Joey Hess 2def1d0a23 other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo ... In c6632ee5c8, it actually only handled uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder. On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this now, and avoid the extra post-download verification. As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability. Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes. It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it; as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally), there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas, a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed, tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.		2015-10-02 14:35:12 -04:00
..
Chunked	update my email address and homepage url	2015-01-21 12:50:09 -04:00
AWS.hs	update my email address and homepage url	2015-01-21 12:50:09 -04:00
Chunked.hs	disable whereisKey for encrypted or chunked remotes	2015-08-19 14:16:01 -04:00
Encryptable.hs	support gpg.program	2015-09-09 18:06:49 -04:00
Git.hs	update my email address and homepage url	2015-01-21 12:50:09 -04:00
Hooks.hs	use lock pools throughout git-annex	2015-05-19 14:09:52 -04:00
Http.hs	update my email address and homepage url	2015-01-21 12:50:09 -04:00
Messages.hs	refactor	2015-08-17 10:42:14 -04:00
ReadOnly.hs	export some always failing methods for readonly remotes	2015-08-17 11:21:38 -04:00
Special.hs	other 80% of avoding verification when hard linking to objects in shared repo	2015-10-02 14:35:12 -04:00
Ssh.hs	--debug is passed along to git-annex-shell when git-annex is in debug mode.	2015-08-13 15:05:39 -04:00