git-annex/Annex/Ingest.hs

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{- git-annex content ingestion
-
- Copyright 2010-2017 Joey Hess <id@joeyh.name>
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-
- Licensed under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher.
-}
module Annex.Ingest (
LockedDown(..),
LockDownConfig(..),
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lockDown,
ingestAdd,
ingestAdd',
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ingest,
ingest',
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finishIngestDirect,
finishIngestUnlocked,
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cleanOldKeys,
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addLink,
makeLink,
addUnlocked,
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restoreFile,
forceParams,
addAnnexedFile,
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) where
import Annex.Common
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import Types.KeySource
import Backend
import Annex.Content
import Annex.Content.Direct
import Annex.Perms
import Annex.Tmp
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import Annex.Link
import Annex.MetaData
import Annex.CurrentBranch
import Annex.Version
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import Logs.Location
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import qualified Annex
import qualified Annex.Queue
import qualified Database.Keys
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import Config
import Utility.InodeCache
import Annex.ReplaceFile
import Utility.Tmp
import Utility.CopyFile
import Utility.Touch
import Git.FilePath
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import Annex.InodeSentinal
import Annex.AdjustedBranch
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import Control.Exception (IOException)
data LockedDown = LockedDown
{ lockDownConfig :: LockDownConfig
, keySource :: KeySource
}
deriving (Show)
data LockDownConfig = LockDownConfig
{ lockingFile :: Bool -- ^ write bit removed during lock down
, hardlinkFileTmp :: Bool -- ^ hard link to temp directory
}
deriving (Show)
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{- The file that's being ingested is locked down before a key is generated,
- to prevent it from being modified in between. This lock down is not
- perfect at best (and pretty weak at worst). For example, it does not
- guard against files that are already opened for write by another process.
- So, the InodeCache can be used to detect any changes that might be made
- to the file after it was locked down.
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-
- When possible, the file is hard linked to a temp directory. This guards
- against some changes, like deletion or overwrite of the file, and
- allows lsof checks to be done more efficiently when adding a lot of files.
-
- Lockdown can fail if a file gets deleted, and Nothing will be returned.
-}
lockDown :: LockDownConfig -> FilePath -> Annex (Maybe LockedDown)
lockDown cfg file = either
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(\e -> warning (show e) >> return Nothing)
(return . Just)
=<< lockDown' cfg file
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lockDown' :: LockDownConfig -> FilePath -> Annex (Either IOException LockedDown)
lockDown' cfg file = ifM (pure (not (hardlinkFileTmp cfg)) <||> crippledFileSystem)
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( withTSDelta $ liftIO . tryIO . nohardlink
, tryIO $ withOtherTmp $ \tmp -> do
when (lockingFile cfg) $
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freezeContent file
withTSDelta $ \delta -> liftIO $ do
(tmpfile, h) <- openTempFile tmp $
relatedTemplate $ "ingest-" ++ takeFileName file
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hClose h
nukeFile tmpfile
withhardlink delta tmpfile `catchIO` const (nohardlink delta)
)
where
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nohardlink delta = do
cache <- genInodeCache file delta
return $ LockedDown cfg $ KeySource
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{ keyFilename = file
, contentLocation = file
, inodeCache = cache
}
withhardlink delta tmpfile = do
createLink file tmpfile
cache <- genInodeCache tmpfile delta
return $ LockedDown cfg $ KeySource
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{ keyFilename = file
, contentLocation = tmpfile
, inodeCache = cache
}
{- Ingests a locked down file into the annex. Updates the work tree and
- index. -}
ingestAdd :: Maybe LockedDown -> Annex (Maybe Key)
ingestAdd ld = ingestAdd' ld Nothing
ingestAdd' :: Maybe LockedDown -> Maybe Key -> Annex (Maybe Key)
ingestAdd' Nothing _ = return Nothing
ingestAdd' ld@(Just (LockedDown cfg source)) mk = do
(mk', mic) <- ingest ld mk
case mk' of
Nothing -> return Nothing
Just k -> do
let f = keyFilename source
if lockingFile cfg
then addLink f k mic
else ifM isDirect
( do
l <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLink f k
stageSymlink f =<< hashSymlink l
, do
mode <- liftIO $ catchMaybeIO $ fileMode <$> getFileStatus (contentLocation source)
stagePointerFile f mode =<< hashPointerFile k
)
return (Just k)
{- Ingests a locked down file into the annex. Does not update the working
- tree or the index. -}
ingest :: Maybe LockedDown -> Maybe Key -> Annex (Maybe Key, Maybe InodeCache)
ingest ld mk = ingest' Nothing ld mk (Restage True)
ingest' :: Maybe Backend -> Maybe LockedDown -> Maybe Key -> Restage -> Annex (Maybe Key, Maybe InodeCache)
ingest' _ Nothing _ _ = return (Nothing, Nothing)
ingest' preferredbackend (Just (LockedDown cfg source)) mk restage = withTSDelta $ \delta -> do
k <- case mk of
Nothing -> do
backend <- maybe (chooseBackend $ keyFilename source) (return . Just) preferredbackend
fmap fst <$> genKey source backend
Just k -> return (Just k)
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let src = contentLocation source
ms <- liftIO $ catchMaybeIO $ getFileStatus src
mcache <- maybe (pure Nothing) (liftIO . toInodeCache delta src) ms
case (mcache, inodeCache source) of
(_, Nothing) -> go k mcache ms
(Just newc, Just c) | compareStrong c newc -> go k mcache ms
_ -> failure "changed while it was being added"
where
go (Just key) mcache (Just s)
| lockingFile cfg = golocked key mcache s
| otherwise = ifM isDirect
( godirect key mcache s
, gounlocked key mcache s
)
go _ _ _ = failure "failed to generate a key"
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golocked key mcache s =
tryNonAsync (moveAnnex key $ contentLocation source) >>= \case
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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Right True -> do
populateAssociatedFiles key source restage
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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success key mcache s
Right False -> giveup "failed to add content to annex"
Left e -> restoreFile (keyFilename source) key e
gounlocked key (Just cache) s = do
-- Remove temp directory hard link first because
-- linkToAnnex falls back to copying if a file
-- already has a hard link.
cleanCruft source
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cleanOldKeys (keyFilename source) key
linkToAnnex key (keyFilename source) (Just cache) >>= \case
LinkAnnexFailed -> failure "failed to link to annex"
_ -> do
finishIngestUnlocked' key source restage
success key (Just cache) s
gounlocked _ _ _ = failure "failed statting file"
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godirect key (Just cache) s = do
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addInodeCache key cache
finishIngestDirect key source
success key (Just cache) s
godirect _ _ _ = failure "failed statting file"
success k mcache s = do
genMetaData k (keyFilename source) s
return (Just k, mcache)
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failure msg = do
warning $ keyFilename source ++ " " ++ msg
cleanCruft source
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return (Nothing, Nothing)
finishIngestDirect :: Key -> KeySource -> Annex ()
finishIngestDirect key source = do
void $ addAssociatedFile key $ keyFilename source
cleanCruft source
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{- Copy to any other locations using the same key. -}
otherfs <- filter (/= keyFilename source) <$> associatedFiles key
forM_ otherfs $
addContentWhenNotPresent key (keyFilename source)
finishIngestUnlocked :: Key -> KeySource -> Annex ()
finishIngestUnlocked key source = do
cleanCruft source
finishIngestUnlocked' key source (Restage True)
finishIngestUnlocked' :: Key -> KeySource -> Restage -> Annex ()
finishIngestUnlocked' key source restage = do
Database.Keys.addAssociatedFile key =<< inRepo (toTopFilePath (keyFilename source))
populateAssociatedFiles key source restage
{- Copy to any other locations using the same key. -}
populateAssociatedFiles :: Key -> KeySource -> Restage -> Annex ()
populateAssociatedFiles key source restage = do
obj <- calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)
g <- Annex.gitRepo
ingestedf <- flip fromTopFilePath g
<$> inRepo (toTopFilePath (keyFilename source))
afs <- map (`fromTopFilePath` g) <$> Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
forM_ (filter (/= ingestedf) afs) $
populatePointerFile restage key obj
cleanCruft :: KeySource -> Annex ()
cleanCruft source = when (contentLocation source /= keyFilename source) $
liftIO $ nukeFile $ contentLocation source
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-- If a worktree file was was hard linked to an annex object before,
-- modifying the file would have caused the object to have the wrong
-- content. Clean up from that.
cleanOldKeys :: FilePath -> Key -> Annex ()
cleanOldKeys file newkey = do
g <- Annex.gitRepo
ingestedf <- flip fromTopFilePath g <$> inRepo (toTopFilePath file)
topf <- inRepo (toTopFilePath file)
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oldkeys <- filter (/= newkey)
<$> Database.Keys.getAssociatedKey topf
lock: Fix edge cases where data loss could occur in v6 mode. In the case where the pointer file is in place, and not the content of the object, lock's performNew was called with filemodified=True, which caused it to try to repopulate the object from an unmodified associated file, of which there were none. So, the content of the object got thrown away incorrectly. This was the cause (although not the root cause) of data loss in https://github.com/datalad/datalad/issues/1020 The same problem could also occur when the work tree file is modified, but the object is not, and lock is called with --force. Added a test case for this, since it's excercising the same code path and is easier to set up than the problem above. Note that this only occurred when the keys database did not have an inode cache recorded for the annex object. Normally, the annex object would be in there, but there are of course circumstances where the inode cache is out of sync with reality, since it's only a cache. Fixed by checking if the object is unmodified; if so we don't need to try to repopulate it. This does add an additional checksum to the unlock path, but it's already checksumming the worktree file in another case, so it doesn't slow it down overall. Further investigation found a similar problem occurred when smudge --clean is called on a file and the inode cache is not populated. cleanOldKeys deleted the unmodified old object file in this case. This was also fixed by checking if the object is unmodified. In general, use of getInodeCaches and sameInodeCache is potentially dangerous if the inode cache has not gotten populated for some reason. Better to use isUnmodified. I breifly auited other places that check the inode cache, and did not see any immediate problems, but it would be easy to miss this kind of problem.
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forM_ oldkeys $ \key ->
unlessM (isUnmodified key =<< calcRepo (gitAnnexLocation key)) $ do
caches <- Database.Keys.getInodeCaches key
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unlinkAnnex key
fs <- filter (/= ingestedf)
. map (`fromTopFilePath` g)
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<$> Database.Keys.getAssociatedFiles key
filterM (`sameInodeCache` caches) fs >>= \case
-- If linkToAnnex fails, the associated
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-- file with the content is still present,
-- so no need for any recovery.
(f:_) -> do
ic <- withTSDelta (liftIO . genInodeCache f)
void $ linkToAnnex key f ic
_ -> logStatus key InfoMissing
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{- On error, put the file back so it doesn't seem to have vanished.
- This can be called before or after the symlink is in place. -}
restoreFile :: FilePath -> Key -> SomeException -> Annex a
restoreFile file key e = do
whenM (inAnnex key) $ do
liftIO $ nukeFile file
-- The key could be used by other files too, so leave the
-- content in the annex, and make a copy back to the file.
obj <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLocation key
unlessM (liftIO $ copyFileExternal CopyTimeStamps obj file) $
warning $ "Unable to restore content of " ++ file ++ "; it should be located in " ++ obj
thawContent file
throwM e
{- Creates the symlink to the annexed content, returns the link target. -}
makeLink :: FilePath -> Key -> Maybe InodeCache -> Annex String
makeLink file key mcache = flip catchNonAsync (restoreFile file key) $ do
l <- calcRepo $ gitAnnexLink file key
replaceFile file $ makeAnnexLink l
-- touch symlink to have same time as the original file,
-- as provided in the InodeCache
case mcache of
Just c -> liftIO $ touch file (inodeCacheToMtime c) False
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Nothing -> noop
return l
{- Creates the symlink to the annexed content, and stages it in git.
-
- As long as the filesystem supports symlinks, we use
- git add, rather than directly staging the symlink to git.
- Using git add is best because it allows the queuing to work
- and is faster (staging the symlink runs hash-object commands each time).
- Also, using git add allows it to skip gitignored files, unless forced
- to include them.
-}
addLink :: FilePath -> Key -> Maybe InodeCache -> Annex ()
addLink file key mcache = ifM (coreSymlinks <$> Annex.getGitConfig)
( do
_ <- makeLink file key mcache
ps <- forceParams
Annex.Queue.addCommand "add" (ps++[Param "--"]) [file]
, do
l <- makeLink file key mcache
addAnnexLink l file
)
{- Parameters to pass to git add, forcing addition of ignored files. -}
forceParams :: Annex [CommandParam]
forceParams = ifM (Annex.getState Annex.force)
( return [Param "-f"]
, return []
)
{- Whether a file should be added unlocked or not. Default is to not,
- unless symlinks are not supported. annex.addunlocked can override that.
- Also, when in an adjusted unlocked branch, always add files unlocked.
-}
addUnlocked :: Annex Bool
addUnlocked = isDirect <||>
(versionSupportsUnlockedPointers <&&>
((not . coreSymlinks <$> Annex.getGitConfig) <||>
(annexAddUnlocked <$> Annex.getGitConfig) <||>
(maybe False isadjustedunlocked . snd <$> getCurrentBranch)
)
)
where
isadjustedunlocked (LinkAdjustment UnlockAdjustment) = True
isadjustedunlocked (PresenceAdjustment _ (Just UnlockAdjustment)) = True
isadjustedunlocked _ = False
{- Adds a file to the work tree for the key, and stages it in the index.
- The content of the key may be provided in a temp file, which will be
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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- moved into place.
-
- When the content of the key is not accepted into the annex, returns False.
-}
addAnnexedFile :: FilePath -> Key -> Maybe FilePath -> Annex Bool
addAnnexedFile file key mtmp = ifM (addUnlocked <&&> not <$> isDirect)
( do
mode <- maybe
(pure Nothing)
(\tmp -> liftIO $ catchMaybeIO $ fileMode <$> getFileStatus tmp)
mtmp
stagePointerFile file mode =<< hashPointerFile key
Database.Keys.addAssociatedFile key =<< inRepo (toTopFilePath file)
case mtmp of
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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Just tmp -> ifM (moveAnnex key tmp)
( linkunlocked mode >> return True
, writepointer mode >> return False
)
Nothing -> ifM (inAnnex key)
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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( linkunlocked mode >> return True
, writepointer mode >> return True
)
, do
addLink file key Nothing
whenM isDirect $ do
void $ addAssociatedFile key file
case mtmp of
Just tmp -> do
{- For moveAnnex to work in direct mode, the
- symlink must already exist, so flush the queue. -}
whenM isDirect $
Annex.Queue.flush
moveAnnex key tmp
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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Nothing -> return True
)
where
linkunlocked mode = linkFromAnnex key file mode >>= \case
LinkAnnexFailed -> liftIO $
writePointerFile file key mode
_ -> return ()
annex.securehashesonly Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository, by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another repository. We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into .git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it was done: * .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be written to it normally * So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent. We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases. * The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary for annex.securehashesonly. * Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content are: - Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant. - fix and lock, which don't add new content - Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a copy. * All other calls to thawContent appear safe. Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them deal with a failure in appropriate ways. linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal with it failing in appropriate ways. This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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writepointer mode = liftIO $ writePointerFile file key mode