Note that get --from foo --failed will get things that a previous get --from bar
tried and failed to get, etc. I considered making --failed only retry
transfers from the same remote, but it was easier, and seems more useful,
to not have the same remote requirement.
Noisy due to some refactoring into Types/
Show branch:file that is being operated on.
I had to make ActionItem a type and not a type class because
withKeyOptions' passed two different types of values when using the type
class, and I could not get the type checker to accept that.
Made all Annex.Perms file mode changing functions ignore errors when
core.sharedRepository is set, because the file might be owned by someone
else. I don't fancy getting bug reports about crashes due to set modes in
this configuration, which is a very foot-shooty configuration in the first
place.
The fsck warning is necessary because old repos kept files mode 444, which
doesn't allow locking them, and so if the mode remains 444 due to the file
being owned by someone else, the user should be told about it.
When annex.thin is set, adding an object will add the execute bits to the
work tree file, and this does mean that the annex object file ends up
executable.
This doesn't add any complexity that wasn't already present, because git
annex add of an executable file has always ingested it so that the annex
object ends up executable.
But, since an annex object file can be executable or not, when populating
an unlocked file from one, the executable bit is always added or removed
to match the mode of the pointer file.
This only adds 1 stat to each file fscked for locked files, so
added overhead is minimal.
For unlocked files it has to access the database to see if a file
is modified.
In c6632ee5c8, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
Ben Boeckel had a patch, but..
Actually, that was not the only place that used ScheduleIncremental when
built w/o database. Since the data type doesn't need database stuff,
I've instead fixed this build problem by exposing the
ScheduleIncremental constructor to database-less builds.
* Perform a clean shutdown when --time-limit is reached.
This includes running queued git commands, and cleanup actions normally
run when a command is finished.
* fsck: Commit incremental fsck database when --time-limit is reached.
Previously, some of the last files fscked did not make it into the
database when using --time-limit.
Note that this changes Annex.addCleanup hooks, to run after --time-limit
expires. Fsck was using such a hook to clean up after a
--incremental-schedule, and that shouldn't run when --time-limit exipires
it. So, instead, moved that cleanup code to be run by cleanupIncremental.
Resulted in some data type juggling.
This is a work in progress. It compiles and is able to do basic command
dispatch, including git autocorrection, while using optparse-applicative
for the core commandline parsing.
* Many commands are temporarily disabled before conversion.
* Options are not wired in yet.
* cmdnorepo actions don't work yet.
Also, removed the [Command] list, which was only used in one place.
