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{- Standard git remotes.
-
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- Copyright 2011 - 2012 Joey Hess < id @ joeyh . name >
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-
- Licensed under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher .
- }
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{- # LANGUAGE CPP # -}
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module Remote.Git (
remote ,
configRead ,
repoAvail ,
) where
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import Common.Annex
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import Annex.Ssh
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import Types.Remote
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import Types.GitConfig
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import qualified Git
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import qualified Git.Config
import qualified Git.Construct
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import qualified Git.Command
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import qualified Git.GCrypt
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import qualified Git.Types as Git
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import qualified Annex
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import Logs.Presence
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import Annex.Transfer
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import Annex.UUID
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import qualified Annex.Content
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import qualified Annex.BranchState
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import qualified Annex.Branch
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import qualified Annex.Url as Url
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import Utility.Tmp
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import Config
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import Config.Cost
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import Annex.Init
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import Types.Key
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import Types.CleanupActions
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import qualified CmdLine.GitAnnexShell.Fields as Fields
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import Logs.Location
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import Utility.Metered
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# ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
import Utility.CopyFile
# endif
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import Utility.Env
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import Utility.Batch
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import Remote.Helper.Git
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import Remote.Helper.Messages
import qualified Remote.Helper.Ssh as Ssh
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import qualified Remote.GCrypt
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import Annex.Path
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import Creds
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import Annex.CatFile
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import Messages.Progress
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import Types.NumCopies
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import Control.Concurrent
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import Control.Concurrent.MSampleVar
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import Control.Concurrent.Async
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import qualified Data.Map as M
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import Network.URI
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remote :: RemoteType
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remote = RemoteType {
typename = " git " ,
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enumerate = list ,
generate = gen ,
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setup = gitSetup
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}
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list :: Bool -> Annex [ Git . Repo ]
list autoinit = do
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c <- fromRepo Git . config
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rs <- mapM ( tweakurl c ) =<< fromRepo Git . remotes
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mapM ( configRead autoinit ) rs
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where
annexurl n = " remote. " ++ n ++ " .annexurl "
tweakurl c r = do
let n = fromJust $ Git . remoteName r
case M . lookup ( annexurl n ) c of
Nothing -> return r
Just url -> inRepo $ \ g ->
Git . Construct . remoteNamed n $
Git . Construct . fromRemoteLocation url g
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{- Git remotes are normally set up using standard git command, not
- git - annex initremote and enableremote .
-
- For initremote , the git remote must already be set up , and have a uuid .
- Initremote simply remembers its location .
-
- enableremote simply sets up a git remote using the stored location .
- No attempt is made to make the remote be accessible via ssh key setup ,
- etc .
- }
gitSetup :: Maybe UUID -> Maybe CredPair -> RemoteConfig -> Annex ( RemoteConfig , UUID )
gitSetup Nothing _ c = do
let location = fromMaybe ( error " Specify location=url " ) $
Url . parseURIRelaxed =<< M . lookup " location " c
g <- Annex . gitRepo
u <- case filter ( \ r -> Git . location r == Git . Url location ) ( Git . remotes g ) of
[ r ] -> getRepoUUID r
[] -> error " could not find existing git remote with specified location "
_ -> error " found multiple git remotes with specified location "
return ( c , u )
gitSetup ( Just u ) _ c = do
inRepo $ Git . Command . run
[ Param " remote "
, Param " add "
, Param $ fromMaybe ( error " no name " ) ( M . lookup " name " c )
, Param $ fromMaybe ( error " no location " ) ( M . lookup " location " c )
]
return ( c , u )
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{- It's assumed to be cheap to read the config of non - URL remotes, so this is
- done each time git - annex is run in a way that uses remotes .
-
- Conversely , the config of an URL remote is only read when there is no
- cached UUID value . - }
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configRead :: Bool -> Git . Repo -> Annex Git . Repo
configRead autoinit r = do
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gc <- Annex . getRemoteGitConfig r
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u <- getRepoUUID r
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case ( repoCheap r , remoteAnnexIgnore gc , u ) of
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( _ , True , _ ) -> return r
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( True , _ , _ ) -> tryGitConfigRead autoinit r
( False , _ , NoUUID ) -> tryGitConfigRead autoinit r
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_ -> return r
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gen :: Git . Repo -> UUID -> RemoteConfig -> RemoteGitConfig -> Annex ( Maybe Remote )
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gen r u c gc
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| Git . GCrypt . isEncrypted r = Remote . GCrypt . chainGen r u c gc
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| otherwise = go <$> remoteCost gc defcst
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where
defcst = if repoCheap r then cheapRemoteCost else expensiveRemoteCost
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go cst = Just new
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where
new = Remote
{ uuid = u
, cost = cst
, name = Git . repoDescribe r
, storeKey = copyToRemote new
, retrieveKeyFile = copyFromRemote new
, retrieveKeyFileCheap = copyFromRemoteCheap new
, removeKey = dropKey new
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, lockContent = Just ( lockKey new )
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, checkPresent = inAnnex new
, checkPresentCheap = repoCheap r
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, whereisKey = Nothing
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, remoteFsck = if Git . repoIsUrl r
then Nothing
else Just $ fsckOnRemote r
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, repairRepo = if Git . repoIsUrl r
then Nothing
else Just $ repairRemote r
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, config = c
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, localpath = localpathCalc r
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, repo = r
, gitconfig = gc
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{ remoteGitConfig = Just $ extractGitConfig r }
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, readonly = Git . repoIsHttp r
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, availability = availabilityCalc r
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, remotetype = remote
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, mkUnavailable = unavailable r u c gc
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, getInfo = gitRepoInfo new
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, claimUrl = Nothing
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, checkUrl = Nothing
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}
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unavailable :: Git . Repo -> UUID -> RemoteConfig -> RemoteGitConfig -> Annex ( Maybe Remote )
unavailable r u c gc = gen r' u c gc
where
r' = case Git . location r of
Git . Local { Git . gitdir = d } ->
r { Git . location = Git . LocalUnknown d }
Git . Url url -> case uriAuthority url of
Just auth ->
let auth' = auth { uriRegName = " !dne! " }
in r { Git . location = Git . Url ( url { uriAuthority = Just auth' } ) }
Nothing -> r { Git . location = Git . Unknown }
_ -> r -- already unavailable
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{- Checks relatively inexpensively if a repository is available for use. -}
repoAvail :: Git . Repo -> Annex Bool
repoAvail r
| Git . repoIsHttp r = return True
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| Git . GCrypt . isEncrypted r = do
g <- gitRepo
liftIO $ do
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er <- Git . GCrypt . encryptedRemote g r
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if Git . repoIsLocal er || Git . repoIsLocalUnknown er
then catchBoolIO $
void ( Git . Config . read er ) >> return True
else return True
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| Git . repoIsUrl r = return True
| Git . repoIsLocalUnknown r = return False
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| otherwise = liftIO $ isJust <$> catchMaybeIO ( Git . Config . read r )
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{- Tries to read the config for a specified remote, updates state, and
- returns the updated repo . - }
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tryGitConfigRead :: Bool -> Git . Repo -> Annex Git . Repo
tryGitConfigRead autoinit r
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| haveconfig r = return r -- already read
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| Git . repoIsSsh r = store $ do
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v <- Ssh . onRemote r ( pipedconfig , return ( Left $ error " configlist failed " ) ) " configlist " [] configlistfields
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case v of
Right r'
| haveconfig r' -> return r'
| otherwise -> configlist_failed
Left _ -> configlist_failed
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| Git . repoIsHttp r = store geturlconfig
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| Git . GCrypt . isEncrypted r = handlegcrypt =<< getConfigMaybe ( remoteConfig r " uuid " )
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| Git . repoIsUrl r = return r
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| otherwise = store $ liftIO $
readlocalannexconfig ` catchNonAsync ` ( const $ return r )
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where
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haveconfig = not . M . null . Git . config
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pipedconfig cmd params = do
v <- Git . Config . fromPipe r cmd params
case v of
Right ( r' , val ) -> do
when ( getUncachedUUID r' == NoUUID && not ( null val ) ) $ do
warningIO $ " Failed to get annex.uuid configuration of repository " ++ Git . repoDescribe r
warningIO $ " Instead, got: " ++ show val
warningIO $ " This is unexpected; please check the network transport! "
return $ Right r'
Left l -> return $ Left l
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geturlconfig = do
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uo <- Url . getUrlOptions
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v <- liftIO $ withTmpFile " git-annex.tmp " $ \ tmpfile h -> do
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hClose h
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let url = Git . repoLocation r ++ " /config "
ifM ( Url . downloadQuiet url tmpfile uo )
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( pipedconfig " git " [ Param " config " , Param " --null " , Param " --list " , Param " --file " , File tmpfile ]
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, return $ Left $ error $ " unable to load config from " ++ url
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)
case v of
Left _ -> do
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set_ignore " not usable by git-annex " False
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return r
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Right r' -> do
-- Cache when http remote is not bare for
-- optimisation.
unless ( Git . Config . isBare r' ) $
setremote " annex-bare " ( Git . Config . boolConfig False )
return r'
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store = observe $ \ r' -> do
g <- gitRepo
let l = Git . remotes g
let g' = g { Git . remotes = exchange l r' }
Annex . changeState $ \ s -> s { Annex . repo = g' }
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exchange [] _ = []
exchange ( old : ls ) new
| Git . remoteName old == Git . remoteName new =
new : exchange ls new
| otherwise =
old : exchange ls new
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{- Is this remote just not available, or does
- it not have git - annex - shell ?
- Find out by trying to fetch from the remote . - }
configlist_failed = case Git . remoteName r of
Nothing -> return r
Just n -> do
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whenM ( inRepo $ Git . Command . runBool [ Param " fetch " , Param " --quiet " , Param n ] ) $ do
set_ignore " does not have git-annex installed " True
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return r
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set_ignore msg longmessage = do
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let k = " annex-ignore "
case Git . remoteName r of
Nothing -> noop
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Just n -> do
warning $ " Remote " ++ n ++ " " ++ msg ++ " ; setting " ++ k
when longmessage $
warning $ " This could be a problem with the git-annex installation on the remote. Please make sure that git-annex-shell is available in PATH when you ssh into the remote. Once you have fixed the git-annex installation, run: git config remote. " ++ n ++ " . " ++ k ++ " false "
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setremote k ( Git . Config . boolConfig True )
setremote k v = case Git . remoteName r of
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Nothing -> noop
Just n -> do
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let k' = " remote. " ++ n ++ " . " ++ k
inRepo $ Git . Command . run [ Param " config " , Param k' , Param v ]
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handlegcrypt Nothing = return r
handlegcrypt ( Just _cacheduuid ) = do
-- Generate UUID from the gcrypt-id
g <- gitRepo
case Git . GCrypt . remoteRepoId g ( Git . remoteName r ) of
Nothing -> return r
Just v -> store $ liftIO $ setUUID r $
genUUIDInNameSpace gCryptNameSpace v
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{- The local repo may not yet be initialized, so try to initialize
- it if allowed . However , if that fails , still return the read
- git config . - }
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readlocalannexconfig = do
s <- Annex . new r
Annex . eval s $ do
Annex . BranchState . disableUpdate
unify exception handling into Utility.Exception
Removed old extensible-exceptions, only needed for very old ghc.
Made webdav use Utility.Exception, to work after some changes in DAV's
exception handling.
Removed Annex.Exception. Mostly this was trivial, but note that
tryAnnex is replaced with tryNonAsync and catchAnnex replaced with
catchNonAsync. In theory that could be a behavior change, since the former
caught all exceptions, and the latter don't catch async exceptions.
However, in practice, nothing in the Annex monad uses async exceptions.
Grepping for throwTo and killThread only find stuff in the assistant,
which does not seem related.
Command.Add.undo is changed to accept a SomeException, and things
that use it for rollback now catch non-async exceptions, rather than
only IOExceptions.
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void $ tryNonAsync $ ensureInitialized
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Annex . getState Annex . repo
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configlistfields = if autoinit
then [ ( Fields . autoInit , " 1 " ) ]
else []
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{- Checks if a given remote has the content for a key in its annex. -}
inAnnex :: Remote -> Key -> Annex Bool
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inAnnex rmt key
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| Git . repoIsHttp r = checkhttp
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| Git . repoIsUrl r = checkremote
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| otherwise = checklocal
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where
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r = repo rmt
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checkhttp = do
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showChecking r
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ifM ( Url . withUrlOptions $ \ uo -> anyM ( \ u -> Url . checkBoth u ( keySize key ) uo ) ( keyUrls rmt key ) )
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( return True
, error " not found "
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)
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checkremote = Ssh . inAnnex r key
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checklocal = guardUsable r ( cantCheck r ) $
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maybe ( cantCheck r ) return
=<< onLocal rmt ( Annex . Content . inAnnexSafe key )
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keyUrls :: Remote -> Key -> [ String ]
keyUrls r key = map tourl locs'
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where
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tourl l = Git . repoLocation ( repo r ) ++ " / " ++ l
-- If the remote is known to not be bare, try the hash locations
-- used for non-bare repos first, as an optimisation.
locs
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| remoteAnnexBare remoteconfig == Just False = reverse ( annexLocations cfg key )
| otherwise = annexLocations cfg key
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# ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
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locs' = locs
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# else
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locs' = map ( replace " \ \ " " / " ) locs
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# endif
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remoteconfig = gitconfig r
cfg = fromJust $ remoteGitConfig remoteconfig
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dropKey :: Remote -> Key -> Annex Bool
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dropKey r key
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| not $ Git . repoIsUrl ( repo r ) =
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guardUsable ( repo r ) ( return False ) $
commitOnCleanup r $ onLocal r $ do
ensureInitialized
whenM ( Annex . Content . inAnnex key ) $ do
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Annex . Content . lockContentForRemoval key
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Annex . Content . removeAnnex
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logStatus key InfoMissing
Annex . Content . saveState True
return True
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| Git . repoIsHttp ( repo r ) = error " dropping from http remote not supported "
| otherwise = commitOnCleanup r $ Ssh . dropKey ( repo r ) key
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lockKey :: Remote -> Key -> ( VerifiedCopy -> Annex r ) -> Annex r
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lockKey r key callback
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| not $ Git . repoIsUrl ( repo r ) =
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guardUsable ( repo r ) failedlock $ do
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inorigrepo <- Annex . makeRunner
-- Lock content from perspective of remote,
-- and then run the callback in the original
-- annex monad, not the remote's.
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onLocal r $
Annex . Content . lockContentShared key $ \ vc ->
ifM ( Annex . Content . inAnnex key )
( liftIO $ inorigrepo $ callback vc
, failedlock
)
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| Git . repoIsSsh ( repo r ) = do
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showLocking r
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Just ( cmd , params ) <- Ssh . git_annex_shell ( repo r ) " lockcontent "
[ Param $ key2file key ] []
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( Just hin , Just hout , Nothing , p ) <- liftIO $
withFile devNull WriteMode $ \ nullh ->
createProcess $
( proc cmd ( toCommand params ) )
{ std_in = CreatePipe
, std_out = CreatePipe
, std_err = UseHandle nullh
}
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-- Wait for either the process to exit, or for it to
-- indicate the content is locked.
v <- liftIO $ race
( waitForProcess p )
( hGetLine hout )
let signaldone = void $ tryNonAsync $ liftIO $ do
hPutStrLn hout " "
hFlush hout
hClose hin
hClose hout
void $ waitForProcess p
let checkexited = not . isJust <$> getProcessExitCode p
case v of
Left _exited -> do
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showNote " lockcontent failed "
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liftIO $ do
hClose hin
hClose hout
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failedlock
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Right l
| l == Ssh . contentLockedMarker -> bracket_
noop
signaldone
( withVerifiedCopy LockedCopy r checkexited callback )
| otherwise -> do
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showNote " lockcontent failed "
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signaldone
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failedlock
| otherwise = failedlock
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where
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failedlock = error " can't lock content "
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{- Tries to copy a key's content from a remote's annex to a file. -}
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
copyFromRemote :: Remote -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> FilePath -> MeterUpdate -> Annex ( Bool , Verification )
2015-04-14 20:35:10 +00:00
copyFromRemote r key file dest p = parallelMetered ( Just p ) key file $
2015-04-10 19:15:01 +00:00
copyFromRemote' r key file dest
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
copyFromRemote' :: Remote -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> FilePath -> MeterUpdate -> Annex ( Bool , Verification )
2015-04-10 19:15:01 +00:00
copyFromRemote' r key file dest meterupdate
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
| not $ Git . repoIsUrl ( repo r ) = guardUsable ( repo r ) ( unVerified ( return False ) ) $ do
2014-04-17 18:31:42 +00:00
params <- Ssh . rsyncParams r Download
2012-07-01 20:59:54 +00:00
u <- getUUID
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
hardlink <- wantHardLink
2012-07-01 20:59:54 +00:00
-- run copy from perspective of remote
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
onLocal r $ do
2012-07-01 20:59:54 +00:00
ensureInitialized
2013-01-10 15:52:11 +00:00
v <- Annex . Content . prepSendAnnex key
case v of
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
Nothing -> return ( False , UnVerified )
2014-09-05 17:44:09 +00:00
Just ( object , checksuccess ) -> do
2015-10-02 16:36:03 +00:00
copier <- mkCopier hardlink params
2014-09-05 17:44:09 +00:00
runTransfer ( Transfer Download u key )
2015-10-02 16:36:03 +00:00
file noRetry noObserver
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
( \ p -> copier object dest p checksuccess )
| Git . repoIsSsh ( repo r ) = unVerified $ feedprogressback $ \ feeder -> do
2013-10-01 18:10:45 +00:00
direct <- isDirect
2013-09-24 17:37:41 +00:00
Ssh . rsyncHelper ( Just feeder )
2013-10-01 18:10:45 +00:00
=<< Ssh . rsyncParamsRemote direct r Download key dest file
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
| Git . repoIsHttp ( repo r ) = unVerified $ Annex . Content . downloadUrl ( keyUrls r key ) dest
2013-09-24 17:37:41 +00:00
| otherwise = error " copying from non-ssh, non-http remote not supported "
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
where
{- Feed local rsync's progress info back to the remote,
- by forking a feeder thread that runs
- git - annex - shell transferinfo at the same time
- git - annex - shell sendkey is running .
-
2013-05-14 17:51:14 +00:00
- To avoid extra password prompts , this is only done when ssh
- connection caching is supported .
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
- Note that it actually waits for rsync to indicate
- progress before starting transferinfo , in order
- to ensure ssh connection caching works and reuses
- the connection set up for the sendkey .
-
- Also note that older git - annex - shell does not support
- transferinfo , so stderr is dropped and failure ignored .
- }
2013-05-14 17:51:14 +00:00
feedprogressback a = ifM ( isJust <$> sshCacheDir )
( feedprogressback' a
2013-05-19 22:15:29 +00:00
, a $ const noop
2013-05-14 17:52:30 +00:00
)
2013-05-14 17:51:14 +00:00
feedprogressback' a = do
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
u <- getUUID
let fields = ( Fields . remoteUUID , fromUUID u )
: maybe [] ( \ f -> [ ( Fields . associatedFile , f ) ] ) file
2013-09-24 17:37:41 +00:00
Just ( cmd , params ) <- Ssh . git_annex_shell ( repo r ) " transferinfo "
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
[ Param $ key2file key ] fields
2013-09-26 03:19:01 +00:00
v <- liftIO ( newEmptySV :: IO ( MSampleVar Integer ) )
2014-08-04 00:14:20 +00:00
pidv <- liftIO $ newEmptyMVar
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
tid <- liftIO $ forkIO $ void $ tryIO $ do
bytes <- readSV v
p <- createProcess $
( proc cmd ( toCommand params ) )
{ std_in = CreatePipe
, std_err = CreatePipe
}
2014-08-04 00:14:20 +00:00
putMVar pidv ( processHandle p )
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
hClose $ stderrHandle p
let h = stdinHandle p
let send b = do
2013-09-26 03:19:01 +00:00
hPrint h b
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
hFlush h
send bytes
forever $
send =<< readSV v
2015-04-10 19:15:01 +00:00
let feeder = \ n -> do
meterupdate n
writeSV v ( fromBytesProcessed n )
2015-08-13 18:20:28 +00:00
-- It can easily take 0.3 seconds to clean up after
-- the transferinfo, and all that's involved is shutting
-- down the process and associated thread cleanly. So,
-- do it in the background.
let cleanup = forkIO $ do
2014-08-04 00:14:20 +00:00
void $ tryIO $ killThread tid
2015-08-13 18:20:28 +00:00
void $ tryNonAsync $
2014-08-04 00:14:20 +00:00
maybe noop ( void . waitForProcess )
=<< tryTakeMVar pidv
bracketIO noop ( const cleanup ) ( const $ a feeder )
2011-08-17 01:04:23 +00:00
2015-04-14 20:35:10 +00:00
copyFromRemoteCheap :: Remote -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> FilePath -> Annex Bool
2013-08-02 16:27:32 +00:00
# ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
2015-04-14 20:35:10 +00:00
copyFromRemoteCheap r key af file
2015-04-18 17:36:12 +00:00
| not $ Git . repoIsUrl ( repo r ) = guardUsable ( repo r ) ( return False ) $ liftIO $ do
loc <- gitAnnexLocation key ( repo r ) $
2013-04-04 19:46:33 +00:00
fromJust $ remoteGitConfig $ gitconfig r
2015-04-18 17:36:12 +00:00
ifM ( doesFileExist loc )
( do
absloc <- absPath loc
catchBoolIO $ do
createSymbolicLink absloc file
return True
, return False
)
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
| Git . repoIsSsh ( repo r ) =
2012-03-16 00:39:25 +00:00
ifM ( Annex . Content . preseedTmp key file )
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
( fst <$> parallelMetered Nothing key af
( copyFromRemote' r key af file )
2012-03-16 00:39:25 +00:00
, return False
)
2012-01-20 17:23:11 +00:00
| otherwise = return False
2013-08-04 17:12:18 +00:00
# else
2015-04-14 20:35:10 +00:00
copyFromRemoteCheap _ _ _ _ = return False
2013-08-04 17:12:18 +00:00
# endif
2012-01-20 17:23:11 +00:00
2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
{- Tries to copy a key's content to a remote's annex. -}
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
copyToRemote :: Remote -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> MeterUpdate -> Annex Bool
2015-04-14 20:35:10 +00:00
copyToRemote r key file p = parallelMetered ( Just p ) key file $ copyToRemote' r key file
2015-04-14 20:00:20 +00:00
copyToRemote' :: Remote -> Key -> AssociatedFile -> MeterUpdate -> Annex Bool
copyToRemote' r key file p
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
| not $ Git . repoIsUrl ( repo r ) =
2014-08-08 23:18:08 +00:00
guardUsable ( repo r ) ( return False ) $ commitOnCleanup r $
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
copylocal =<< Annex . Content . prepSendAnnex key
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
| Git . repoIsSsh ( repo r ) = commitOnCleanup r $
2013-10-01 18:10:45 +00:00
Annex . Content . sendAnnex key noop $ \ object -> do
direct <- isDirect
2013-09-24 17:37:41 +00:00
Ssh . rsyncHelper ( Just p )
2013-10-01 18:10:45 +00:00
=<< Ssh . rsyncParamsRemote direct r Upload key object file
2012-12-08 21:03:39 +00:00
| otherwise = error " copying to non-ssh repo not supported "
where
2013-01-10 15:45:44 +00:00
copylocal Nothing = return False
copylocal ( Just ( object , checksuccess ) ) = do
2013-03-12 20:41:54 +00:00
-- The checksuccess action is going to be run in
-- the remote's Annex, but it needs access to the current
-- Annex monad's state.
checksuccessio <- Annex . withCurrentState checksuccess
2014-04-17 18:31:42 +00:00
params <- Ssh . rsyncParams r Upload
2012-07-01 20:59:54 +00:00
u <- getUUID
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
hardlink <- wantHardLink
2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
-- run copy from perspective of remote
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
onLocal r $ ifM ( Annex . Content . inAnnex key )
2013-03-10 21:54:27 +00:00
( return True
2012-09-18 17:59:03 +00:00
, do
ensureInitialized
2015-10-02 16:36:03 +00:00
copier <- mkCopier hardlink params
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
let verify = Annex . Content . RemoteVerify r
2015-05-12 19:50:03 +00:00
runTransfer ( Transfer Download u key ) file noRetry noObserver $ const $
2012-09-18 17:59:03 +00:00
Annex . Content . saveState True ` after `
2015-10-02 16:36:03 +00:00
Annex . Content . getViaTmp verify key
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
( \ dest -> copier object dest p ( liftIO checksuccessio ) )
2012-09-18 17:59:03 +00:00
)
2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
2013-10-11 20:03:18 +00:00
fsckOnRemote :: Git . Repo -> [ CommandParam ] -> Annex ( IO Bool )
fsckOnRemote r params
2013-10-14 16:23:38 +00:00
| Git . repoIsUrl r = do
2013-10-11 20:03:18 +00:00
s <- Ssh . git_annex_shell r " fsck " params []
return $ case s of
Nothing -> return False
Just ( c , ps ) -> batchCommand c ps
2013-10-14 16:23:38 +00:00
| otherwise = return $ do
2015-02-28 21:23:13 +00:00
program <- programPath
2013-10-14 19:05:10 +00:00
r' <- Git . Config . read r
2014-06-10 23:20:14 +00:00
environ <- getEnvironment
let environ' = addEntries
2013-10-14 19:05:10 +00:00
[ ( " GIT_WORK_TREE " , Git . repoPath r' )
, ( " GIT_DIR " , Git . localGitDir r' )
2014-06-10 23:20:14 +00:00
] environ
2015-02-09 18:16:42 +00:00
batchCommandEnv program ( Param " fsck " : params ) ( Just environ' )
2013-10-11 20:03:18 +00:00
2013-10-27 19:38:59 +00:00
{- The passed repair action is run in the Annex monad of the remote. -}
repairRemote :: Git . Repo -> Annex Bool -> Annex ( IO Bool )
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
repairRemote r a = return $ do
2013-09-07 22:38:00 +00:00
s <- Annex . new r
Annex . eval s $ do
Annex . BranchState . disableUpdate
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
ensureInitialized
2013-09-07 22:38:00 +00:00
a
2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
{- Runs an action from the perspective of a local remote.
-
- The AnnexState is cached for speed and to avoid resource leaks .
2014-08-20 16:01:45 +00:00
- However , catFileStop is called to avoid git - cat - file processes hanging
- around on removable media .
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
-
- The repository's git - annex branch is not updated , as an optimisation .
- No caller of onLocal can query data from the branch and be ensured
- it gets a current value . Caller of onLocal can make changes to
- the branch , however .
- }
onLocal :: Remote -> Annex a -> Annex a
onLocal r a = do
m <- Annex . getState Annex . remoteannexstate
case M . lookup ( uuid r ) m of
Nothing -> do
st <- liftIO $ Annex . new ( repo r )
go st $ do
Annex . BranchState . disableUpdate
a
Just st -> go st a
where
cache st = Annex . changeState $ \ s -> s
{ Annex . remoteannexstate = M . insert ( uuid r ) st ( Annex . remoteannexstate s ) }
go st a' = do
2015-04-04 00:08:38 +00:00
curro <- Annex . getState Annex . output
( ret , st' ) <- liftIO $ Annex . run ( st { Annex . output = curro } ) $
2014-08-20 16:01:45 +00:00
catFileStop ` after ` a'
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
cache st'
return ret
2011-06-14 00:23:47 +00:00
{- Copys a file with rsync unless both locations are on the same
- filesystem . Then cp could be faster . - }
2012-09-21 18:50:14 +00:00
rsyncOrCopyFile :: [ CommandParam ] -> FilePath -> FilePath -> MeterUpdate -> Annex Bool
2012-09-19 20:08:37 +00:00
rsyncOrCopyFile rsyncparams src dest p =
2013-08-02 16:27:32 +00:00
# ifdef mingw32_HOST_OS
2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
dorsync
where
# else
2012-09-22 00:24:08 +00:00
ifM ( sameDeviceIds src dest ) ( docopy , dorsync )
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
where
2013-09-26 03:19:01 +00:00
sameDeviceIds a b = ( == ) <$> getDeviceId a <*> getDeviceId b
2015-01-09 17:11:56 +00:00
getDeviceId f = deviceID <$> liftIO ( getFileStatus $ parentDir f )
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
docopy = liftIO $ bracket
2013-03-28 21:03:04 +00:00
( forkIO $ watchfilesize zeroBytesProcessed )
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
( void . tryIO . killThread )
2014-08-27 00:06:43 +00:00
( const $ copyFileExternal CopyTimeStamps src dest )
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
watchfilesize oldsz = do
threadDelay 500000 -- 0.5 seconds
2015-01-20 20:58:48 +00:00
v <- catchMaybeIO $ toBytesProcessed <$> getFileSize dest
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
case v of
Just sz
| sz /= oldsz -> do
p sz
watchfilesize sz
_ -> watchfilesize oldsz
2013-05-11 20:03:00 +00:00
# endif
2013-09-24 17:37:41 +00:00
dorsync = Ssh . rsyncHelper ( Just p ) $
2013-05-14 17:24:15 +00:00
rsyncparams ++ [ File src , File dest ]
2011-06-14 00:23:47 +00:00
2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
commitOnCleanup :: Remote -> Annex a -> Annex a
2012-02-25 22:02:49 +00:00
commitOnCleanup r a = go ` after ` a
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
where
2014-03-13 23:06:26 +00:00
go = Annex . addCleanup ( RemoteCleanup $ uuid r ) cleanup
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
cleanup
2014-03-06 21:12:50 +00:00
| not $ Git . repoIsUrl ( repo r ) = onLocal r $
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
doQuietSideAction $
Annex . Branch . commit " update "
| otherwise = void $ do
Just ( shellcmd , shellparams ) <-
2013-09-24 17:37:41 +00:00
Ssh . git_annex_shell ( repo r ) " commit " [] []
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
-- Throw away stderr, since the remote may not
-- have a new enough git-annex shell to
-- support committing.
2013-09-26 03:19:01 +00:00
liftIO $ catchMaybeIO $
2012-10-29 01:27:15 +00:00
withQuietOutput createProcessSuccess $
proc shellcmd $
toCommand shellparams
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
wantHardLink :: Annex Bool
wantHardLink = ( annexHardLink <$> Annex . getGitConfig ) <&&> ( not <$> isDirect )
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
-- Copies from src to dest, updating a meter. If the copy finishes
-- successfully, calls a final check action, which must also success, or
-- returns false.
--
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
-- If either the remote or local repository wants to use hard links,
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
-- the copier will do so (falling back to copying if a hard link cannot be
-- made).
--
-- When a hard link is created, returns Verified; the repo being linked
-- from is implicitly trusted, so no expensive verification needs to be
-- done.
type Copier = FilePath -> FilePath -> MeterUpdate -> Annex Bool -> Annex ( Bool , Verification )
2015-10-02 16:36:03 +00:00
mkCopier :: Bool -> [ CommandParam ] -> Annex Copier
mkCopier remotewanthardlink rsyncparams = do
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
let copier = \ src dest p check -> unVerified $
rsyncOrCopyFile rsyncparams src dest p <&&> check
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
# ifndef mingw32_HOST_OS
localwanthardlink <- wantHardLink
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
let linker = \ src dest -> createLink src dest >> return True
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
ifM ( pure ( remotewanthardlink || localwanthardlink ) <&&> not <$> isDirect )
other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
( return $ \ src dest p check ->
ifM ( liftIO ( catchBoolIO ( linker src dest ) ) )
( return ( True , Verified )
, copier src dest p check
)
, return copier
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
)
# else
2015-10-13 17:24:44 +00:00
return $ if remotewanthardlink then copier else copier
2015-09-14 16:13:38 +00:00
# endif