32 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
Using URL keys can lead to data loss. Two remotes can have two different
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objects for the same URL key, as the content of an url may change over
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time. If git-annex gets part of an object from the first remote, but is
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then interrupted or fails, and then resumes from the second remote's
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object, it will stitch together a chimera that has never existed at the
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url. Then dropping the URL objects from both remotes will result in no
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valid copies of the object remaining.
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This could also happen with WORM, but it would be much less likely. Two
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files with the same mtime, size, and path would have to be added to two
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repos.
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And it could happen if an old git-annex is being used in a repo that uses
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some new key that it doesn't support, like a new checksum type.
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Special remotes are affected if they use chunking, or if they resume
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when the destination file already exists and don't have their own
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checksumming. So the rsync special remote is affected when it's used with
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chunking, but not otherwise.
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With the default annex.security.allow-unverified-downloads config,
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encrypted special remotes already don't allow downloading the problem keys.
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The bug affects remotes using the git-annex P2P protocol, but not ssh remotes
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using rsync. So the introduction of the P2P protocol made this bug more
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prevelant.
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Best fix for this seems to be to prevent resuming download of keys
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when their content is not verifiable.
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The P2P protocol could also be extended to use a checksum to verify a
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resume is safe to do. That would only be worth doing for the affected keys.
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