2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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{- git-annex file content managing
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2010-10-27 20:53:54 +00:00
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-
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annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
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- Copyright 2010-2017 Joey Hess <id@joeyh.name>
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2010-10-27 20:53:54 +00:00
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-
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- Licensed under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher.
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-}
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2010-10-14 07:40:26 +00:00
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2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
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{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
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2011-10-04 04:40:47 +00:00
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module Annex.Content (
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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inAnnex,
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2015-04-09 19:34:47 +00:00
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inAnnex',
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2011-11-09 22:33:15 +00:00
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inAnnexSafe,
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2013-07-18 17:30:12 +00:00
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inAnnexCheck,
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2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
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lockContentShared,
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2015-10-09 19:48:02 +00:00
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lockContentForRemoval,
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ContentRemovalLock,
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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getViaTmp,
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2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
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getViaTmp',
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checkDiskSpaceToGet,
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2014-07-29 22:40:40 +00:00
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prepTmp,
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2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
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withTmp,
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2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
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checkDiskSpace,
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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moveAnnex,
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2015-12-22 20:22:28 +00:00
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populatePointerFile,
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2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
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linkToAnnex,
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linkFromAnnex,
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2015-12-04 18:20:32 +00:00
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LinkAnnexResult(..),
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2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
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unlinkAnnex,
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2015-12-11 19:13:36 +00:00
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checkedCopyFile,
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2016-01-07 18:51:28 +00:00
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linkOrCopy,
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linkOrCopy',
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2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
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sendAnnex,
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2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
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prepSendAnnex,
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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removeAnnex,
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moveBad,
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2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
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KeyLocation(..),
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2011-06-23 01:19:52 +00:00
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getKeysPresent,
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2012-01-02 18:20:20 +00:00
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saveState,
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downloadUrl,
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2012-01-19 21:05:39 +00:00
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preseedTmp,
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2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
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dirKeys,
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2013-11-24 01:58:39 +00:00
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withObjectLoc,
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2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
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staleKeysPrune,
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2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
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isUnmodified,
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2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
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verifyKeyContent,
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VerifyConfig(..),
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Verification(..),
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unVerified,
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2011-01-16 20:05:05 +00:00
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) where
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2010-10-14 07:40:26 +00:00
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2012-03-11 22:04:58 +00:00
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import System.IO.Unsafe (unsafeInterleaveIO)
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2017-11-14 18:00:24 +00:00
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import System.PosixCompat.Files
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2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
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import qualified Data.Set as S
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2011-11-10 01:45:03 +00:00
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2016-01-20 20:36:33 +00:00
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import Annex.Common
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2011-10-15 20:21:08 +00:00
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import Logs.Location
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2016-08-03 16:37:12 +00:00
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import Types.Transfer
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2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
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import Logs.Transfer
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2011-06-30 17:16:57 +00:00
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import qualified Git
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2010-10-14 07:40:26 +00:00
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import qualified Annex
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2011-10-04 04:40:47 +00:00
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import qualified Annex.Queue
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import qualified Annex.Branch
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2012-03-22 21:09:54 +00:00
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import Utility.DiskFree
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2011-09-23 22:13:24 +00:00
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import Utility.FileMode
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2013-09-28 18:35:21 +00:00
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import qualified Annex.Url as Url
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2011-07-06 00:36:43 +00:00
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import Utility.DataUnits
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2012-01-19 21:05:39 +00:00
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import Utility.CopyFile
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2015-11-17 01:00:54 +00:00
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import Utility.Metered
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2011-03-28 01:43:25 +00:00
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import Config
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2016-01-05 21:22:19 +00:00
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import Git.FilePath
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2012-04-21 20:59:49 +00:00
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import Annex.Perms
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2013-04-02 17:13:42 +00:00
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import Annex.Link
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2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
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import qualified Annex.Content.Direct as Direct
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2013-05-17 19:59:37 +00:00
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import Annex.ReplaceFile
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2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
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import Annex.LockPool
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2015-04-04 00:38:56 +00:00
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import Messages.Progress
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2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
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import Types.Remote (unVerified, Verification(..))
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Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
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import qualified Types.Remote
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import qualified Types.Backend
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import qualified Backend
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2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
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import qualified Database.Keys
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2015-10-08 20:55:11 +00:00
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import Types.NumCopies
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
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import Types.Key
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2015-10-08 20:55:11 +00:00
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import Annex.UUID
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2015-12-09 19:42:16 +00:00
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import Annex.InodeSentinal
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2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
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import Utility.InodeCache
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2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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2011-11-09 22:33:15 +00:00
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{- Checks if a given key's content is currently present. -}
|
2010-10-14 23:36:11 +00:00
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inAnnex :: Key -> Annex Bool
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2013-07-18 17:30:12 +00:00
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inAnnex key = inAnnexCheck key $ liftIO . doesFileExist
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{- Runs an arbitrary check on a key's content. -}
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inAnnexCheck :: Key -> (FilePath -> Annex Bool) -> Annex Bool
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inAnnexCheck key check = inAnnex' id False check key
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2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
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2015-12-10 18:51:04 +00:00
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{- inAnnex that performs an arbitrary check of the key's content.
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-
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- When the content is unlocked, it must also be unmodified, or the bad
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- value will be returned.
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
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-
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- In direct mode, at least one of the associated files must pass the
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- check. Additionally, the file must be unmodified.
|
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-}
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inAnnex' :: (a -> Bool) -> a -> (FilePath -> Annex a) -> Key -> Annex a
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inAnnex' isgood bad check key = withObjectLoc key checkindirect checkdirect
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where
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checkindirect loc = do
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2015-12-10 18:51:04 +00:00
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r <- check loc
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if isgood r
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then do
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cache <- Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
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if null cache
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then return r
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else ifM (sameInodeCache loc cache)
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( return r
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, return bad
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)
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else return bad
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
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checkdirect [] = return bad
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checkdirect (loc:locs) = do
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r <- check loc
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if isgood r
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
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then ifM (Direct.goodContent key loc)
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2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
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( return r
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, checkdirect locs
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)
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else checkdirect locs
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2011-11-09 22:33:15 +00:00
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{- A safer check; the key's content must not only be present, but
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- is not in the process of being removed. -}
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inAnnexSafe :: Key -> Annex (Maybe Bool)
|
2015-05-19 18:26:07 +00:00
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inAnnexSafe key = inAnnex' (fromMaybe True) (Just False) go key
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
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where
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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is_locked = Nothing
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is_unlocked = Just True
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is_missing = Just False
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go contentfile = maybe (checkindirect contentfile) (checkdirect contentfile)
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=<< contentLockFile key
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|
2013-08-02 16:27:32 +00:00
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
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checkindirect contentfile = checkOr is_missing contentfile
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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{- In direct mode, the content file must exist, but
|
2014-08-20 22:56:25 +00:00
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- the lock file generally won't exist unless a removal is in
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- process. -}
|
2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
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checkdirect contentfile lockfile =
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ifM (liftIO $ doesFileExist contentfile)
|
2014-08-20 22:56:25 +00:00
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( checkOr is_unlocked lockfile
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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, return is_missing
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)
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
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checkOr d lockfile = checkLocked lockfile >>= return . \case
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Nothing -> d
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Just True -> is_locked
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Just False -> is_unlocked
|
2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
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#else
|
2014-06-05 19:43:12 +00:00
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checkindirect f = liftIO $ ifM (doesFileExist f)
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
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( lockShared f >>= \case
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Nothing -> return is_locked
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Just lockhandle -> do
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dropLock lockhandle
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return is_unlocked
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2014-06-05 19:31:23 +00:00
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, return is_missing
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)
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2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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{- In Windows, see if we can take a shared lock. If so,
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- remove the lock file to clean up after ourselves. -}
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checkdirect contentfile lockfile =
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ifM (liftIO $ doesFileExist contentfile)
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2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
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( modifyContent lockfile $ liftIO $
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lockShared >>= \case
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2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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Nothing -> return is_locked
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Just lockhandle -> do
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dropLock lockhandle
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void $ tryIO $ nukeFile lockfile
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return is_unlocked
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, return is_missing
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)
|
2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
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#endif
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
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{- Direct mode and especially Windows has to use a separate lock
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- file from the content, since locking the actual content file
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- would interfere with the user's use of it. -}
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contentLockFile :: Key -> Annex (Maybe FilePath)
|
2015-05-19 18:10:13 +00:00
|
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|
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#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
|
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contentLockFile key = ifM isDirect
|
|
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( Just <$> calcRepo (gitAnnexContentLock key)
|
|
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|
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, return Nothing
|
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)
|
2015-05-19 18:10:13 +00:00
|
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|
|
#else
|
|
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contentLockFile key = Just <$> calcRepo (gitAnnexContentLock key)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-10-16 17:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
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{- Prevents the content from being removed while the action is running.
|
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- Uses a shared lock.
|
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-
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|
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- Does not actually check if the content is present. Use inAnnex for that.
|
|
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- However, since the contentLockFile is the content file in indirect mode,
|
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- if the content is not present, locking it will fail.
|
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-
|
|
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|
|
- If locking fails, throws an exception rather than running the action.
|
|
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-
|
|
|
|
|
- Note that, in direct mode, nothing prevents the user from directly
|
|
|
|
|
- editing or removing the content, even while it's locked by this.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2015-10-08 20:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
lockContentShared :: Key -> (VerifiedCopy -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
|
lockContentShared key a = lockContentUsing lock key $ do
|
|
|
|
|
u <- getUUID
|
2015-10-09 20:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
withVerifiedCopy LockedCopy u (return True) a
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
lock contentfile Nothing = tryLockShared Nothing contentfile
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
lock _ (Just lockfile) = posixLocker tryLockShared lockfile
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
lock = winLocker lockShared
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Exclusively locks content, while performing an action that
|
|
|
|
|
- might remove it.
|
2014-08-21 00:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2015-10-09 19:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
lockContentForRemoval :: Key -> (ContentRemovalLock -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
|
lockContentForRemoval key a = lockContentUsing lock key $
|
|
|
|
|
a (ContentRemovalLock key)
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
|
|
|
|
{- Since content files are stored with the write bit disabled, have
|
|
|
|
|
- to fiddle with permissions to open for an exclusive lock. -}
|
|
|
|
|
lock contentfile Nothing = bracket_
|
|
|
|
|
(thawContent contentfile)
|
|
|
|
|
(freezeContent contentfile)
|
2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
(tryLockExclusive Nothing contentfile)
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
lock _ (Just lockfile) = posixLocker tryLockExclusive lockfile
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
lock = winLocker lockExclusive
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Passed the object content file, and maybe a separate lock file to use,
|
|
|
|
|
- when the content file itself should not be locked. -}
|
|
|
|
|
type ContentLocker = FilePath -> Maybe LockFile -> Annex (Maybe LockHandle)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
|
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|
|
posixLocker :: (Maybe FileMode -> LockFile -> Annex (Maybe LockHandle)) -> LockFile -> Annex (Maybe LockHandle)
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
posixLocker takelock lockfile = do
|
|
|
|
|
mode <- annexFileMode
|
|
|
|
|
modifyContent lockfile $
|
2015-11-12 22:05:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
takelock (Just mode) lockfile
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
winLocker :: (LockFile -> IO (Maybe LockHandle)) -> ContentLocker
|
|
|
|
|
winLocker takelock _ (Just lockfile) = do
|
|
|
|
|
modifyContent lockfile $
|
|
|
|
|
void $ liftIO $ tryIO $
|
|
|
|
|
writeFile lockfile ""
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ takelock lockfile
|
|
|
|
|
-- never reached; windows always uses a separate lock file
|
|
|
|
|
winLocker _ _ Nothing = return Nothing
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lockContentUsing :: ContentLocker -> Key -> Annex a -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
|
lockContentUsing locker key a = do
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
contentfile <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key
|
|
|
|
|
lockfile <- contentLockFile key
|
2014-08-21 00:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bracket
|
|
|
|
|
(lock contentfile lockfile)
|
|
|
|
|
(unlock lockfile)
|
2015-10-08 20:55:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
(const a)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2016-11-16 01:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
alreadylocked = giveup "content is locked"
|
|
|
|
|
failedtolock e = giveup $ "failed to lock content: " ++ show e
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lock contentfile lockfile =
|
2015-05-19 18:53:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
(maybe alreadylocked return
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
=<< locker contentfile lockfile)
|
|
|
|
|
`catchIO` failedtolock
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
|
2015-05-19 18:10:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
unlock mlockfile lck = do
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
maybe noop cleanuplockfile mlockfile
|
2015-05-19 18:10:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ dropLock lck
|
2013-08-04 17:12:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2015-10-12 19:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
unlock mlockfile lck = do
|
|
|
|
|
-- Can't delete a locked file on Windows
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ dropLock lck
|
2014-01-28 20:01:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
maybe noop cleanuplockfile mlockfile
|
2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2011-11-10 01:45:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-08 18:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cleanuplockfile lockfile = modifyContent lockfile $
|
|
|
|
|
void $ liftIO $ tryIO $
|
|
|
|
|
nukeFile lockfile
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Runs an action, passing it the temp file to get,
|
|
|
|
|
- and if the action succeeds, verifies the file matches
|
|
|
|
|
- the key and moves the file into the annex as a key's content. -}
|
2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
getViaTmp :: VerifyConfig -> Key -> (FilePath -> Annex (Bool, Verification)) -> Annex Bool
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
getViaTmp v key action = checkDiskSpaceToGet key False $
|
|
|
|
|
getViaTmp' v key action
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Like getViaTmp, but does not check that there is enough disk space
|
|
|
|
|
- for the incoming key. For use when the key content is already on disk
|
|
|
|
|
- and not being copied into place. -}
|
2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
getViaTmp' :: VerifyConfig -> Key -> (FilePath -> Annex (Bool, Verification)) -> Annex Bool
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
getViaTmp' v key action = do
|
2015-10-01 18:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
tmpfile <- prepTmp key
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
(ok, verification) <- action tmpfile
|
|
|
|
|
if ok
|
|
|
|
|
then ifM (verifyKeyContent v verification key tmpfile)
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( ifM (moveAnnex key tmpfile)
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
|
|
|
|
logStatus key InfoPresent
|
|
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, do
|
|
|
|
|
warning "verification of content failed"
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile tmpfile
|
|
|
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
-- On transfer failure, the tmp file is left behind, in case
|
|
|
|
|
-- caller wants to resume its transfer
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
else return False
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Verifies that a file is the expected content of a key.
|
2015-10-02 16:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- Configuration can prevent verification, for either a
|
|
|
|
|
- particular remote or always.
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Most keys have a known size, and if so, the file size is checked.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- When the key's backend allows verifying the content (eg via checksum),
|
2015-10-02 16:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- it is checked.
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
verifyKeyContent :: VerifyConfig -> Verification -> Key -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
verifyKeyContent _ Verified _ _ = return True
|
|
|
|
|
verifyKeyContent v UnVerified k f = ifM (shouldVerify v)
|
2015-10-02 16:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( verifysize <&&> verifycontent
|
|
|
|
|
, return True
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2016-01-20 20:36:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
verifysize = case keySize k of
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> return True
|
|
|
|
|
Just size -> do
|
|
|
|
|
size' <- liftIO $ catchDefaultIO 0 $ getFileSize f
|
|
|
|
|
return (size' == size)
|
2017-02-24 19:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
verifycontent = case Types.Backend.verifyKeyContent =<< Backend.maybeLookupBackendVariety (keyVariety k) of
|
2015-10-02 16:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> return True
|
|
|
|
|
Just verifier -> verifier k f
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
data VerifyConfig = AlwaysVerify | NoVerify | RemoteVerify Remote | DefaultVerify
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
shouldVerify :: VerifyConfig -> Annex Bool
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
shouldVerify AlwaysVerify = return True
|
2015-10-02 16:36:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
shouldVerify NoVerify = return False
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
shouldVerify DefaultVerify = annexVerify <$> Annex.getGitConfig
|
2017-09-04 20:39:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
shouldVerify (RemoteVerify r) =
|
|
|
|
|
(shouldVerify DefaultVerify
|
|
|
|
|
<&&> pure (remoteAnnexVerify (Types.Remote.gitconfig r)))
|
|
|
|
|
-- Export remotes are not key/value stores, so always verify
|
|
|
|
|
-- content from them even when verification is disabled.
|
2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
<||> Types.Remote.isExportSupported r
|
Do verification of checksums of annex objects downloaded from remotes.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
2015-10-01 19:54:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Checks if there is enough free disk space to download a key
|
|
|
|
|
- to its temp file.
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- When the temp file already exists, count the space it is using as
|
|
|
|
|
- free, since the download will overwrite it or resume.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Wen there's enough free space, runs the download action.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2015-10-01 18:13:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpaceToGet :: Key -> a -> Annex a -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpaceToGet key unabletoget getkey = do
|
2014-02-26 20:52:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
tmp <- fromRepo $ gitAnnexTmpObjectLocation key
|
2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
e <- liftIO $ doesFileExist tmp
|
2015-01-20 20:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
alreadythere <- liftIO $ if e
|
|
|
|
|
then getFileSize tmp
|
2012-04-20 18:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
else return 0
|
2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ifM (checkDiskSpace Nothing key alreadythere True)
|
2012-04-20 18:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( do
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-- The tmp file may not have been left writable
|
2012-04-21 18:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
when e $ thawContent tmp
|
2014-01-04 19:08:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
getkey
|
import metadata from feeds
When annex.genmetadata is set, metadata from the feed is added to files
that are imported from it.
Reused the same feedtitle and itemtitle, feedauthor, itemauthor, etc names
that are used in --template.
Also added title and author, which are the item title/author if available,
falling back to the feed title/author. These are more likely to be common
metadata fields.
(There is a small bit of dupication here, but once git gets
around to packing the object, it will compress it away.)
The itempubdate field is not included in the metadata as a string; instead
it is used to generate year and month fields, same as is done when adding
files with annex.genmetadata set.
This commit was sponsored by Amitai Schlair, who cooincidentially
is responsible for ikiwiki generating nice feed metadata!
2014-07-03 17:46:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, return unabletoget
|
2012-04-20 18:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
)
|
2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
prepTmp :: Key -> Annex FilePath
|
|
|
|
|
prepTmp key = do
|
2014-02-26 20:52:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
tmp <- fromRepo $ gitAnnexTmpObjectLocation key
|
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
createAnnexDirectory (parentDir tmp)
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return tmp
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-29 21:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Creates a temp file for a key, runs an action on it, and cleans up
|
|
|
|
|
- the temp file. If the action throws an exception, the temp file is
|
|
|
|
|
- left behind, which allows for resuming.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
withTmp :: Key -> (FilePath -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
|
withTmp key action = do
|
2011-07-15 07:12:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
tmp <- prepTmp key
|
2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
res <- action tmp
|
2012-06-06 17:13:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile tmp
|
2011-04-28 00:06:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Checks that there is disk space available to store a given key,
|
2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- in a destination directory (or the annex) printing a warning if not.
|
2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- If the destination is on the same filesystem as the annex,
|
|
|
|
|
- checks for any other running downloads, removing the amount of data still
|
|
|
|
|
- to be downloaded from the free space. This way, we avoid overcommitting
|
|
|
|
|
- when doing concurrent downloads.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpace :: Maybe FilePath -> Key -> Integer -> Bool -> Annex Bool
|
2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpace destdir key = checkDiskSpace' (fromMaybe 1 (keySize key)) destdir key
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Allows specifying the size of the key, if it's known, which is useful
|
|
|
|
|
- as not all keys know their size. -}
|
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpace' :: Integer -> Maybe FilePath -> Key -> Integer -> Bool -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
checkDiskSpace' need destdir key alreadythere samefilesystem = ifM (Annex.getState Annex.force)
|
2015-04-18 01:29:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( return True
|
|
|
|
|
, do
|
2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-- We can't get inprogress and free at the same
|
|
|
|
|
-- time, and both can be changing, so there's a
|
|
|
|
|
-- small race here. Err on the side of caution
|
|
|
|
|
-- by getting inprogress first, so if it takes
|
|
|
|
|
-- a while, we'll see any decrease in the free
|
|
|
|
|
-- disk space.
|
|
|
|
|
inprogress <- if samefilesystem
|
|
|
|
|
then sizeOfDownloadsInProgress (/= key)
|
|
|
|
|
else pure 0
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
dir >>= liftIO . getDiskFree >>= \case
|
2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Just have -> do
|
2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
reserve <- annexDiskReserve <$> Annex.getGitConfig
|
|
|
|
|
let delta = need + reserve - have - alreadythere + inprogress
|
|
|
|
|
let ok = delta <= 0
|
2015-04-18 01:29:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
unless ok $
|
2015-05-12 19:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
needmorespace delta
|
2015-04-18 01:29:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return ok
|
|
|
|
|
_ -> return True
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2015-12-11 17:50:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
dir = maybe (fromRepo gitAnnexDir) return destdir
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
needmorespace n =
|
|
|
|
|
warning $ "not enough free space, need " ++
|
|
|
|
|
roughSize storageUnits True n ++
|
|
|
|
|
" more" ++ forcemsg
|
|
|
|
|
forcemsg = " (use --force to override this check or adjust annex.diskreserve)"
|
2011-03-22 21:27:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-07 18:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Moves a key's content into .git/annex/objects/
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
2015-12-09 19:25:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- When a key has associated pointer files, the object is hard
|
|
|
|
|
- linked (or copied) to the files, and the object file is left thawed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- In direct mode, moves the object file to the associated file, or files.
|
2011-04-29 00:41:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- What if the key there already has content? This could happen for
|
|
|
|
|
- various reasons; perhaps the same content is being annexed again.
|
|
|
|
|
- Perhaps there has been a hash collision generating the keys.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- The current strategy is to assume that in this case it's safe to delete
|
|
|
|
|
- one of the two copies of the content; and the one already in the annex
|
|
|
|
|
- is left there, assuming it's the original, canonical copy.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- I considered being more paranoid, and checking that both files had
|
|
|
|
|
- the same content. Decided against it because A) users explicitly choose
|
|
|
|
|
- a backend based on its hashing properties and so if they're dealing
|
|
|
|
|
- with colliding files it's their own fault and B) adding such a check
|
|
|
|
|
- would not catch all cases of colliding keys. For example, perhaps
|
|
|
|
|
- a remote has a key; if it's then added again with different content then
|
|
|
|
|
- the overall system now has two different peices of content for that
|
|
|
|
|
- key, and one of them will probably get deleted later. So, adding the
|
|
|
|
|
- check here would only raise expectations that git-annex cannot truely
|
|
|
|
|
- meet.
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- May return false, when a particular variety of key is not being
|
|
|
|
|
- accepted into the repository. Will display a warning message in this
|
|
|
|
|
- case. May also throw exceptions in some cases.
|
2011-04-29 00:41:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-}
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
moveAnnex :: Key -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
moveAnnex key src = ifM (checkSecureHashes key)
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
|
|
|
|
withObjectLoc key storeobject storedirect
|
|
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2012-12-07 18:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2013-02-18 06:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
storeobject dest = ifM (liftIO $ doesFileExist dest)
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( alreadyhave
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, modifyContent dest $ do
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
freezeContent src
|
2013-02-18 06:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ moveFile src dest
|
2016-01-05 21:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
g <- Annex.gitRepo
|
|
|
|
|
fs <- map (`fromTopFilePath` g)
|
|
|
|
|
<$> Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
unless (null fs) $ do
|
|
|
|
|
mapM_ (populatePointerFile key dest) fs
|
|
|
|
|
Database.Keys.storeInodeCaches key (dest:fs)
|
2013-02-18 06:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
)
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
storeindirect = storeobject =<< calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
2013-02-05 20:48:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- In direct mode, the associated file's content may be locally
|
|
|
|
|
- modified. In that case, it's preserved. However, the content
|
|
|
|
|
- we're moving into the annex may be the only extant copy, so
|
|
|
|
|
- it's important we not lose it. So, when the key's content
|
|
|
|
|
- cannot be moved to any associated file, it's stored in indirect
|
|
|
|
|
- mode.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
storedirect = storedirect' storeindirect
|
|
|
|
|
storedirect' fallback [] = fallback
|
|
|
|
|
storedirect' fallback (f:fs) = do
|
2012-12-07 18:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
thawContent src
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
v <- isAnnexLink f
|
2013-09-25 07:09:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if Just key == v
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
then do
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Direct.updateInodeCache key src
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
replaceFile f $ liftIO . moveFile src
|
2013-09-03 17:35:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
chmodContent f
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
forM_ fs $
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Direct.addContentWhenNotPresent key f
|
|
|
|
|
else ifM (Direct.goodContent key f)
|
2013-05-17 20:25:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( storedirect' alreadyhave fs
|
|
|
|
|
, storedirect' fallback fs
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alreadyhave = liftIO $ removeFile src
|
2011-07-15 07:12:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
checkSecureHashes :: Key -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
checkSecureHashes key
|
|
|
|
|
| cryptographicallySecure (keyVariety key) = return True
|
|
|
|
|
| otherwise = ifM (annexSecureHashesOnly <$> Annex.getGitConfig)
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
|
|
|
|
warning $ "annex.securehashesonly blocked adding " ++ formatKeyVariety (keyVariety key) ++ " key to annex objects"
|
|
|
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
, return True
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
populatePointerFile :: Key -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Annex ()
|
2016-01-01 17:22:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
populatePointerFile k obj f = go =<< liftIO (isPointerFile f)
|
2015-12-09 19:25:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
go (Just k') | k == k' = do
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
destmode <- liftIO $ catchMaybeIO $ fileMode <$> getFileStatus f
|
2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile f
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ifM (linkOrCopy k obj f destmode)
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( thawContent f
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, liftIO $ writePointerFile f k destmode
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
)
|
2015-12-09 19:25:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
go _ = return ()
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
data LinkAnnexResult = LinkAnnexOk | LinkAnnexFailed | LinkAnnexNoop
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Populates the annex object file by hard linking or copying a source
|
|
|
|
|
- file to it. -}
|
|
|
|
|
linkToAnnex :: Key -> FilePath -> Maybe InodeCache -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
annex.securehashesonly
Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
2017-02-27 17:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkToAnnex key src srcic = ifM (checkSecureHashes key)
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
|
|
|
|
dest <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
|
|
|
|
modifyContent dest $ linkAnnex To key src srcic dest Nothing
|
|
|
|
|
, return LinkAnnexFailed
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Makes a destination file be a link or copy from the annex object. -}
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex :: Key -> FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
|
|
|
|
linkFromAnnex key dest destmode = do
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
src <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
|
|
|
|
srcic <- withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache src)
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkAnnex From key src srcic dest destmode
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data FromTo = From | To
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Hard links or copies from or to the annex object location.
|
|
|
|
|
- Updates inode cache.
|
2015-12-04 17:39:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- Thaws the file that is not the annex object.
|
|
|
|
|
- When a hard link was made, this necessarily thaws
|
|
|
|
|
- the annex object too. So, adding an object to the annex this
|
|
|
|
|
- way can prevent losing the content if the source file
|
|
|
|
|
- is deleted, but does not guard against modifications.
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Nothing is done if the destination file already exists.
|
2015-12-04 17:39:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkAnnex :: FromTo -> Key -> FilePath -> Maybe InodeCache -> FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex LinkAnnexResult
|
|
|
|
|
linkAnnex _ _ _ Nothing _ _ = return LinkAnnexFailed
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkAnnex fromto key src (Just srcic) dest destmode =
|
|
|
|
|
withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache dest) >>= \case
|
2015-12-29 20:26:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Just destic -> do
|
|
|
|
|
cs <- Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
|
|
|
|
|
if null cs
|
|
|
|
|
then Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key [srcic, destic]
|
|
|
|
|
else Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key [srcic]
|
2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return LinkAnnexNoop
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> ifM (linkOrCopy key src dest destmode)
|
2015-12-10 20:07:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( do
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
thawContent $ case fromto of
|
|
|
|
|
From -> dest
|
|
|
|
|
To -> src
|
|
|
|
|
checksrcunchanged
|
2015-12-22 19:20:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, failed
|
2015-12-10 20:07:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
)
|
2015-12-22 19:20:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
failed = do
|
|
|
|
|
Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key [srcic]
|
|
|
|
|
return LinkAnnexFailed
|
2017-11-15 20:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
checksrcunchanged = withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache src) >>= \case
|
|
|
|
|
Just srcic' | compareStrong srcic srcic' -> do
|
|
|
|
|
destic <- withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache dest)
|
|
|
|
|
Database.Keys.addInodeCaches key $
|
|
|
|
|
catMaybes [destic, Just srcic]
|
|
|
|
|
return LinkAnnexOk
|
|
|
|
|
_ -> do
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile dest
|
|
|
|
|
failed
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Hard links or copies src to dest, which must not already exists.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Only uses a hard link when annex.thin is enabled and when src is
|
|
|
|
|
- not already hardlinked to elsewhere.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
2016-01-07 18:51:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- Checks disk reserve before copying against the size of the key,
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- and will fail if not enough space, or if the dest file already exists.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- The FileMode, if provided, influences the mode of the dest file.
|
|
|
|
|
- In particular, if it has an execute bit set, the dest file's
|
|
|
|
|
- execute bit will be set. The mode is not fully copied over because
|
|
|
|
|
- git doesn't support file modes beyond execute.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
linkOrCopy :: Key -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex Bool
|
2016-01-07 18:51:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkOrCopy = linkOrCopy' (annexThin <$> Annex.getGitConfig)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
linkOrCopy' :: Annex Bool -> Key -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
linkOrCopy' canhardlink key src dest destmode
|
|
|
|
|
| maybe False isExecutable destmode = copy =<< getstat
|
|
|
|
|
| otherwise = catchBoolIO $
|
|
|
|
|
ifM canhardlink
|
|
|
|
|
( hardlink
|
|
|
|
|
, copy =<< getstat
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
hardlink = do
|
|
|
|
|
s <- getstat
|
|
|
|
|
if linkCount s > 1
|
|
|
|
|
then copy s
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
else liftIO (createLink src dest >> preserveGitMode dest destmode >> return True)
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
`catchIO` const (copy s)
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
copy = checkedCopyFile' key src dest destmode
|
2015-12-27 19:59:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
getstat = liftIO $ getFileStatus src
|
2015-12-11 19:13:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-15 17:02:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Removes the annex object file for a key. Lowlevel. -}
|
|
|
|
|
unlinkAnnex :: Key -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
|
unlinkAnnex key = do
|
|
|
|
|
obj <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key
|
|
|
|
|
modifyContent obj $ do
|
|
|
|
|
secureErase obj
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile obj
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-11 19:13:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Checks disk space before copying. -}
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
checkedCopyFile :: Key -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
checkedCopyFile key src dest destmode = catchBoolIO $
|
|
|
|
|
checkedCopyFile' key src dest destmode
|
2015-12-11 19:13:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
=<< liftIO (getFileStatus src)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
checkedCopyFile' :: Key -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> FileStatus -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
checkedCopyFile' key src dest destmode s = catchBoolIO $
|
2015-12-11 19:13:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ifM (checkDiskSpace' (fromIntegral $ fileSize s) (Just $ takeDirectory dest) key 0 True)
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( liftIO $
|
|
|
|
|
copyFileExternal CopyAllMetaData src dest
|
|
|
|
|
<&&> preserveGitMode dest destmode
|
2015-12-11 17:56:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
preserveGitMode :: FilePath -> Maybe FileMode -> IO Bool
|
|
|
|
|
preserveGitMode f (Just mode)
|
|
|
|
|
| isExecutable mode = catchBoolIO $ do
|
|
|
|
|
modifyFileMode f $ addModes executeModes
|
|
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
| otherwise = catchBoolIO $ do
|
|
|
|
|
modifyFileMode f $ removeModes executeModes
|
|
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
|
preserveGitMode _ _ = return True
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Runs an action to transfer an object's content.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
2015-12-10 18:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- In some cases, it's possible for the file to change as it's being sent.
|
2013-01-09 22:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- If this happens, runs the rollback action and returns False. The
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- rollback action should remove the data that was transferred.
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2013-02-18 06:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
sendAnnex :: Key -> Annex () -> (FilePath -> Annex Bool) -> Annex Bool
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
sendAnnex key rollback sendobject = go =<< prepSendAnnex key
|
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
go Nothing = return False
|
|
|
|
|
go (Just (f, checksuccess)) = do
|
|
|
|
|
r <- sendobject f
|
|
|
|
|
ifM checksuccess
|
|
|
|
|
( return r
|
|
|
|
|
, do
|
|
|
|
|
rollback
|
|
|
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Returns a file that contains an object's content,
|
2014-09-05 17:44:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- and a check to run after the transfer is complete.
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
2015-12-10 18:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- When a file is unlocked (or in direct mode), it's possble for its
|
|
|
|
|
- content to change as it's being sent. The check detects this case
|
|
|
|
|
- and returns False.
|
2013-03-18 15:18:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Note that the returned check action is, in some cases, run in the
|
|
|
|
|
- Annex monad of the remote that is receiving the object, rather than
|
2013-03-18 17:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- the sender. So it cannot rely on Annex state.
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
prepSendAnnex :: Key -> Annex (Maybe (FilePath, Annex Bool))
|
|
|
|
|
prepSendAnnex key = withObjectLoc key indirect direct
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2015-12-10 18:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
indirect f = do
|
|
|
|
|
cache <- Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
|
|
|
|
|
cache' <- if null cache
|
|
|
|
|
-- Since no inode cache is in the database, this
|
|
|
|
|
-- object is not currently unlocked. But that could
|
|
|
|
|
-- change while the transfer is in progress, so
|
|
|
|
|
-- generate an inode cache for the starting
|
|
|
|
|
-- content.
|
|
|
|
|
then maybeToList <$>
|
|
|
|
|
withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache f)
|
|
|
|
|
else pure cache
|
|
|
|
|
return $ if null cache'
|
|
|
|
|
then Nothing
|
|
|
|
|
else Just (f, sameInodeCache f cache')
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
direct [] = return Nothing
|
|
|
|
|
direct (f:fs) = do
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cache <- Direct.recordedInodeCache key
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-- check that we have a good file
|
2015-12-10 18:29:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ifM (sameInodeCache f cache)
|
|
|
|
|
( return $ Just (f, sameInodeCache f cache)
|
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
, direct fs
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Performs an action, passing it the location to use for a key's content.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- In direct mode, the associated files will be passed. But, if there are
|
|
|
|
|
- no associated files for a key, the indirect mode action will be
|
|
|
|
|
- performed instead. -}
|
|
|
|
|
withObjectLoc :: Key -> (FilePath -> Annex a) -> ([FilePath] -> Annex a) -> Annex a
|
|
|
|
|
withObjectLoc key indirect direct = ifM isDirect
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
fs <- Direct.associatedFiles key
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if null fs
|
|
|
|
|
then goindirect
|
|
|
|
|
else direct fs
|
|
|
|
|
, goindirect
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
where
|
2013-04-04 19:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
goindirect = indirect =<< calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
|
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc :: Key -> Annex () -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc key cleaner = do
|
2013-04-04 19:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
file <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key
|
unify exception handling into Utility.Exception
Removed old extensible-exceptions, only needed for very old ghc.
Made webdav use Utility.Exception, to work after some changes in DAV's
exception handling.
Removed Annex.Exception. Mostly this was trivial, but note that
tryAnnex is replaced with tryNonAsync and catchAnnex replaced with
catchNonAsync. In theory that could be a behavior change, since the former
caught all exceptions, and the latter don't catch async exceptions.
However, in practice, nothing in the Annex monad uses async exceptions.
Grepping for throwTo and killThread only find stuff in the assistant,
which does not seem related.
Command.Add.undo is changed to accept a SomeException, and things
that use it for rollback now catch non-async exceptions, rather than
only IOExceptions.
2014-08-08 01:55:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
void $ tryIO $ thawContentDir file
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cleaner
|
2013-02-15 20:37:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ removeparents file (3 :: Int)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
removeparents _ 0 = noop
|
|
|
|
|
removeparents file n = do
|
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
let dir = parentDir file
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
maybe noop (const $ removeparents dir (n-1))
|
|
|
|
|
<=< catchMaybeIO $ removeDirectory dir
|
2012-02-24 20:30:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Removes a key's file from .git/annex/objects/
|
2015-12-09 19:42:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- When a key has associated pointer files, they are checked for
|
|
|
|
|
- modifications, and if unmodified, are reset.
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- In direct mode, deletes the associated files or files, and replaces
|
2014-08-21 00:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- them with symlinks.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
2015-10-09 19:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
removeAnnex :: ContentRemovalLock -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
|
removeAnnex (ContentRemovalLock key) = withObjectLoc key remove removedirect
|
2012-12-07 21:28:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
remove file = cleanObjectLoc key $ do
|
2014-01-24 16:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
secureErase file
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile file
|
2016-01-05 21:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
g <- Annex.gitRepo
|
|
|
|
|
mapM_ (\f -> void $ tryIO $ resetpointer $ fromTopFilePath f g)
|
2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
=<< Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
|
2015-12-09 21:47:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Database.Keys.removeInodeCaches key
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Direct.removeInodeCache key
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
resetpointer file = ifM (isUnmodified key file)
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mode <- liftIO $ catchMaybeIO $ fileMode <$> getFileStatus file
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
secureErase file
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ nukeFile file
|
2016-04-14 18:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ writePointerFile file key mode
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-- Can't delete the pointer file.
|
|
|
|
|
-- If it was a hard link to the annex object,
|
|
|
|
|
-- that object might have been frozen as part of the
|
|
|
|
|
-- removal process, so thaw it.
|
|
|
|
|
, void $ tryIO $ thawContent file
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2012-12-08 17:13:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
removedirect fs = do
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cache <- Direct.recordedInodeCache key
|
|
|
|
|
Direct.removeInodeCache key
|
2013-02-05 20:48:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mapM_ (resetfile cache) fs
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
resetfile cache f = whenM (Direct.sameInodeCache f cache) $ do
|
2015-01-27 21:38:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
l <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLink f key
|
2014-01-24 16:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
secureErase f
|
2014-02-06 21:35:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
replaceFile f $ makeAnnexLink l
|
2010-11-08 23:26:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Check if a file contains the unmodified content of the key.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- The expensive way to tell is to do a verification of its content.
|
2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- The cheaper way is to see if the InodeCache for the key matches the
|
2015-12-09 21:47:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- file. -}
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
isUnmodified :: Key -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
isUnmodified key f = go =<< geti
|
2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2015-12-11 14:42:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
go Nothing = return False
|
|
|
|
|
go (Just fc) = cheapcheck fc <||> expensivecheck fc
|
2015-12-09 21:47:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cheapcheck fc = anyM (compareInodeCaches fc)
|
|
|
|
|
=<< Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
|
2016-04-20 17:21:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
expensivecheck fc = ifM (verifyKeyContent AlwaysVerify UnVerified key f)
|
2015-12-09 21:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-- The file could have been modified while it was
|
|
|
|
|
-- being verified. Detect that.
|
|
|
|
|
( geti >>= maybe (return False) (compareInodeCaches fc)
|
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
geti = withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache f)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-01-24 16:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Runs the secure erase command if set, otherwise does nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
- File may or may not be deleted at the end; caller is responsible for
|
|
|
|
|
- making sure it's deleted. -}
|
|
|
|
|
secureErase :: FilePath -> Annex ()
|
|
|
|
|
secureErase file = maybe noop go =<< annexSecureEraseCommand <$> Annex.getGitConfig
|
|
|
|
|
where
|
2014-10-09 18:53:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
go basecmd = void $ liftIO $
|
2014-01-24 16:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
boolSystem "sh" [Param "-c", Param $ gencmd basecmd]
|
|
|
|
|
gencmd = massReplace [ ("%file", shellEscape file) ]
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-13 18:59:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Moves a key out of .git/annex/objects/ into .git/annex/bad, and
|
2010-11-13 19:42:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- returns the file it was moved to. -}
|
2010-11-13 18:59:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
moveBad :: Key -> Annex FilePath
|
|
|
|
|
moveBad key = do
|
2013-04-04 19:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
src <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key
|
2011-11-11 05:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
bad <- fromRepo gitAnnexBadDir
|
2011-11-08 19:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
let dest = bad </> takeFileName src
|
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
createAnnexDirectory (parentDir dest)
|
2013-11-15 18:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
cleanObjectLoc key $
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ moveFile src dest
|
2011-07-01 19:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
logStatus key InfoMissing
|
2010-11-13 18:59:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
return dest
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-15 19:56:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
data KeyLocation = InAnnex | InRepository | InAnywhere
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- List of keys whose content exists in the specified location.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-11 20:12:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- InAnnex only lists keys with content in .git/annex/objects,
|
|
|
|
|
- while InRepository, in direct mode, also finds keys with content
|
2015-12-15 19:56:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
- in the work tree. InAnywhere lists all keys that have directories
|
|
|
|
|
- in .git/annex/objects, whether or not the content is present.
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Note that InRepository has to check whether direct mode files
|
|
|
|
|
- have goodContent.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
getKeysPresent :: KeyLocation -> Annex [Key]
|
|
|
|
|
getKeysPresent keyloc = do
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
direct <- isDirect
|
|
|
|
|
dir <- fromRepo gitAnnexObjectDir
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
s <- getstate direct
|
2015-06-11 19:14:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
depth <- gitAnnexLocationDepth <$> Annex.getGitConfig
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ walk s direct depth dir
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2015-05-10 19:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
walk s direct depth dir = do
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
contents <- catchDefaultIO [] (dirContents dir)
|
2015-06-11 19:14:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
if depth < 2
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
then do
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
contents' <- filterM (present s direct) contents
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
let keys = mapMaybe (fileKey . takeFileName) contents'
|
|
|
|
|
continue keys []
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
else do
|
2015-05-10 19:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
let deeper = walk s direct (depth - 1)
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
continue [] (map deeper contents)
|
|
|
|
|
continue keys [] = return keys
|
|
|
|
|
continue keys (a:as) = do
|
|
|
|
|
{- Force lazy traversal with unsafeInterleaveIO. -}
|
|
|
|
|
morekeys <- unsafeInterleaveIO a
|
|
|
|
|
continue (morekeys++keys) as
|
2011-06-23 01:19:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-15 19:56:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
inanywhere = case keyloc of
|
|
|
|
|
InAnywhere -> True
|
|
|
|
|
_ -> False
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
present _ _ _ | inanywhere = pure True
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
present _ False d = presentInAnnex d
|
|
|
|
|
present s True d = presentDirect s d <||> presentInAnnex d
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
presentInAnnex = doesFileExist . contentfile
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
contentfile d = d </> takeFileName d
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
presentDirect s d = case keyloc of
|
|
|
|
|
InAnnex -> return False
|
|
|
|
|
InRepository -> case fileKey (takeFileName d) of
|
|
|
|
|
Nothing -> return False
|
|
|
|
|
Just k -> Annex.eval s $
|
2015-12-09 23:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
anyM (Direct.goodContent k) =<< Direct.associatedFiles k
|
2015-12-15 19:56:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
InAnywhere -> return True
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- In order to run Annex monad actions within unsafeInterleaveIO,
|
|
|
|
|
- the current state is taken and reused. No changes made to this
|
|
|
|
|
- state will be preserved.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- As an optimsation, call inodesChanged to prime the state with
|
|
|
|
|
- a cached value that will be used in the call to goodContent.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
getstate direct = do
|
|
|
|
|
when direct $
|
2015-04-11 04:10:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
void inodesChanged
|
2014-03-07 16:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Annex.getState id
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-28 19:41:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Things to do to record changes to content when shutting down.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- It's acceptable to avoid committing changes to the branch,
|
|
|
|
|
- especially if performing a short-lived action.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
saveState :: Bool -> Annex ()
|
2012-09-16 00:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
saveState nocommit = doSideAction $ do
|
2012-04-27 17:23:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Annex.Queue.flush
|
2012-09-16 00:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
unless nocommit $
|
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
whenM (annexAlwaysCommit <$> Annex.getGitConfig) $
|
2012-09-15 23:47:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Annex.Branch.commit "update"
|
2012-01-02 18:20:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Downloads content from any of a list of urls. -}
|
2015-11-17 01:00:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
downloadUrl :: Key -> MeterUpdate -> [Url.URLString] -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
|
2016-09-09 20:15:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
downloadUrl k p urls file = meteredFile file (Just p) k $
|
2015-11-17 01:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
go =<< annexWebDownloadCommand <$> Annex.getGitConfig
|
2013-04-09 03:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
2015-04-04 00:38:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
go Nothing = do
|
|
|
|
|
a <- ifM commandProgressDisabled
|
|
|
|
|
( return Url.downloadQuiet
|
|
|
|
|
, return Url.download
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
Url.withUrlOptions $ \uo ->
|
|
|
|
|
anyM (\u -> a u file uo) urls
|
|
|
|
|
go (Just basecmd) = anyM (downloadcmd basecmd) urls
|
2013-04-09 03:34:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
downloadcmd basecmd url =
|
2015-04-04 18:34:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
progressCommand "sh" [Param "-c", Param $ gencmd url basecmd]
|
2015-04-04 00:38:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
<&&> liftIO (doesFileExist file)
|
2013-04-09 03:56:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
gencmd url = massReplace
|
|
|
|
|
[ ("%file", shellEscape file)
|
|
|
|
|
, ("%url", shellEscape url)
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
2012-01-19 21:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Copies a key's content, when present, to a temp file.
|
|
|
|
|
- This is used to speed up some rsyncs. -}
|
2012-01-20 17:23:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
preseedTmp :: Key -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
|
|
|
|
|
preseedTmp key file = go =<< inAnnex key
|
2012-12-13 04:24:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
go False = return False
|
|
|
|
|
go True = do
|
|
|
|
|
ok <- copy
|
|
|
|
|
when ok $ thawContent file
|
|
|
|
|
return ok
|
|
|
|
|
copy = ifM (liftIO $ doesFileExist file)
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
( return True
|
|
|
|
|
, do
|
2013-04-04 19:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
s <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key
|
2015-07-30 17:40:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ ifM (doesFileExist s)
|
|
|
|
|
( copyFileExternal CopyTimeStamps s file
|
|
|
|
|
, return False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2013-02-15 21:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
)
|
2012-04-21 18:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
2013-10-10 21:27:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Finds files directly inside a directory like gitAnnexBadDir
|
|
|
|
|
- (not in subdirectories) and returns the corresponding keys. -}
|
|
|
|
|
dirKeys :: (Git.Repo -> FilePath) -> Annex [Key]
|
|
|
|
|
dirKeys dirspec = do
|
|
|
|
|
dir <- fromRepo dirspec
|
|
|
|
|
ifM (liftIO $ doesDirectoryExist dir)
|
|
|
|
|
( do
|
|
|
|
|
contents <- liftIO $ getDirectoryContents dir
|
|
|
|
|
files <- liftIO $ filterM doesFileExist $
|
|
|
|
|
map (dir </>) contents
|
|
|
|
|
return $ mapMaybe (fileKey . takeFileName) files
|
|
|
|
|
, return []
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-02 18:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
{- Looks in the specified directory for bad/tmp keys, and returns a list
|
|
|
|
|
- of those that might still have value, or might be stale and removable.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Also, stale keys that can be proven to have no value
|
|
|
|
|
- (ie, their content is already present) are deleted.
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
staleKeysPrune :: (Git.Repo -> FilePath) -> Bool -> Annex [Key]
|
|
|
|
|
staleKeysPrune dirspec nottransferred = do
|
|
|
|
|
contents <- dirKeys dirspec
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dups <- filterM inAnnex contents
|
|
|
|
|
let stale = contents `exclude` dups
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dir <- fromRepo dirspec
|
|
|
|
|
liftIO $ forM_ dups $ \t -> removeFile $ dir </> keyFile t
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if nottransferred
|
|
|
|
|
then do
|
|
|
|
|
inprogress <- S.fromList . map (transferKey . fst)
|
|
|
|
|
<$> getTransfers
|
|
|
|
|
return $ filter (`S.notMember` inprogress) stale
|
|
|
|
|
else return stale
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{- Finds items in the first, smaller list, that are not
|
|
|
|
|
- present in the second, larger list.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- Constructing a single set, of the list that tends to be
|
|
|
|
|
- smaller, appears more efficient in both memory and CPU
|
|
|
|
|
- than constructing and taking the S.difference of two sets. -}
|
|
|
|
|
exclude :: Ord a => [a] -> [a] -> [a]
|
|
|
|
|
exclude [] _ = [] -- optimisation
|
|
|
|
|
exclude smaller larger = S.toList $ remove larger $ S.fromList smaller
|
|
|
|
|
where
|
|
|
|
|
remove a b = foldl (flip S.delete) b a
|