On Solaris, using f_bsize provided a value that is apparently much larger
than the real block size. The solaris docs for statvfs say
f_bsize is the "preferred" file system block size, and I guess the
filesystem prefers larger blocks, but uses smaller ones or something.
The docs also say that f_frsize is the "fundamental" block size.
Switched to using f_frsize on Linux and kFreeBSD too, since I guess
f_bsize could in theory vary the same way there too. Assuming that Solaris
is not violating the posix spec, I guess the linux man page for statvfs
is not as well written and I misunderstood it.
This is the kind of annoying thing that makes me not want to use a library.
conduitManagerSettings was a perfectly fine name and could have been kept
forever.
In c6632ee5c8, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
