2011-06-02 01:56:04 +00:00
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{- git-annex remotes types
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2011-03-27 21:12:32 +00:00
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-
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2011-12-31 08:14:33 +00:00
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- Most things should not need this, using Types instead
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-
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2018-06-21 15:35:27 +00:00
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- Copyright 2011-2018 Joey Hess <id@joeyh.name>
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-
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- Licensed under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher.
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-}
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2015-10-08 19:01:38 +00:00
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{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
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2014-01-13 18:41:10 +00:00
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module Types.Remote
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( RemoteConfigKey
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, RemoteConfig
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, RemoteTypeA(..)
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, RemoteA(..)
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2017-02-07 18:35:58 +00:00
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, SetupStage(..)
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2014-01-13 18:41:10 +00:00
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, Availability(..)
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other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
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, Verification(..)
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, unVerified
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2018-06-21 15:35:27 +00:00
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, RetrievalSecurityPolicy(..)
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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, isExportSupported
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, ExportActions(..)
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2014-01-13 18:41:10 +00:00
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)
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where
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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2017-09-15 19:04:29 +00:00
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import qualified Data.Map as M
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2017-09-15 20:30:49 +00:00
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import Data.Ord
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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2011-06-30 17:16:57 +00:00
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import qualified Git
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2011-06-02 01:56:04 +00:00
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import Types.Key
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2011-11-07 18:46:01 +00:00
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import Types.UUID
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2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
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import Types.GitConfig
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2014-01-13 18:41:10 +00:00
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import Types.Availability
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2014-02-11 18:06:50 +00:00
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import Types.Creds
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2014-12-11 19:32:42 +00:00
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import Types.UrlContents
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2015-10-09 16:36:04 +00:00
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import Types.NumCopies
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2017-09-15 20:34:45 +00:00
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import Types.Export
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2013-03-13 20:16:01 +00:00
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import Config.Cost
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2013-03-28 21:03:04 +00:00
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import Utility.Metered
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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import Git.Types (RemoteName)
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2013-10-11 20:03:18 +00:00
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import Utility.SafeCommand
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2014-12-08 17:40:15 +00:00
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import Utility.Url
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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2012-11-14 23:32:27 +00:00
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type RemoteConfigKey = String
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2017-02-07 18:35:58 +00:00
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2012-11-14 23:32:27 +00:00
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type RemoteConfig = M.Map RemoteConfigKey String
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2011-04-15 19:09:36 +00:00
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2017-09-04 16:40:33 +00:00
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data SetupStage = Init | Enable RemoteConfig
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2017-02-07 18:35:58 +00:00
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2011-03-29 03:51:07 +00:00
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{- There are different types of remotes. -}
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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data RemoteTypeA a = RemoteType
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2011-03-29 03:51:07 +00:00
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-- human visible type name
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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{ typename :: String
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2011-03-29 21:57:20 +00:00
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-- enumerates remotes of this type
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2015-08-05 17:49:54 +00:00
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-- The Bool is True if automatic initialization of remotes is desired
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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, enumerate :: Bool -> a [Git.Repo]
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2018-08-29 14:55:52 +00:00
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-- generates a remote of this type
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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, generate :: Git.Repo -> UUID -> RemoteConfig -> RemoteGitConfig -> a (Maybe (RemoteA a))
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2017-02-07 18:35:58 +00:00
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-- initializes or enables a remote
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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, setup :: SetupStage -> Maybe UUID -> Maybe CredPair -> RemoteConfig -> RemoteGitConfig -> a (RemoteConfig, UUID)
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-- check if a remote of this type is able to support export
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, exportSupported :: RemoteConfig -> RemoteGitConfig -> a Bool
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}
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2011-03-29 03:51:07 +00:00
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2011-12-31 08:11:39 +00:00
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instance Eq (RemoteTypeA a) where
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2011-12-31 07:27:37 +00:00
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x == y = typename x == typename y
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2011-03-29 03:51:07 +00:00
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{- An individual remote. -}
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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data RemoteA a = Remote
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-- each Remote has a unique uuid
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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{ uuid :: UUID
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-- each Remote has a human visible name
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, name :: RemoteName
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-- Remotes have a use cost; higher is more expensive
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, cost :: Cost
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add API for exporting
Implemented so far for the directory special remote.
Several remotes don't make sense to export to. Regular Git remotes,
obviously, do not. Bup remotes almost certianly do not, since bup would
need to be used to extract the export; same store for Ddar. Web and
Bittorrent are download-only. GCrypt is always encrypted so exporting to
it would be pointless. There's probably no point complicating the Hook
remotes with exporting at this point. External, S3, Glacier, WebDAV,
Rsync, and possibly Tahoe should be modified to support export.
Thought about trying to reuse the storeKey/retrieveKeyFile/removeKey
interface, rather than adding a new interface. But, it seemed better to
keep it separate, to avoid a complicated interface that sometimes
encrypts/chunks key/value storage and sometimes users non-key/value
storage. Any common parts can be factored out.
Note that storeExport is not atomic.
doc/design/exporting_trees_to_special_remotes.mdwn has some things in
the "resuming exports" section that bear on this decision. Basically,
I don't think, at this time, that an atomic storeExport would help with
resuming, because exports are not key/value storage, and we can't be
sure that a partially uploaded file is the same content we're currently
trying to export.
Also, note that ExportLocation will always use unix path separators.
This is important, because users may export from a mix of windows and
unix, and it avoids complicating the API with path conversions,
and ensures that in such a mix, they always use the same locations for
exports.
This commit was sponsored by Bruno BEAUFILS on Patreon.
2017-08-29 17:00:41 +00:00
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2014-07-26 17:25:06 +00:00
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-- Transfers a key's contents from disk to the remote.
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resume interrupted chunked uploads
Leverage the new chunked remotes to automatically resume uploads.
Sort of like rsync, although of course not as efficient since this
needs to start at a chunk boundry.
But, unlike rsync, this method will work for S3, WebDAV, external
special remotes, etc, etc. Only directory special remotes so far,
but many more soon!
This implementation will also allow starting an upload from one repository,
interrupting it, and then resuming the upload to the same remote from
an entirely different repository.
Note that I added a comment that storeKey should atomically move the content
into place once it's all received. This was already an undocumented
requirement -- it's necessary for hasKey to work reliably. This resume code
just uses hasKey to find the first chunk that's missing.
Note that if there are two uploads of the same key to the same chunked remote,
one might resume at the point the other had gotten to, but both will then
redundantly upload. As before.
In the non-resume case, this adds one hasKey call per storeKey, and only
if the remote is configured to use chunks. Future work: Try to eliminate that
hasKey. Notice that eg, `git annex copy --to` checks if the key is present
before sending it, so is already running hasKey.. which could perhaps
be cached and reused.
However, this additional overhead is not very large compared with
transferring an entire large file, and the ability to resume
is certianly worth it. There is an optimisation in place for small files,
that avoids trying to resume if the whole file fits within one chunk.
This commit was sponsored by Georg Bauer.
2014-07-28 18:18:08 +00:00
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-- The key should not appear to be present on the remote until
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-- all of its contents have been transferred.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, storeKey :: Key -> AssociatedFile -> MeterUpdate -> a Bool
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2013-04-11 21:15:45 +00:00
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-- Retrieves a key's contents to a file.
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other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
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-- (The MeterUpdate does not need to be used if it writes
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-- sequentially to the file.)
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, retrieveKeyFile :: Key -> AssociatedFile -> FilePath -> MeterUpdate -> a (Bool, Verification)
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2015-04-18 17:07:57 +00:00
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-- Retrieves a key's contents to a tmp file, if it can be done cheaply.
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-- It's ok to create a symlink or hardlink.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, retrieveKeyFileCheap :: Key -> AssociatedFile -> FilePath -> a Bool
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2018-06-21 15:35:27 +00:00
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-- Security policy for reteiving keys from this remote.
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, retrievalSecurityPolicy :: RetrievalSecurityPolicy
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2015-10-08 19:01:38 +00:00
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-- Removes a key's contents (succeeds if the contents are not present)
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, removeKey :: Key -> a Bool
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2015-10-08 19:01:38 +00:00
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-- Uses locking to prevent removal of a key's contents,
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2015-10-09 17:07:03 +00:00
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-- thus producing a VerifiedCopy, which is passed to the callback.
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-- If unable to lock, does not run the callback, and throws an
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-- error.
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2015-10-08 19:01:38 +00:00
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-- This is optional; remotes do not have to support locking.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, lockContent :: forall r. Maybe (Key -> (VerifiedCopy -> a r) -> a r)
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2014-08-06 17:45:19 +00:00
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-- Checks if a key is present in the remote.
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-- Throws an exception if the remote cannot be accessed.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, checkPresent :: Key -> a Bool
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2014-08-06 17:45:19 +00:00
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-- Some remotes can checkPresent without an expensive network
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-- operation.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, checkPresentCheap :: Bool
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-- Some remotes support exports of trees.
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2019-01-30 18:55:28 +00:00
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, exportActions :: ExportActions a
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2012-02-14 07:49:48 +00:00
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-- Some remotes can provide additional details for whereis.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, whereisKey :: Maybe (Key -> a [String])
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2013-10-11 20:03:18 +00:00
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-- Some remotes can run a fsck operation on the remote,
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-- without transferring all the data to the local repo
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-- The parameters are passed to the fsck command on the remote.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, remoteFsck :: Maybe ([CommandParam] -> a (IO Bool))
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2013-10-27 19:38:59 +00:00
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-- Runs an action to repair the remote's git repository.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, repairRepo :: Maybe (a Bool -> a (IO Bool))
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2012-11-30 04:55:59 +00:00
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-- a Remote has a persistent configuration store
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, config :: RemoteConfig
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2018-06-04 18:31:55 +00:00
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-- Get the git repo for the Remote.
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, getRepo :: a Git.Repo
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2013-01-01 17:52:47 +00:00
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-- a Remote's configuration from git
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, gitconfig :: RemoteGitConfig
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2012-08-26 18:26:43 +00:00
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-- a Remote can be assocated with a specific local filesystem path
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, localpath :: Maybe FilePath
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2012-08-26 19:39:02 +00:00
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-- a Remote can be known to be readonly
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, readonly :: Bool
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2018-08-30 15:12:18 +00:00
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-- a Remote can allow writes but not have a way to delete content
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2018-08-30 15:18:20 +00:00
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-- from it. Note that an export remote that supports removeExport
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-- to remove a file from the exported tree, but still retains the
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-- content in accessible form should set this to True.
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2018-08-30 15:12:18 +00:00
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, appendonly :: Bool
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2013-03-15 23:16:13 +00:00
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-- a Remote can be globally available. (Ie, "in the cloud".)
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, availability :: Availability
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2011-12-31 07:27:37 +00:00
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-- the type of the remote
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, remotetype :: RemoteTypeA a
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2014-08-10 18:52:58 +00:00
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-- For testing, makes a version of this remote that is not
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-- available for use. All its actions should fail.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, mkUnavailable :: a (Maybe (RemoteA a))
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2014-10-21 18:36:09 +00:00
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-- Information about the remote, for git annex info to display.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, getInfo :: a [(String, String)]
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2014-12-08 17:40:15 +00:00
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-- Some remotes can download from an url (or uri).
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, claimUrl :: Maybe (URLString -> a Bool)
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2014-12-11 19:32:42 +00:00
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-- Checks that the url is accessible, and gets information about
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-- its contents, without downloading the full content.
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2014-12-08 23:14:24 +00:00
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-- Throws an exception if the url is inaccessible.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, checkUrl :: Maybe (URLString -> a UrlContents)
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}
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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2011-12-31 08:11:39 +00:00
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instance Show (RemoteA a) where
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2011-03-30 19:15:46 +00:00
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show remote = "Remote { name =\"" ++ name remote ++ "\" }"
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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-- two remotes are the same if they have the same uuid
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2011-12-31 08:11:39 +00:00
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instance Eq (RemoteA a) where
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2011-03-27 20:17:56 +00:00
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x == y = uuid x == uuid y
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2011-03-27 19:56:43 +00:00
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2018-08-03 17:06:06 +00:00
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-- Order by cost since that is the important order of remotes
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-- when deciding which to use. But since remotes often have the same cost
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-- and Ord must be total, do a secondary ordering by uuid.
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2011-12-31 08:11:39 +00:00
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instance Ord (RemoteA a) where
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2018-08-03 17:06:06 +00:00
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compare a b
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| cost a == cost b = comparing uuid a b
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| otherwise = comparing cost a b
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other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
|
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2015-10-08 21:58:32 +00:00
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instance ToUUID (RemoteA a) where
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toUUID = uuid
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2018-03-13 18:18:30 +00:00
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data Verification
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= UnVerified
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2018-03-13 18:50:49 +00:00
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-- ^ Content was not verified during transfer, but is probably
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2018-03-13 18:18:30 +00:00
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-- ok, so if verification is disabled, don't verify it
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| Verified
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2018-03-13 18:50:49 +00:00
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-- ^ Content was verified during transfer, so don't verify it
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-- again.
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2018-03-13 18:18:30 +00:00
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| MustVerify
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2018-03-13 18:50:49 +00:00
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-- ^ Content likely to have been altered during transfer,
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2018-03-13 18:18:30 +00:00
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-- verify even if verification is normally disabled
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other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo
In c6632ee5c8e66c26ef18317f56ae02bae1e7e280, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
2015-10-02 17:56:42 +00:00
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unVerified :: Monad m => m Bool -> m (Bool, Verification)
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unVerified a = do
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ok <- a
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return (ok, UnVerified)
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add API for exporting
Implemented so far for the directory special remote.
Several remotes don't make sense to export to. Regular Git remotes,
obviously, do not. Bup remotes almost certianly do not, since bup would
need to be used to extract the export; same store for Ddar. Web and
Bittorrent are download-only. GCrypt is always encrypted so exporting to
it would be pointless. There's probably no point complicating the Hook
remotes with exporting at this point. External, S3, Glacier, WebDAV,
Rsync, and possibly Tahoe should be modified to support export.
Thought about trying to reuse the storeKey/retrieveKeyFile/removeKey
interface, rather than adding a new interface. But, it seemed better to
keep it separate, to avoid a complicated interface that sometimes
encrypts/chunks key/value storage and sometimes users non-key/value
storage. Any common parts can be factored out.
Note that storeExport is not atomic.
doc/design/exporting_trees_to_special_remotes.mdwn has some things in
the "resuming exports" section that bear on this decision. Basically,
I don't think, at this time, that an atomic storeExport would help with
resuming, because exports are not key/value storage, and we can't be
sure that a partially uploaded file is the same content we're currently
trying to export.
Also, note that ExportLocation will always use unix path separators.
This is important, because users may export from a mix of windows and
unix, and it avoids complicating the API with path conversions,
and ensures that in such a mix, they always use the same locations for
exports.
This commit was sponsored by Bruno BEAUFILS on Patreon.
2017-08-29 17:00:41 +00:00
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2018-06-21 15:35:27 +00:00
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-- Security policy indicating what keys can be safely retrieved from a
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-- remote.
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data RetrievalSecurityPolicy
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= RetrievalVerifiableKeysSecure
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-- ^ Transfer of keys whose content can be verified
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-- with a hash check is secure; transfer of unverifiable keys is
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-- not secure and should not be allowed.
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--
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-- This is used eg, when HTTP to a remote could be redirected to a
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-- local private web server or even a file:// url, causing private
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-- data from it that is not the intended content of a key to make
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-- its way into the git-annex repository.
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--
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-- It's also used when content is stored encrypted on a remote,
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-- which could replace it with a different encrypted file, and
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-- trick git-annex into decrypting it and leaking the decryption
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-- into the git-annex repository.
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--
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-- It's not (currently) used when the remote could alter the
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-- content stored on it, because git-annex does not provide
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-- strong guarantees about the content of keys that cannot be
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-- verified with a hash check.
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-- (But annex.securehashesonly does provide such guarantees.)
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| RetrievalAllKeysSecure
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-- ^ Any key can be securely retrieved.
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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isExportSupported :: RemoteA a -> a Bool
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isExportSupported r = exportSupported (remotetype r) (config r) (gitconfig r)
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data ExportActions a = ExportActions
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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-- Exports content to an ExportLocation.
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-- The exported file should not appear to be present on the remote
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-- until all of its contents have been transferred.
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2017-09-07 17:45:31 +00:00
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{ storeExport :: FilePath -> Key -> ExportLocation -> MeterUpdate -> a Bool
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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-- Retrieves exported content to a file.
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-- (The MeterUpdate does not need to be used if it writes
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-- sequentially to the file.)
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2017-09-08 18:24:05 +00:00
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, retrieveExport :: Key -> ExportLocation -> FilePath -> MeterUpdate -> a Bool
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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-- Removes an exported file (succeeds if the contents are not present)
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, removeExport :: Key -> ExportLocation -> a Bool
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2017-09-15 17:15:47 +00:00
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-- Removes an exported directory. Typically the directory will be
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-- empty, but it could possbly contain files or other directories,
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-- and it's ok to delete those. If the remote does not use
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-- directories, or automatically cleans up empty directories,
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-- this can be Nothing. Should not fail if the directory was
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-- already removed.
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, removeExportDirectory :: Maybe (ExportDirectory -> a Bool)
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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-- Checks if anything is exported to the remote at the specified
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-- ExportLocation.
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-- Throws an exception if the remote cannot be accessed.
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, checkPresentExport :: Key -> ExportLocation -> a Bool
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-- Renames an already exported file.
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2017-09-06 19:33:40 +00:00
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-- This may fail, if the file doesn't exist, or the remote does not
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-- support renames.
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2017-09-01 17:02:07 +00:00
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, renameExport :: Key -> ExportLocation -> ExportLocation -> a Bool
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}
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