git-annex/P2P/Http/Server.hs
Joey Hess 4f3ae96666
cleanly close proxy connection on interrupted PUT
An interrupted PUT to cluster that has a node that is a special remote
over http left open the connection to the cluster, so the next request
opens another one. So did an interrupted PUT directly to the proxied
special remote over http.

proxySpecialRemote was stuck waiting for all the DATA. Its connection
remained open so it kept waiting.

In servePut, checktooshort handles closing the P2P connection
when too short a data is received from PUT. But, checktooshort was only
called after the protoaction, which is what runs the proxy, which is
what was getting stuck. Modified it to run as a background thread,
which waits for the tooshortv to be written to, which gather always does
once it gets to the end of the data received from the http client.

That makes proxyConnection's releaseconn run once all data is received
from the http client. Made it close the connection handles before
waiting on the asyncworker thread. This lets proxySpecialRemote finish
processing any data from the handle, and then it will give up,
more or less cleanly, if it didn't receive enough data.

I say "more or less cleanly" because with both sides of the P2P
connection taken down, some protocol unhappyness results. Which can lead
to some ugly debug messages. But also can cause the asyncworker thread
to throw an exception. So made withP2PConnections not crash when it
receives an exception from releaseconn.

This did have a small change to the behavior of an interrupted PUT when
proxying to a regular remote. proxyConnection has a protoerrorhandler
that closes the proxy connection on a protocol error. But the proxy
connection is also closed by checktooshort when it closes the P2P
connection. Closing the same proxy connection twice is not a problem,
it just results in duplicated debug messages about it.
2024-07-29 10:37:19 -04:00

478 lines
14 KiB
Haskell

{- P2P protocol over HTTP, server
-
- https://git-annex.branchable.com/design/p2p_protocol_over_http/
-
- Copyright 2024 Joey Hess <id@joeyh.name>
-
- Licensed under the GNU AGPL version 3 or higher.
-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
module P2P.Http.Server (
module P2P.Http,
module P2P.Http.Server,
module P2P.Http.Types,
module P2P.Http.State,
) where
import Annex.Common
import P2P.Http
import P2P.Http.Types
import P2P.Http.State
import P2P.Protocol hiding (Offset, Bypass, auth)
import P2P.IO
import P2P.Annex
import Annex.WorkerPool
import Types.WorkerPool
import Types.Direction
import Utility.Metered
import Servant
import qualified Servant.Types.SourceT as S
import qualified Data.ByteString as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Internal as LI
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Concurrent.Async
import Control.Concurrent
import System.IO.Unsafe
import Data.Either
p2pHttpApp :: P2PHttpServerState -> Application
p2pHttpApp = serve p2pHttpAPI . serveP2pHttp
serveP2pHttp :: P2PHttpServerState -> Server P2PHttpAPI
serveP2pHttp st
= serveGet st
:<|> serveGet st
:<|> serveGet st
:<|> serveGet st
:<|> serveCheckPresent st
:<|> serveCheckPresent st
:<|> serveCheckPresent st
:<|> serveCheckPresent st
:<|> serveRemove st id
:<|> serveRemove st id
:<|> serveRemove st dePlus
:<|> serveRemove st dePlus
:<|> serveRemoveBefore st
:<|> serveGetTimestamp st
:<|> servePut st id
:<|> servePut st id
:<|> servePut st dePlus
:<|> servePut st dePlus
:<|> servePutOffset st id
:<|> servePutOffset st id
:<|> servePutOffset st dePlus
:<|> serveLockContent st
:<|> serveLockContent st
:<|> serveLockContent st
:<|> serveLockContent st
:<|> serveKeepLocked st
:<|> serveKeepLocked st
:<|> serveKeepLocked st
:<|> serveKeepLocked st
:<|> serveGetGeneric st
serveGetGeneric
:: P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> B64Key
-> Maybe (B64UUID ClientSide)
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler (Headers '[DataLengthHeader] (S.SourceT IO B.ByteString))
serveGetGeneric st su@(B64UUID u) k mcu bypass =
-- Use V0 because it does not alter the returned data to indicate
-- Invalid content.
serveGet st su V0 k (fromMaybe scu mcu) bypass Nothing Nothing
where
-- Reuse server UUID as client UUID.
scu = B64UUID u :: B64UUID ClientSide
serveGet
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> Maybe B64FilePath
-> Maybe Offset
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler (Headers '[DataLengthHeader] (S.SourceT IO B.ByteString))
serveGet st su apiver (B64Key k) cu bypass baf startat sec auth = do
conn <- getP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth ReadAction id
bsv <- liftIO newEmptyTMVarIO
endv <- liftIO newEmptyTMVarIO
validityv <- liftIO newEmptyTMVarIO
finalv <- liftIO newEmptyTMVarIO
annexworker <- liftIO $ async $ inAnnexWorker st $ do
let storer _offset len = sendContentWith $ \bs -> liftIO $ do
atomically $ putTMVar bsv (len, bs)
atomically $ takeTMVar endv
signalFullyConsumedByteString $
connOhdl $ serverP2PConnection conn
return $ \v -> do
liftIO $ atomically $ putTMVar validityv v
return True
enteringStage (TransferStage Upload) $
runFullProto (clientRunState conn) (clientP2PConnection conn) $
void $ receiveContent Nothing nullMeterUpdate
sizer storer getreq
void $ liftIO $ forkIO $ waitfinal endv finalv conn annexworker
(Len len, bs) <- liftIO $ atomically $ takeTMVar bsv
bv <- liftIO $ newMVar (filter (not . B.null) (L.toChunks bs))
szv <- liftIO $ newMVar 0
let streamer = S.SourceT $ \s -> s =<< return
(stream (bv, szv, len, endv, validityv, finalv))
return $ addHeader (DataLength len) streamer
where
stream (bv, szv, len, endv, validityv, finalv) =
S.fromActionStep B.null $
modifyMVar bv $ nextchunk szv $
checkvalidity szv len endv validityv finalv
nextchunk szv checkvalid (b:[]) = do
updateszv szv b
ifM checkvalid
( return ([], b)
-- The key's content is invalid, but
-- the amount of data is the same as the
-- DataLengthHeader indicated. Truncate
-- the response by one byte to indicate
-- to the client that it's not valid.
, return ([], B.take (B.length b - 1) b)
)
nextchunk szv _checkvalid (b:bs) = do
updateszv szv b
return (bs, b)
nextchunk _szv checkvalid [] = do
void checkvalid
-- Result ignored because 0 bytes of data are sent,
-- so even if the key is invalid, if that's the
-- amount of data that the DataLengthHeader indicates,
-- we've successfully served an empty key.
return ([], mempty)
updateszv szv b = modifyMVar szv $ \sz ->
let !sz' = sz + fromIntegral (B.length b)
in return (sz', ())
-- Returns False when the key's content is invalid, but the
-- amount of data sent was the same as indicated by the
-- DataLengthHeader.
checkvalidity szv len endv validityv finalv =
ifM (atomically $ isEmptyTMVar endv)
( do
atomically $ putTMVar endv ()
validity <- atomically $ takeTMVar validityv
sz <- takeMVar szv
atomically $ putTMVar finalv ()
atomically $ putTMVar endv ()
return $ case validity of
Nothing -> True
Just Valid -> True
Just Invalid -> sz /= len
, pure True
)
waitfinal endv finalv conn annexworker = do
-- Wait for everything to be transferred before
-- stopping the annexworker. The finalv will usually
-- be written to at the end. If the client disconnects
-- early that does not happen, so catch STM exception.
alltransferred <- isRight
<$> tryNonAsync (liftIO $ atomically $ takeTMVar finalv)
-- Make sure the annexworker is not left blocked on endv
-- if the client disconnected early.
void $ liftIO $ atomically $ tryPutTMVar endv ()
void $ tryNonAsync $ if alltransferred
then releaseP2PConnection conn
else closeP2PConnection conn
void $ tryNonAsync $ wait annexworker
sizer = pure $ Len $ case startat of
Just (Offset o) -> fromIntegral o
Nothing -> 0
getreq offset = P2P.Protocol.GET offset af k
af = ProtoAssociatedFile $ b64FilePathToAssociatedFile baf
serveCheckPresent
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler CheckPresentResult
serveCheckPresent st su apiver (B64Key k) cu bypass sec auth = do
res <- withP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth ReadAction id
$ \conn -> liftIO $ proxyClientNetProto conn $ checkPresent k
case res of
Right b -> return (CheckPresentResult b)
Left err -> throwError $ err500 { errBody = encodeBL err }
serveRemove
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> (RemoveResultPlus -> t)
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler t
serveRemove st resultmangle su apiver (B64Key k) cu bypass sec auth = do
res <- withP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth RemoveAction id
$ \conn ->
liftIO $ proxyClientNetProto conn $ remove Nothing k
case res of
(Right b, plusuuids) -> return $ resultmangle $
RemoveResultPlus b (map B64UUID (fromMaybe [] plusuuids))
(Left err, _) -> throwError $
err500 { errBody = encodeBL err }
serveRemoveBefore
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> Timestamp
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler RemoveResultPlus
serveRemoveBefore st su apiver (B64Key k) cu bypass (Timestamp ts) sec auth = do
res <- withP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth RemoveAction id
$ \conn ->
liftIO $ proxyClientNetProto conn $
removeBeforeRemoteEndTime ts k
case res of
(Right b, plusuuids) -> return $
RemoveResultPlus b (map B64UUID (fromMaybe [] plusuuids))
(Left err, _) -> throwError $
err500 { errBody = encodeBL err }
serveGetTimestamp
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler GetTimestampResult
serveGetTimestamp st su apiver cu bypass sec auth = do
res <- withP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth ReadAction id
$ \conn ->
liftIO $ proxyClientNetProto conn getTimestamp
case res of
Right ts -> return $ GetTimestampResult (Timestamp ts)
Left err -> throwError $
err500 { errBody = encodeBL err }
servePut
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> (PutResultPlus -> t)
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> DataLength
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> Maybe B64FilePath
-> Maybe Offset
-> S.SourceT IO B.ByteString
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler t
servePut st resultmangle su apiver (DataLength len) (B64Key k) cu bypass baf moffset stream sec auth = do
validityv <- liftIO newEmptyTMVarIO
let validitycheck = local $ runValidityCheck $
liftIO $ atomically $ readTMVar validityv
tooshortv <- liftIO newEmptyTMVarIO
content <- liftIO $ S.unSourceT stream (gather validityv tooshortv)
res <- withP2PConnection' apiver st cu su bypass sec auth WriteAction
(\cst -> cst { connectionWaitVar = False }) $ \conn -> do
liftIO $ void $ async $ checktooshort conn tooshortv
liftIO (protoaction conn content validitycheck)
case res of
Right (Right (Just plusuuids)) -> return $ resultmangle $
PutResultPlus True (map B64UUID plusuuids)
Right (Right Nothing) -> return $ resultmangle $
PutResultPlus False []
Right (Left protofail) -> throwError $
err500 { errBody = encodeBL (describeProtoFailure protofail) }
Left err -> throwError $
err500 { errBody = encodeBL (show err) }
where
protoaction conn content validitycheck = inAnnexWorker st $
enteringStage (TransferStage Download) $
runFullProto (clientRunState conn) (clientP2PConnection conn) $
protoaction' content validitycheck
protoaction' content validitycheck = put' k af $ \offset' ->
let offsetdelta = offset' - offset
in case compare offset' offset of
EQ -> sendContent' nullMeterUpdate (Len len)
content validitycheck
GT -> sendContent' nullMeterUpdate
(Len (len - fromIntegral offsetdelta))
(L.drop (fromIntegral offsetdelta) content)
validitycheck
LT -> sendContent' nullMeterUpdate
(Len len)
content
(validitycheck >>= \_ -> return Invalid)
offset = case moffset of
Just (Offset o) -> o
Nothing -> 0
af = b64FilePathToAssociatedFile baf
-- Streams the ByteString from the client. Avoids returning a longer
-- than expected ByteString by truncating to the expected length.
-- Returns a shorter than expected ByteString when the data is not
-- valid.
gather validityv tooshortv = unsafeInterleaveIO . go 0
where
go n S.Stop = do
atomically $ do
writeTMVar validityv $
if n == len then Valid else Invalid
writeTMVar tooshortv (n /= len)
return LI.Empty
go n (S.Error _err) = do
atomically $ do
writeTMVar validityv Invalid
writeTMVar tooshortv (n /= len)
return LI.Empty
go n (S.Skip s) = go n s
go n (S.Effect ms) = ms >>= go n
go n (S.Yield v s) =
let !n' = n + fromIntegral (B.length v)
in if n' > len
then do
atomically $ do
writeTMVar validityv Invalid
writeTMVar tooshortv True
return $ LI.Chunk
(B.take (fromIntegral (len - n')) v)
LI.Empty
else LI.Chunk v <$> unsafeInterleaveIO (go n' s)
-- The connection can no longer be used when too short a DATA has
-- been written to it.
checktooshort conn tooshortv = do
liftIO $ whenM (atomically $ takeTMVar tooshortv) $
closeP2PConnection conn
servePutOffset
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> (PutOffsetResultPlus -> t)
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler t
servePutOffset st resultmangle su apiver (B64Key k) cu bypass sec auth = do
res <- withP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth WriteAction
(\cst -> cst { connectionWaitVar = False }) $ \conn ->
liftIO $ proxyClientNetProto conn $ getPutOffset k af
case res of
Right offset -> return $ resultmangle $
PutOffsetResultPlus (Offset offset)
Left plusuuids -> return $ resultmangle $
PutOffsetResultAlreadyHavePlus (map B64UUID plusuuids)
where
af = AssociatedFile Nothing
serveLockContent
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> B64Key
-> B64UUID ClientSide
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Handler LockResult
serveLockContent st su apiver (B64Key k) cu bypass sec auth = do
conn <- getP2PConnection apiver st cu su bypass sec auth WriteAction id
let lock = do
lockresv <- newEmptyTMVarIO
unlockv <- newEmptyTMVarIO
annexworker <- async $ inAnnexWorker st $ do
lockres <- runFullProto (clientRunState conn) (clientP2PConnection conn) $ do
net $ sendMessage (LOCKCONTENT k)
checkSuccess
liftIO $ atomically $ putTMVar lockresv lockres
liftIO $ atomically $ takeTMVar unlockv
void $ runFullProto (clientRunState conn) (clientP2PConnection conn) $ do
net $ sendMessage UNLOCKCONTENT
atomically (takeTMVar lockresv) >>= \case
Right True -> return (Just (annexworker, unlockv))
_ -> return Nothing
let unlock (annexworker, unlockv) = do
atomically $ putTMVar unlockv ()
void $ wait annexworker
releaseP2PConnection conn
liftIO $ mkLocker lock unlock >>= \case
Just (locker, lockid) -> do
liftIO $ storeLock lockid locker st
return $ LockResult True (Just lockid)
Nothing -> return $ LockResult False Nothing
serveKeepLocked
:: APIVersion v
=> P2PHttpServerState
-> B64UUID ServerSide
-> v
-> LockID
-> Maybe (B64UUID ClientSide)
-> [B64UUID Bypass]
-> IsSecure
-> Maybe Auth
-> Maybe ConnectionKeepAlive
-> Maybe KeepAlive
-> S.SourceT IO UnlockRequest
-> Handler LockResult
serveKeepLocked st _su _apiver lckid _cu _bypass sec auth _ _ unlockrequeststream = do
checkAuthActionClass st sec auth WriteAction $ \_ -> do
liftIO $ keepingLocked lckid st
_ <- liftIO $ S.unSourceT unlockrequeststream go
return (LockResult False Nothing)
where
go S.Stop = dropLock lckid st
go (S.Error _err) = dropLock lckid st
go (S.Skip s) = go s
go (S.Effect ms) = ms >>= go
go (S.Yield (UnlockRequest False) s) = go s
go (S.Yield (UnlockRequest True) _) = dropLock lckid st