Don't need to be sanitized and displaying them messes up actually
exiting with the right exit code! And broke the test suite.
Sponsored-by: Brett Eisenberg on Patreon
These are quite low-level, but still there is no point in displaying
escape sequences that have been embedded in a key to the terminal.
I think these are the only remaining commands that didn't use safe
output, except for cases where git-annex is speaking a protocol to
itself.
Sponsored-by: Kevin Mueller on Patreon
When displaying a ByteString like "💕", safeOutput operates on
individual bytes like "\240\159\146\149" and isControl '\146' = True,
so it got truncated to just "\240".
So, only treat the low control characters, and DEL, as control
characters.
Also split Utility.Terminal out of Utility.SafeOutput. The latter needs
win32, but Utility.SafeOutput is used by Control.Exception, which is
used by Setup.
Sponsored-by: Nicholas Golder-Manning on Patreon
I'm on the fence about this. Notice that pulling from a git remote can
pull branches that have escape sequences in their names. Git will
display those as-is. Arguably git should try harder to avoid that.
But, names of remotes are usually up to the local user, and autoenable
changes that, and so it makes sense that git chooses to display control
characters in names of remotes, and so autoenable needs to guard against
it.
Sponsored-by: Graham Spencer on Patreon
Seems unlikely to have a tab in a path, but it's not a control character
that needs to be prevented either.
Left \n \r \v and \a as other non-threatening control characters
that are still obnoxious to have in a filepath because of how it causes
issues with display and/or with shell scripting.
This causes an encodeBS thunk, and the first evaluation of the string
forces it. From then on, further uses operate on a ByteString. This
avoids converting repeatedly.
Searched for uses of putStr and hPutStr and changed appropriate ones to filter
out control characters and quote filenames.
This notably does not make find and findkeys quote filenames in their default
output. Because they should only do that when stdout is non a pipe.
A few commands like calckey and lookupkey seem too low-level to make sense to filter
output, so skipped those.
Also when relaying output from other commands that is not progress output,
have git-annex filter out control characters.
Sponsored-by: k0ld on Patreon
This does, as a side effect, make long notes in json output not
be indented. The indentation is only needed to offset them
underneath the display of the file they apply to, so that's ok.
Sponsored-by: Brock Spratlen on Patreon
Converted warning and similar to use StringContainingQuotedPath. Most
warnings are static strings, some do refer to filepaths that need to be
quoted, and others don't need quoting.
Note that, since quote filters out control characters of even
UnquotedString, this makes all warnings safe, even when an attacker
sneaks in a control character in some other way.
When json is being output, no quoting is done, since json gets its own
quoting.
This does, as a side effect, make warning messages in json output not
be indented. The indentation is only needed to offset warning messages
underneath the display of the file they apply to, so that's ok.
Sponsored-by: Brett Eisenberg on Patreon
UnquotedString does not need to be quoted, but still it's possible
it contains something attacker-controlled, which could have an
escape sequence or control character in it. This is a convenient
place to filter out such things, since quoting alrready handles
those in filenames.
Sponsored-by: Luke Shumaker on Patreon
giveup changed to filter out control characters. (It is too low level to
make it use StringContainingQuotedPath.)
error still does not, but it should only be used for internal errors,
where the message is not attacker-controlled.
Changed a lot of existing error to giveup when it is not strictly an
internal error.
Of course, other exceptions can still be thrown, either by code in
git-annex, or a library, that include some attacker-controlled value.
This does not guard against those.
Sponsored-by: Noam Kremen on Patreon
When the filenames are part of the git repository or other files that
might have attacker-controlled names, quote them in error messages.
This is fairly complete, although I didn't do the one in
Utility.DirWatcher.INotify.hs because that doesn't have access to
Git.Filename or Annex.
But it's also quite possible I missed some. And also while scanning for
these, I found giveup used with other things that could be attacker
controlled to contain control characters (eg Keys). So, I'm thinking
it would also be good for giveup to just filter out control characters.
This commit is then not the only line of defence, but just good
formatting when git-annex displays a filename in an error message.
Sponsored-by: Kevin Mueller on Patreon
As well as escape sequences, control characters seem unlikely to be desired when
doing addurl, and likely to trip someone up. So disallow them as well.
I did consider going the other way and allowing filenames with control characters
and escape sequences, since git-annex is in the process of escaping display
of all filenames. Might still be a better idea?
Also display the illegal filename git quoted when it rejects it.
Sponsored-by: Nicholas Golder-Manning on Patreon
Added StringContainingQuotedPath, which is used for ActionItemOther.
In the process, checked every ActionItemOther for those containing
filenames, and made them use quoting.
Sponsored-by: Graham Spencer on Patreon
This is by no means complete, but escaping filenames in actionItemDesc does
cover most commands.
Note that for ActionItemBranchFilePath, the value is branch:file, and I
choose to only quote the file part (if necessary). I considered quoting the
whole thing. But, branch names cannot contain control characters, and while
they can contain unicode, git coes not quote unicode when displaying branch
names. So, it would be surprising for git-annex to quote unicode in a
branch name.
The find command is the most obvious command that still needs to be
dealt with. There are probably other places that filenames also get
displayed, eg embedded in error messages.
Some other commands use ActionItemOther with a filename, I think that
ActionItemOther should either be pre-sanitized, or should explicitly not
be used for filenames, so that needs more work.
When --json is used, unicode does not get escaped, but control
characters were already escaped in json.
(Key escaping may turn out to be needed, but I'm ignoring that for now.)
Sponsored-by: unqueued on Patreon
