 +00:00
|
|
|
Just destic -> do
|
|
|
|
cs <- Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
|
|
|
|
if null cs
|
|
|
|
then Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key [srcic, destic]
|
|
|
|
else Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key [srcic]
|
2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return LinkAnnexNoop
|
2018-09-05 21:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
Nothing -> linkOrCopy key src dest destmode >>= \case
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> failed
|
|
|
|
Just r -> do
|
2018-09-05 19:27:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case fromto of
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
From -> thawContent dest
|
2018-09-05 21:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
To -> case r of
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
Copied -> freezeContent dest
|
2018-09-05 21:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
Linked -> noop
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
checksrcunchanged
|
2015-12-22 19:20:03 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
failed = do
|
|
|
|
Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key [srcic]
|
|
|
|
return LinkAnnexFailed
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
checksrcunchanged = withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache src) >>= \case
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
Just srcic' | compareStrong srcic srcic' -> do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
destic <- withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache dest)
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key $
|
|
|
|
catMaybes [destic, Just srcic]
|
|
|
|
return LinkAnnexOk
|
|
|
|
_ -> do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ removeWhenExistsWith R.removeLink dest
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
failed
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Removes the annex object file for a key. Lowlevel. -}
|
|
|
|
unlinkAnnex :: Key -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
unlinkAnnex key = do
|
2020-10-29 14:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
|
|
|
modifyContent obj $ do
|
|
|
|
secureErase obj
|
2020-10-29 14:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ removeWhenExistsWith R.removeLink obj
|
2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Runs an action to transfer an object's content.
|
|
|
|
-
|
2015-12-10 18:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
- In some cases, it's possible for the file to change as it's being sent.
|
2020-05-13 18:03:00 +00:00
|
|
|
- If this happens, runs the rollback action and throws an exception.
|
|
|
|
- The rollback action should remove the data that was transferred.
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-05-13 18:03:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sendAnnex :: Key -> Annex () -> (FilePath -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
2021-06-25 17:04:17 +00:00
|
|
|
sendAnnex key rollback sendobject = go =<< prepSendAnnex' key
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
2021-06-25 17:04:17 +00:00
|
|
|
go (Just (f, check)) = do
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
r <- sendobject f
|
2021-06-25 17:04:17 +00:00
|
|
|
check >>= \case
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> return r
|
|
|
|
Just err -> do
|
|
|
|
rollback
|
|
|
|
giveup err
|
2020-05-13 18:03:00 +00:00
|
|
|
go Nothing = giveup "content not available to send"
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Returns a file that contains an object's content,
|
2014-09-05 17:44:09 +00:00
|
|
|
- and a check to run after the transfer is complete.
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
- When a file is unlocked, it's possble for its content to
|
|
|
|
- change as it's being sent. The check detects this case
|
2015-12-10 18:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
- and returns False.
|
2013-03-18 15:18:04 +00:00
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- Note that the returned check action is, in some cases, run in the
|
|
|
|
- Annex monad of the remote that is receiving the object, rather than
|
2013-03-18 17:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
- the sender. So it cannot rely on Annex state.
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
prepSendAnnex :: Key -> Annex (Maybe (FilePath, Annex Bool))
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
prepSendAnnex key = withObjectLoc key $ \f -> do
|
2021-07-29 16:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
let retval c = return $ Just (fromRawFilePath f, sameInodeCache f c)
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
cache <- Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
|
2021-07-29 16:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if null cache
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Since no inode cache is in the database, this
|
|
|
|
-- object is not currently unlocked. But that could
|
|
|
|
-- change while the transfer is in progress, so
|
|
|
|
-- generate an inode cache for the starting
|
|
|
|
-- content.
|
2021-07-29 16:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
then maybe (return Nothing) (retval . (:[]))
|
|
|
|
=<< withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache f)
|
2021-07-26 21:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Verify that the object is not modified. Usually this
|
|
|
|
-- only has to check the inode cache, but if the cache
|
|
|
|
-- is somehow stale, it will fall back to verifying its
|
|
|
|
-- content.
|
|
|
|
else withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache f) >>= \case
|
|
|
|
Just fc -> ifM (isUnmodified' key f fc cache)
|
2021-07-29 16:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
( retval (fc:cache)
|
|
|
|
, return Nothing
|
2021-07-26 21:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2021-07-29 16:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
Nothing -> return Nothing
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-25 17:04:17 +00:00
|
|
|
prepSendAnnex' :: Key -> Annex (Maybe (FilePath, Annex (Maybe String)))
|
|
|
|
prepSendAnnex' key = prepSendAnnex key >>= \case
|
|
|
|
Just (f, checksuccess) ->
|
|
|
|
let checksuccess' = ifM checksuccess
|
|
|
|
( return Nothing
|
|
|
|
, return (Just "content changed while it was being sent")
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
in return (Just (f, checksuccess'))
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> return Nothing
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc :: Key -> Annex () -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc key cleaner = do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
file <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
unify exception handling into Utility.Exception
Removed old extensible-exceptions, only needed for very old ghc.
Made webdav use Utility.Exception, to work after some changes in DAV's
exception handling.
Removed Annex.Exception. Mostly this was trivial, but note that
tryAnnex is replaced with tryNonAsync and catchAnnex replaced with
catchNonAsync. In theory that could be a behavior change, since the former
caught all exceptions, and the latter don't catch async exceptions.
However, in practice, nothing in the Annex monad uses async exceptions.
Grepping for throwTo and killThread only find stuff in the assistant,
which does not seem related.
Command.Add.undo is changed to accept a SomeException, and things
that use it for rollback now catch non-async exceptions, rather than
only IOExceptions.
2014-08-08 01:55:44 +00:00
|
|
|
void $ tryIO $ thawContentDir file
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
cleaner
|
2022-01-13 18:19:36 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ cleanObjectDirs file
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectDirs :: RawFilePath -> IO ()
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectDirs = go (3 :: Int)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
2022-01-13 18:19:36 +00:00
|
|
|
go 0 _ = noop
|
|
|
|
go n file = do
|
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
let dir = parentDir file
|
2022-01-13 18:19:36 +00:00
|
|
|
maybe noop (const $ go (n-1) dir)
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
<=< catchMaybeIO $ removeDirectory (fromRawFilePath dir)
|
2012-02-24 20:30:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Removes a key's file from .git/annex/objects/ -}
|
2015-10-09 19:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
removeAnnex :: ContentRemovalLock -> Annex ()
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
removeAnnex (ContentRemovalLock key) = withObjectLoc key $ \file ->
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc key $ do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
secureErase file
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ removeWhenExistsWith R.removeLink file
|
2021-06-15 13:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
g <- Annex.gitRepo
|
|
|
|
mapM_ (\f -> void $ tryIO $ resetpointer $ fromTopFilePath f g)
|
|
|
|
=<< Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
|
|
|
|
Database.Keys.removeInodeCaches key
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
2018-08-14 18:22:23 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Check associated pointer file for modifications, and reset if
|
|
|
|
-- it's unmodified.
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
resetpointer file = ifM (isUnmodified key file)
|
2020-11-16 18:09:55 +00:00
|
|
|
( adjustedBranchRefresh (AssociatedFile (Just file)) $
|
|
|
|
depopulatePointerFile key file
|
2018-08-14 18:22:23 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Modified file, so leave it alone.
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
-- If it was a hard link to the annex object,
|
|
|
|
-- that object might have been frozen as part of the
|
|
|
|
-- removal process, so thaw it.
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
, void $ tryIO $ thawContent file
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2018-08-22 18:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-13 18:59:27 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Moves a key out of .git/annex/objects/ into .git/annex/bad, and
|
2010-11-13 19:42:56 +00:00
|
|
|
- returns the file it was moved to. -}
|
2010-11-13 18:59:27 +00:00
|
|
|
moveBad :: Key -> Annex FilePath
|
|
|
|
moveBad key = do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
src <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
2011-11-11 05:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
bad <- fromRepo gitAnnexBadDir
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
let dest = bad P.</> P.takeFileName src
|
|
|
|
let dest' = fromRawFilePath dest
|
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
createAnnexDirectory (parentDir dest)
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc key $
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ moveFile (fromRawFilePath src) dest'
|
2011-07-01 19:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
logStatus key InfoMissing
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return dest'
|
2010-11-13 18:59:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
data KeyLocation = InAnnex | InAnywhere
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{- InAnnex only lists keys with content in .git/annex/objects.
|
|
|
|
- InAnywhere lists all keys that have directories in
|
|
|
|
- .git/annex/objects, whether or not the content is present.
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
-}
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
listKeys :: KeyLocation -> Annex [Key]
|
|
|
|
listKeys keyloc = do
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
dir <- fromRepo gitAnnexObjectDir
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{- In order to run Annex monad actions within unsafeInterleaveIO,
|
|
|
|
- the current state is taken and reused. No changes made to this
|
|
|
|
- state will be preserved.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
s <- Annex.getState id
|
2015-06-11 19:14:42 +00:00
|
|
|
depth <- gitAnnexLocationDepth <$> Annex.getGitConfig
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ walk s depth (fromRawFilePath dir)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
walk s depth dir = do
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
contents <- catchDefaultIO [] (dirContents dir)
|
2015-06-11 19:14:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if depth < 2
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
then do
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
contents' <- filterM (present s) contents
|
2019-12-18 20:45:03 +00:00
|
|
|
let keys = mapMaybe (fileKey . P.takeFileName . toRawFilePath) contents'
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
continue keys []
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else do
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
let deeper = walk s (depth - 1)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
continue [] (map deeper contents)
|
|
|
|
continue keys [] = return keys
|
|
|
|
continue keys (a:as) = do
|
|
|
|
{- Force lazy traversal with unsafeInterleaveIO. -}
|
|
|
|
morekeys <- unsafeInterleaveIO a
|
|
|
|
continue (morekeys++keys) as
|
2011-06-23 01:19:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-15 19:56:37 +00:00
|
|
|
inanywhere = case keyloc of
|
|
|
|
InAnywhere -> True
|
|
|
|
_ -> False
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-27 16:59:57 +00:00
|
|
|
present _ _ | inanywhere = pure True
|
|
|
|
present _ d = presentInAnnex d
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
presentInAnnex = doesFileExist . contentfile
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
contentfile d = d </> takeFileName d
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-28 19:41:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Things to do to record changes to content when shutting down.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- It's acceptable to avoid committing changes to the branch,
|
|
|
|
- especially if performing a short-lived action.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
saveState :: Bool -> Annex ()
|
2012-09-16 00:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
saveState nocommit = doSideAction $ do
|
2012-04-27 17:23:52 +00:00
|
|
|
Annex.Queue.flush
|
2018-10-31 02:19:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Database.Keys.closeDb
|
2012-09-16 00:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
unless nocommit $
|
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
whenM (annexAlwaysCommit <$> Annex.getGitConfig) $
|
2018-08-02 18:06:06 +00:00
|
|
|
Annex.Branch.commit =<< Annex.Branch.commitMessage
|
2012-01-02 18:20:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-30 16:29:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Downloads content from any of a list of urls, displaying a progress
|
2021-09-01 19:28:22 +00:00
|
|
|
- meter.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- Only displays error message if all the urls fail to download.
|
|
|
|
- When listfailedurls is set, lists each url and why it failed.
|
|
|
|
- Otherwise, only displays one error message, from one of the urls
|
|
|
|
- that failed.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
downloadUrl :: Bool -> Key -> MeterUpdate -> Maybe IncrementalVerifier -> [Url.URLString] -> FilePath -> Url.UrlOptions -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
downloadUrl listfailedurls k p iv urls file uo =
|
2018-04-06 21:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Poll the file to handle configurations where an external
|
|
|
|
-- download command is used.
|
2021-09-01 19:28:22 +00:00
|
|
|
meteredFile file (Just p) k (go urls [])
|
2020-09-02 15:35:07 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
2021-09-01 19:28:22 +00:00
|
|
|
go (u:us) errs = Url.download' p iv u file uo >>= \case
|
2020-09-02 15:35:07 +00:00
|
|
|
Right () -> return True
|
2021-08-18 18:49:01 +00:00
|
|
|
Left err -> do
|
|
|
|
-- If the incremental verifier was fed anything
|
|
|
|
-- while the download that failed ran, it's unable
|
|
|
|
-- to be used for the other urls.
|
|
|
|
case iv of
|
|
|
|
Just iv' ->
|
2021-11-09 16:29:09 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ positionIncrementalVerifier iv' >>= \case
|
|
|
|
Just n | n > 0 -> unableIncrementalVerifier iv'
|
2021-08-18 18:49:01 +00:00
|
|
|
_ -> noop
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> noop
|
2021-09-01 19:28:22 +00:00
|
|
|
go us ((u, err) : errs)
|
|
|
|
go [] [] = return False
|
|
|
|
go [] errs@((_, err):_) = do
|
|
|
|
if listfailedurls
|
|
|
|
then warning $ unlines $ flip map errs $ \(u, err') ->
|
|
|
|
u ++ " " ++ err'
|
|
|
|
else warning err
|
|
|
|
return False
|
2012-01-19 21:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Copies a key's content, when present, to a temp file.
|
|
|
|
- This is used to speed up some rsyncs. -}
|
2012-01-20 17:23:11 +00:00
|
|
|
preseedTmp :: Key -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
preseedTmp key file = go =<< inAnnex key
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
go False = return False
|
|
|
|
go True = do
|
|
|
|
ok <- copy
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
when ok $ thawContent (toRawFilePath file)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return ok
|
|
|
|
copy = ifM (liftIO $ doesFileExist file)
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
( return True
|
|
|
|
, do
|
2019-12-11 18:12:22 +00:00
|
|
|
s <- fromRawFilePath <$> (calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key)
|
2015-07-30 17:40:17 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ ifM (doesFileExist s)
|
|
|
|
( copyFileExternal CopyTimeStamps s file
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
)
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2012-04-21 18:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Finds files directly inside a directory like gitAnnexBadDir
|
|
|
|
- (not in subdirectories) and returns the corresponding keys. -}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
dirKeys :: (Git.Repo -> RawFilePath) -> Annex [Key]
|
2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
|
|
|
dirKeys dirspec = do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
dir <- fromRawFilePath <$> fromRepo dirspec
|
2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ifM (liftIO $ doesDirectoryExist dir)
|
|
|
|
( do
|
|
|
|
contents <- liftIO $ getDirectoryContents dir
|
|
|
|
files <- liftIO $ filterM doesFileExist $
|
|
|
|
map (dir </>) contents
|
2019-12-18 20:45:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return $ mapMaybe (fileKey . P.takeFileName . toRawFilePath) files
|
2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
|
|
|
, return []
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Looks in the specified directory for bad/tmp keys, and returns a list
|
|
|
|
- of those that might still have value, or might be stale and removable.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- Also, stale keys that can be proven to have no value
|
|
|
|
- (ie, their content is already present) are deleted.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
staleKeysPrune :: (Git.Repo -> RawFilePath) -> Bool -> Annex [Key]
|
2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
staleKeysPrune dirspec nottransferred = do
|
|
|
|
contents <- dirKeys dirspec
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dups <- filterM inAnnex contents
|
|
|
|
let stale = contents `exclude` dups
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dir <- fromRepo dirspec
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
forM_ dups $ \k ->
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
pruneTmpWorkDirBefore (dir P.</> keyFile k)
|
|
|
|
(liftIO . R.removeLink)
|
2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if nottransferred
|
|
|
|
then do
|
|
|
|
inprogress <- S.fromList . map (transferKey . fst)
|
|
|
|
<$> getTransfers
|
|
|
|
return $ filter (`S.notMember` inprogress) stale
|
|
|
|
else return stale
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Prune the work dir associated with the specified content file,
|
|
|
|
- before performing an action that deletes the file, or moves it away.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- This preserves the invariant that the workdir never exists without
|
|
|
|
- the content file.
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
pruneTmpWorkDirBefore :: RawFilePath -> (RawFilePath -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
pruneTmpWorkDirBefore f action = do
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
let workdir = fromRawFilePath $ gitAnnexTmpWorkDir f
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
liftIO $ whenM (doesDirectoryExist workdir) $
|
|
|
|
removeDirectoryRecursive workdir
|
|
|
|
action f
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Runs an action, passing it a temporary work directory where
|
|
|
|
- it can write files while receiving the content of a key.
|
|
|
|
-
|
2018-06-28 16:58:11 +00:00
|
|
|
- Preserves the invariant that the workdir never exists without the
|
|
|
|
- content file, by creating an empty content file first.
|
|
|
|
-
|
2017-11-30 17:45:43 +00:00
|
|
|
- On exception, or when the action returns Nothing,
|
2018-06-28 16:58:11 +00:00
|
|
|
- the temporary work directory is retained (unless
|
|
|
|
- empty), so anything in it can be used on resume.
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
-}
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
withTmpWorkDir :: Key -> (RawFilePath -> Annex (Maybe a)) -> Annex (Maybe a)
|
2017-11-29 19:49:05 +00:00
|
|
|
withTmpWorkDir key action = do
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
-- Create the object file if it does not exist. This way,
|
|
|
|
-- staleKeysPrune only has to look for object files, and can
|
|
|
|
-- clean up gitAnnexTmpWorkDir for those it finds.
|
2017-11-29 19:49:05 +00:00
|
|
|
obj <- prepTmp key
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
let obj' = fromRawFilePath obj
|
|
|
|
unlessM (liftIO $ doesFileExist obj') $ do
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ writeFile obj' ""
|
2020-11-06 18:10:58 +00:00
|
|
|
setAnnexFilePerm obj
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
let tmpdir = gitAnnexTmpWorkDir obj
|
2020-03-05 18:56:47 +00:00
|
|
|
createAnnexDirectory tmpdir
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
res <- action tmpdir
|
2017-11-29 19:49:05 +00:00
|
|
|
case res of
|
2020-10-29 18:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
Just _ -> liftIO $ removeDirectoryRecursive (fromRawFilePath tmpdir)
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> liftIO $ void $ tryIO $ removeDirectory (fromRawFilePath tmpdir)
|
2017-11-29 17:49:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
{- Finds items in the first, smaller list, that are not
|
|
|
|
- present in the second, larger list.
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
- Constructing a single set, of the list that tends to be
|
|
|
|
- smaller, appears more efficient in both memory and CPU
|
|
|
|
- than constructing and taking the S.difference of two sets. -}
|
|
|
|
exclude :: Ord a => [a] -> [a] -> [a]
|
|
|
|
exclude [] _ = [] -- optimisation
|
|
|
|
exclude smaller larger = S.toList $ remove larger $ S.fromList smaller
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
remove a b = foldl (flip S.delete) b a
|
2022-01-13 17:24:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data KeyStatus
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= KeyMissing
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| KeyPresent
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| KeyUnlockedThin
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-- ^ An annex.thin worktree file is hard linked to the object.
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| KeyLockedThin
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-- ^ The object has hard links, but the file being fscked
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-- is not the one that hard links to it.
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deriving (Show)
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isKeyUnlockedThin :: KeyStatus -> Bool
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isKeyUnlockedThin KeyUnlockedThin = True
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isKeyUnlockedThin KeyLockedThin = False
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isKeyUnlockedThin KeyPresent = False
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isKeyUnlockedThin KeyMissing = False
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getKeyStatus :: Key -> Annex KeyStatus
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getKeyStatus key = catchDefaultIO KeyMissing $ do
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afs <- not . null <$> Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
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obj <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
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multilink <- ((> 1) . linkCount <$> liftIO (R.getFileStatus obj))
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return $ if multilink && afs
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then KeyUnlockedThin
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else KeyPresent
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getKeyFileStatus :: Key -> FilePath -> Annex KeyStatus
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getKeyFileStatus key file = do
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s <- getKeyStatus key
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case s of
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KeyUnlockedThin -> catchDefaultIO KeyUnlockedThin $
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ifM (isJust <$> isAnnexLink (toRawFilePath file))
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( return KeyLockedThin
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, return KeyUnlockedThin
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)
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_ -> return s
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