add section on security

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Joey Hess 2016-12-07 13:58:10 -04:00
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@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
git-annex has recently gotten support for running as a
[Tor](http://http://torproject.org/) hidden service. This is a great, and
very secure way to connect repositories between computers in different
[Tor](http://http://torproject.org/) hidden service. This is a nice secure
and easy to use way to connect repositories between peers in different
locations, without needing any central server.
## the first peer
## setting up the first peer
First, you need to get Tor installed and running. See
[their website](http://http://torproject.org/), or try a command like:
@ -100,3 +100,33 @@ combine the onion address with the authentication data.
When you run `git annex peer --link`, it sets up a git remote using
the onion address, and it stashes the authentication data away in a file in
`.git/annex/creds/`
## security
Tor hidden services can be quite secure. But this doesn't mean that using
git-annex over Tor is automatically perfectly secure. Here are some things
to consider:
* Anyone who learns the address of a peer can connect to that peer,
download the whole history of the git repository, and any available
annexed files. They can also upload new files to the peer, and even
remove annexed files from the peer. So consider ways that the address
of a peer might be exposed.
* While Tor can be used to anonymize who you are, git defaults to including
your name and email address in git commit messages. So if you want an
anonymous git-annex repository, you'll need to configure git not to do
that.
* Using Tor prevents listeners from decrypting your traffic. But, they'll
probably still know you're using Tor. Also, by traffic analysis,
they may be able to guess if you're using git-annex over tor, and even
make guesses about the sizes and types of files that you're exchanging
with peers.
* There have been past attacks on the Tor network that have exposed
who was running Tor hidden services.
<https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack>
* An attacker who can connect to the git-annex Tor hidden service, even
without authenticating, can try to perform denial of service attacks.