The former can be useful to make remotes that don't get fully synced with
local changes, which comes up in a lot of situations.
The latter was mostly added for symmetry, but could be useful (though less
likely to be).
Implementing `remote.<name>.annex-pull` was a bit tricky, as there's no one
place where git-annex pulls/fetches from remotes. I audited all
instances of "fetch" and "pull". A few cases were left not checking this
config:
* Git.Repair can try to pull missing refs from a remote, and if the local
repo is corrupted, that seems a reasonable thing to do even though
the config would normally prevent it.
* Assistant.WebApp.Gpg and Remote.Gcrypt and Remote.Git do fetches
as part of the setup process of a remote. The config would probably not
be set then, and having the setup fail seems worse than honoring it if it
is already set.
I have not prevented all the code that does a "merge" from merging branches
from remotes with remote.<name>.annex-pull=false. That could perhaps
be done, but it would need a way to map from branch name to remote name,
and the way refspecs work makes that hard to get really correct. So if the
user fetches manually, the git-annex branch will get merged, for example.
Anther way of looking at/justifying this is that the setting is called
"annex-pull", not "annex-merge".
This commit was supported by the NSF-funded DataLad project.
* init: When annex.securehashesonly has been set with git-annex config,
copy that value to the annex.securehashesonly git config.
* config --set: As well as setting value in git-annex branch,
set local gitconfig. This is needed especially for
annex.securehashesonly, which is read only from local gitconfig and not
the git-annex branch.
doc/todo/sha1_collision_embedding_in_git-annex_keys.mdwn has the
rationalle for doing it this way. There's no perfect solution; this
seems to be the least-bad one.
This commit was supported by the NSF-funded DataLad project.
Avoiding such problems is one reason why git-annex does active
verification of other copies of a file when dropping.
You could argue that reusing the uuid of a trusted repository leads to
data loss, but that data loss doesn't really involve reusing the uuid,
but instead is caused by deleting a trusted repository. Using trusted
repositories without a great deal of care is a good way to blow off your
foot, of which deleting them is only the most obvious;
added some sections about that.
If reusing a repository uuid could result in data loss then I'd be on
board with making reinit run a fast fsck to update the location log, but
since it can't, I feel that is not worth forcing. Not a bad idea to run
fsck afterwards. Updated language about that.
This commit was sponsored by Jake Vosloo on Patreon.
This way we know that after enable-tor, the tor hidden service is fully
published and working, and so there should be no problems with it at
pairing time.
It has to start up its own temporary listener on the hidden service. It
would be nice to have it start the remotedaemon running, so that extra
step is not needed afterwards. But, there may already be a remotedaemon
running, in communication with the assistant and we don't want to start
another one. I thought about trying to HUP any running remotedaemon, but
Windows does not make it easy to do that. In any case, having the user
start the remotedaemon themselves lets them know it needs to be running
to serve the hidden service.
This commit was sponsored by Boyd Stephen Smith Jr. on Patreon.
This reverts commit 3037feb1bf.
On second thought, this was an overcomplication of what should be the
lowest-level primitive. Let's build bi-directional links at the pairing
level with eg magic wormhole.
Both the local and remote git repositories get remotes added
pointing at one-another.
Makes pairing twice as easy!
Security: The new LINK command in the protocol can be sent repeatedly,
but only by a peer who has authenticated with us. So, it's entirely safe to
add a link back to that peer, or to some other peer it knows about.
Anything we receive over such a link, the peer could send us over the
current connection.
There is some risk of being flooded with LINKs, and adding too many
remotes. To guard against that, there's a hard cap on the number of remotes
that can be set up this way. This will only be a problem if setting up
large p2p networks that have exceptional interconnectedness.
A new, dedicated authtoken is created when sending LINK.
This also allows, in theory, using a p2p network like tor, to learn about
links on other networks, like telehash.
This commit was sponsored by Bruno BEAUFILS on Patreon.
