Finally builds (oh the agoncy of making it build), but still very
unmergable, only Command.Find is included and lots of stuff is badly
hacked to make it compile.
Benchmarking vs master, this git-annex find is significantly faster!
Specifically:
num files old new speedup
48500 4.77 3.73 28%
12500 1.36 1.02 66%
20 0.075 0.074 0% (so startup time is unchanged)
That's without really finishing the optimization. Things still to do:
* Eliminate all the fromRawFilePath, toRawFilePath, encodeBS,
decodeBS conversions.
* Use versions of IO actions like getFileStatus that take a RawFilePath.
* Eliminate some Data.ByteString.Lazy.toStrict, which is a slow copy.
* Use ByteString for parsing git config to speed up startup.
It's likely several of those will speed up git-annex find further.
And other commands will certianly benefit even more.
This does not change the overall license of the git-annex program, which
was already AGPL due to a number of sources files being AGPL already.
Legally speaking, I'm adding a new license under which these files are
now available; I already released their current contents under the GPL
license. Now they're dual licensed GPL and AGPL. However, I intend
for all my future changes to these files to only be released under the
AGPL license, and I won't be tracking the dual licensing status, so I'm
simply changing the license statement to say it's AGPL.
(In some cases, others wrote parts of the code of a file and released it
under the GPL; but in all cases I have contributed a significant portion
of the code in each file and it's that code that is getting the AGPL
license; the GPL license of other contributors allows combining with
AGPL code.)
p2p and multicast creds are not cached the same way that s3 and webdav
creds are. The difference is that p2p and multicast obtain the creds
themselves, as part of a process like pairing. So they're storing the
only extant copy of the creds. In s3 and webdav etc the creds are
provided by the cloud storage provider.
This is a fine difference, but I do think it's a reasonable difference.
If the user wants to prevent s3 and webdav etc creds from being stored
unencrypted on disk, they won't feel the same about p2p auth tokens
used for tor, or a multicast encryption key, or for that matter their
local ssh private key.
This commit was sponsored by Fernando Jimenez on Patreon.
Finishes the start made in 983c9d5a53, by
handling the case where `transfer` fails for some other reason, and so the
ReadContent callback does not get run. I don't know of a case where
`transfer` does fail other than the locking dealt with in that commit, but
it's good to have a guarantee.
StoreContent and StoreContentTo had a similar problem.
Things like `getViaTmp` may decide not to run the transfer action.
And `transfer` could certianly fail, if another transfer of the same
object was in progress. (Or a different object when annex.pidlock is set.)
If the transfer action was not run, the content of the object would
not all get consumed, and so would get interpreted as protocol commands,
which would not go well.
My approach to fixing all of these things is to set a TVar only
once all the data in the transfer is known to have been read/written.
This way the internals of `transfer`, `getViaTmp` etc don't matter.
So in ReadContent, it checks if the transfer completed.
If not, as long as it didn't throw an exception, send empty and Invalid
data to the callback. On an exception the state of the protocol is unknown
so it has to raise ProtoFailureException and close the connection,
same as before.
In StoreContent, if the transfer did not complete
some portion of the DATA has been read, so the protocol is in an unknown
state and it has to close the conection as well.
(The ProtoFailureMessage used here matches the one in Annex.Transfer, which
is the most likely reason. Not ideal to duplicate it..)
StoreContent did not ever close the protocol connection before. So this is
a protocol change, but only in an exceptional circumstance, and it's not
going to break anything, because clients already need to deal with the
connection breaking at any point.
The way this new behavior looks (here origin has annex.pidlock = true so will
only accept one upload to it at a time):
git annex copy --to origin -J2
copy x (to origin...) ok
copy y (to origin...)
Lost connection (fd:25: hGetChar: end of file)
This work is supported by the NIH-funded NICEMAN (ReproNim TR&D3) project.
Fix hang when transferring the same objects to two different clients at the
same time. (Or when annex.pidlock is used, two different objects to the
same or different clients.)
Could also potentially occur if a client was downloading an object and
somehow lost connection but that git-annex-shell was still running and
holding the transfer lock.
This does not guarantee that, if `transfer` fails for some other reason,
a DATA response will be made.
This work is supported by the NIH-funded NICEMAN (ReproNim TR&D3) project.
When readContent got Nothing from prepSendAnnex, it did not run its
callback, and the callback is what sends the DATA reply.
sendContent checks with contentSize that the object file is present, but
that doesn't really guarantee that prepSendAnnex won't return Nothing.
So, it was possible for a P2P protocol GET to not receive a response,
and appear to hang. When what it's really doing is waiting for the next
protocol command.
This seems most likely to happen when the annex is in direct mode, and the
file being requested has been modified. It could also happen in an indirect
mode repository if genInodeCache somehow failed. Perhaps due to a race
with a drop of the content file.
Fixed by making readContent behave the way its spec said it should,
and run the callback with L.empty in this case.
Note that, it's finee for readContent to send any amount of data
to the callback, including L.empty. sendBytes deals with that
by making sure it sends exactly the specified number of bytes,
aborting the protocol if it's too short. So, when L.empty is sent,
the protocol will end up aborting.
This work is supported by the NIH-funded NICEMAN (ReproNim TR&D3) project.
Same goal as b18fb1e343 but without
breaking backwards compatability. Just return IO exceptions when running
the P2P protocol, so that git-annex-shell can detect eof and avoid the
ugly message.
This commit was sponsored by Ethan Aubin.
This reverts commit b18fb1e343.
That broke support for old git-annex-shell before p2pstdio was added.
The immediate problem is that postAuth had a fallthrough case
that sent an error back to the peer, but sending an error back when the
connection is closed is surely not going to work.
But thinking about it some more, making every function that uses receiveMessage
need to handle ProtocolEOF adds a lot of complication, so I don't want
to do that.
The commit only cleaned up the test suite output a tiny bit, so I'm just
gonna revert it for now.
Avoids "git-annex-shell: <stdin>: hGetChar: end of file"
being displayed by the test suite, due to the way it
runs git-annex-shell without using ssh.
git-annex-shell over ssh was not affected because git-annex hangs up the
ssh connection and so never sees the error message that git-annnex-shell
probably did emit.
This commit was sponsored by Ryan Newton on Patreon.
Leveraged the existing verification code by making it also check the
retrievalSecurityPolicy.
Also, prevented getViaTmp from running the download action at all when the
retrievalSecurityPolicy is going to prevent verifying and so storing it.
Added annex.security.allow-unverified-downloads. A per-remote version
would be nice to have too, but would need more plumbing, so KISS.
(Bill the Cat reference not too over the top I hope. The point is to
make this something the user reads the documentation for before using.)
A few calls to verifyKeyContent and getViaTmp, that don't
involve downloads from remotes, have RetrievalAllKeysSecure hard-coded.
It was also hard-coded for P2P.Annex and Command.RecvKey,
to match the values of the corresponding remotes.
A few things use retrieveKeyFile/retrieveKeyFileCheap without going
through getViaTmp.
* Command.Fsck when downloading content from a remote to verify it.
That content does not get into the annex, so this is ok.
* Command.AddUrl when using a remote to download an url; this is new
content being added, so this is ok.
This commit was sponsored by Fernando Jimenez on Patreon.
Makes it allow writes, but not deletion of annexed content. Note that
securing pushes to the git repository is left up to the user.
This commit was sponsored by Jack Hill on Patreon.
Added annex.retry, annex.retry-delay, and per-remote versions to configure
transfer retries.
This commit was supported by the NSF-funded DataLad project.
P2P protocol version 1 adds VALID|INVALID after DATA; INVALID means the
file was detected to change content while it was being sent and so we
may not have received the valid content of the file.
Added new MustVerify constructor for Verification, which forces
verification even when annex.verify=false etc. This is used when INVALID
and in protocol version 0.
As well as changing git-annex-shell p2psdio, this makes git-annex tor
remotes always force verification, since they don't yet use protocol
version 1. Previously, annex.verify=false could skip verification when
using tor remotes, and let bad data into the repository.
This commit was sponsored by Jack Hill on Patreon.
Noticed that getting a key whose size is not known resulted in a
progress display that didn't include the percent complete.
Fixed for P2P by making the size sent with DATA be used to update the
meter's total size.
In order for rateLimitMeterUpdate to also learn the total size,
had to make it be passed the Meter, and some other reorg in
Utility.Metered was also done so that --json-progress can construct a
Meter to pass to rateLimitMeterUpdate.
When the fallback rsync is done, the progress display still doesn't
include the percent complete. Only way to fix that seems to be to let rsync
display its output again, but that would conflict with git-annex's
own progress meter, which is also being displayed.
This commit was sponsored by Henrik Riomar on Patreon.
Unfortunately ReceiveMessage didn't handle unknown messages the way it
was documented to; client sending VERSION would cause the server to
return an ERROR and hang up. Fixed that, but old releases of git-annex
use the P2P protocol for tor and will still have that behavior.
So, version is not negotiated for Remote.P2P connections, only for
Remote.Git connections, which will support VERSION from their first
release. There will need to be a later flag day to change Remote.P2P;
left a commented out line that is the only thing that will need to be
changed then.
Version 1 of the P2P protocol is not implemented yet, but updated
the docs for the DATA change that will be allowed by that version.
This commit was sponsored by Jeff Goeke-Smith on Patreon.
Much like Remote.P2P, there's a pool of connections to a peer, in order
to support concurrent operations.
Deals with old git-annex-ssh on the remote that does not support p2pstdio,
by only trying once to use it, and remembering if it's not supported.
Made p2pstdio send an AUTH_SUCCESS with its uuid, which serves the dual
purposes of something to detect to see that the connection is working,
and a way to verify that it's connected to the right uuid.
(There's a redundant uuid check since the uuid field is sent
by git_annex_shell, but I anticipate that being removed later when
the legacy git-annex-shell stuff gets removed.)
Not entirely happy with Remote.Git.runSsh's behavior
when the proto action fails. Running the fallback will work ok, but what
will we do when the fallbacks later get removed? It might be better to
try to reconnect, in case the connection got closed.
This commit was sponsored by Boyd Stephen Smith Jr. on Patreon.
Not yet used by git-annex, but this will allow faster transfers etc than
using individual ssh connections and rsync.
Not called git-annex-shell p2p, because git-annex p2p does something
else and I don't want two subcommands with the same name between the two
for sanity reasons.
This commit was sponsored by Øyvind Andersen Holm.
lockContentShared had a screwy caveat that it didn't verify that the content
was present when locking it, but in the most common case, eg indirect mode,
it failed to lock when the content is not present.
That led to a few callers forgetting to check inAnnex when using it,
but the potential data loss was unlikely to be noticed because it only
affected direct mode I think.
Fix data loss bug when the local repository uses direct mode, and a
locally modified file is dropped from a remote repsitory. The bug
caused the modified file to be counted as a copy of the original file.
(This is not a severe bug because in such a situation, dropping
from the remote and then modifying the file is allowed and has the same
end result.)
And, in content locking over tor, when the remote repository is
in direct mode, it neglected to check that the content was actually
present when locking it. This could cause git annex drop to remove
the only copy of a file when it thought the tor remote had a copy.
So, make lockContentShared do its own inAnnex check. This could perhaps
be optimised for direct mode, to avoid the check then, since locking
the content necessarily verifies it exists there, but I have not bothered
with that.
This commit was sponsored by Jeff Goeke-Smith on Patreon.
This way we know that after enable-tor, the tor hidden service is fully
published and working, and so there should be no problems with it at
pairing time.
It has to start up its own temporary listener on the hidden service. It
would be nice to have it start the remotedaemon running, so that extra
step is not needed afterwards. But, there may already be a remotedaemon
running, in communication with the assistant and we don't want to start
another one. I thought about trying to HUP any running remotedaemon, but
Windows does not make it easy to do that. In any case, having the user
start the remotedaemon themselves lets them know it needs to be running
to serve the hidden service.
This commit was sponsored by Boyd Stephen Smith Jr. on Patreon.
This reverts commit 3037feb1bf.
On second thought, this was an overcomplication of what should be the
lowest-level primitive. Let's build bi-directional links at the pairing
level with eg magic wormhole.
Both the local and remote git repositories get remotes added
pointing at one-another.
Makes pairing twice as easy!
Security: The new LINK command in the protocol can be sent repeatedly,
but only by a peer who has authenticated with us. So, it's entirely safe to
add a link back to that peer, or to some other peer it knows about.
Anything we receive over such a link, the peer could send us over the
current connection.
There is some risk of being flooded with LINKs, and adding too many
remotes. To guard against that, there's a hard cap on the number of remotes
that can be set up this way. This will only be a problem if setting up
large p2p networks that have exceptional interconnectedness.
A new, dedicated authtoken is created when sending LINK.
This also allows, in theory, using a p2p network like tor, to learn about
links on other networks, like telehash.
This commit was sponsored by Bruno BEAUFILS on Patreon.
Seems that git upload-pack outputs a "ONCDN " that is not read by the
remote git receive-pack. This fixes:
[2016-12-09 17:08:32.77159731] P2P > ERROR protocol parse error: "ONCDN "
This is more efficient. Note that the peer will get CHANGED messages for
all refs changed since the connection opened, even if those changes
happened before it sent NOTIFYCHANGE.
Added to change notification to P2P protocol.
Switched to a TBChan so that a single long-running thread can be
started, and serve perhaps intermittent requests for change
notifications, without buffering all changes in memory.
The P2P runner currently starts up a new thread each times it waits
for a change, but that should allow later reusing a thread. Although
each connection from a peer will still need a new watcher thread to run.
The dependency on stm-chans is more or less free; some stuff in yesod
uses it, so it was already indirectly pulled in when building with the
webapp.
This commit was sponsored by Francois Marier on Patreon.
The attacker could just send a very lot of data, with no \n and it would
all be buffered in memory until the kernel killed git-annex or perhaps OOM
killed some other more valuable process.
This is a low impact security hole, only affecting communication between
local git-annex and git-annex-shell on the remote system. (With either
able to be the attacker). Only those with the right ssh key can do it. And,
there are probably lots of ways to construct git repositories that make git
use a lot of memory in various ways, which would have similar impact as
this attack.
The fix in P2P/IO.hs would have been higher impact, if it had made it to a
released version, since it would have allowed DOSing the tor hidden
service without needing to authenticate.
(The LockContent and NotifyChanges instances may not be really
exploitable; since the line is read and ignored, it probably gets read
lazily and does not end up staying buffered in memory.)