15be5c04a6
The attacker could just send a very lot of data, with no \n and it would all be buffered in memory until the kernel killed git-annex or perhaps OOM killed some other more valuable process. This is a low impact security hole, only affecting communication between local git-annex and git-annex-shell on the remote system. (With either able to be the attacker). Only those with the right ssh key can do it. And, there are probably lots of ways to construct git repositories that make git use a lot of memory in various ways, which would have similar impact as this attack. The fix in P2P/IO.hs would have been higher impact, if it had made it to a released version, since it would have allowed DOSing the tor hidden service without needing to authenticate. (The LockContent and NotifyChanges instances may not be really exploitable; since the line is read and ignored, it probably gets read lazily and does not end up staying buffered in memory.) |
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| .. | ||
| Address.hs | ||
| Annex.hs | ||
| Auth.hs | ||
| IO.hs | ||
| Protocol.hs | ||