This is a massive win on OSX, which doesn't have a sha256sum normally.
Only use external hash commands when the file is > 1 mb,
since cryptohash is quite close to them in speed.
SHA is still used to calculate HMACs. I don't quite understand
cryptohash's API for those.
Used the following benchmark to arrive at the 1 mb number.
1 mb file:
benchmarking sha256/internal
mean: 13.86696 ms, lb 13.83010 ms, ub 13.93453 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 249.3235 us, lb 162.0448 us, ub 458.1744 us, ci 0.950
found 5 outliers among 100 samples (5.0%)
4 (4.0%) high mild
1 (1.0%) high severe
variance introduced by outliers: 10.415%
variance is moderately inflated by outliers
benchmarking sha256/external
mean: 14.20670 ms, lb 14.17237 ms, ub 14.27004 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 230.5448 us, lb 150.7310 us, ub 427.6068 us, ci 0.950
found 3 outliers among 100 samples (3.0%)
2 (2.0%) high mild
1 (1.0%) high severe
2 mb file:
benchmarking sha256/internal
mean: 26.44270 ms, lb 26.23701 ms, ub 26.63414 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 1.012303 ms, lb 925.8921 us, ub 1.122267 ms, ci 0.950
variance introduced by outliers: 35.540%
variance is moderately inflated by outliers
benchmarking sha256/external
mean: 26.84521 ms, lb 26.77644 ms, ub 26.91433 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 347.7867 us, lb 210.6283 us, ub 571.3351 us, ci 0.950
found 6 outliers among 100 samples (6.0%)
import Crypto.Hash
import Data.ByteString.Lazy as L
import Criterion.Main
import Common
testfile :: FilePath
testfile = "/run/shm/data" -- on ram disk
main = defaultMain
[ bgroup "sha256"
[ bench "internal" $ whnfIO internal
, bench "external" $ whnfIO external
]
]
sha256 :: L.ByteString -> Digest SHA256
sha256 = hashlazy
internal :: IO String
internal = show . sha256 <$> L.readFile testfile
external :: IO String
external = do
s <- readProcess "sha256sum" [testfile]
return $ fst $ separate (== ' ') s
Now can tell if a repo uses gcrypt or not, and whether it's decryptable
with the current gpg keys.
This closes the hole that undecryptable gcrypt repos could have before been
combined into the repo in encrypted mode.
When adding a removable drive, it's now detected if the drive contains
a gcrypt special remote, and that's all handled nicely. This includes
fetching the git-annex branch from the gcrypt repo in order to find
out how to set up the special remote.
Note that gcrypt repos that are not git-annex special remotes are not
supported. It will attempt to detect such a gcrypt repo and refuse
to use it. (But this is hard to do any may fail; see
https://github.com/blake2-ppc/git-remote-gcrypt/issues/6)
The problem with supporting regular gcrypt repos is that we don't know
what the gcrypt.participants setting is intended to be for the repo.
So even if we can decrypt it, if we push changes to it they might not be
visible to other participants.
Anyway, encrypted sneakernet (or mailnet) is now fully possible with the
git-annex assistant! Assuming that the gpg key distribution is handled
somehow, which the assistant doesn't yet help with.
This commit was sponsored by Navishkar Rao.
To support this, a core.gcrypt-id is stored by git-annex inside the git
config of a local gcrypt repository, when setting it up.
That is compared with the remote's cached gcrypt-id. When different, a
drive has been changed. git-annex then looks up the remote config for
the uuid mapped from the core.gcrypt-id, and tweaks the configuration
appropriately. When there is no known config for the uuid, it will refuse to
use the remote.
Use rsync for gcrypt remotes that are not local to the disk.
(Note that I have punted on supporting http transport for now, it doesn't
seem likely to be very useful.)
This was mostly quite easy, it just uses the rsync special remote to handle
the transfers. The git repository url is converted to a RsyncOptions
structure, which required parsing it separately, since the rsync special
remote only supports rsync urls, which use a different format.
Note that annexed objects are now stored at the top of the gcrypt repo,
rather than inside annex/objects. This simplified the rsync suport,
since it doesn't have to arrange to create that directory. And git-annex
is not going to be run directly within gcrypt repos -- or if in some
strance scenario it was, it would make sense for it to not see the
encrypted objects.
This commit was sponsored by Sheila Miguez
This is a git-remote-gcrypt encrypted special remote. Only sending files
in to the remote works, and only for local repositories.
Most of the work so far has involved making initremote work. A particular
problem is that remote setup in this case needs to generate its own uuid,
derivied from the gcrypt-id. That required some larger changes in the code
to support.
For ssh remotes, this will probably just reuse Remote.Rsync's code, so
should be easy enough. And for downloading from a web remote, I will need
to factor out the part of Remote.Git that does that.
One particular thing that will need work is supporting hot-swapping a local
gcrypt remote. I think it needs to store the gcrypt-id in the git config of the
local remote, so that it can check it every time, and compare with the
cached annex-uuid for the remote. If there is a mismatch, it can change
both the cached annex-uuid and the gcrypt-id. That should work, and I laid
some groundwork for it by already reading the remote's config when it's
local. (Also needed for other reasons.)
This commit was sponsored by Daniel Callahan.
Cipher is now a datatype
data Cipher = Cipher String | MacOnlyCipher String
which makes more precise its interpretation MAC-only vs. MAC + used to
derive a key for symmetric crypto.
With the initremote parameters "encryption=pubkey keyid=788A3F4C".
/!\ Adding or removing a key has NO effect on files that have already
been copied to the remote. Hence using keyid+= and keyid-= with such
remotes should be used with care, and make little sense unless the point
is to replace a (sub-)key by another. /!\
Also, a test case has been added to ensure that the cipher and file
contents are encrypted as specified by the chosen encryption scheme.
/!\ It is to be noted that revoking a key does NOT necessarily prevent
the owner of its private part from accessing data on the remote /!\
The only sound use of `keyid-=` is probably to replace a (sub-)key by
another, where the private part of both is owned by the same
person/entity:
git annex enableremote myremote keyid-=2512E3C7 keyid+=788A3F4C
Reference: http://git-annex.branchable.com/bugs/Using_a_revoked_GPG_key/
* Other change introduced by this patch:
New keys now need to be added with option `keyid+=`, and the scheme
specified (upon initremote only) with `encryption=`. The motivation for
this change is to open for new schemes, e.g., strict asymmetric
encryption.
git annex initremote myremote encryption=hybrid keyid=2512E3C7
git annex enableremote myremote keyid+=788A3F4C
When quvi is installed, git-annex addurl automatically uses it to detect
when an page is a video, and downloads the video file.
web special remote: Also support using quvi, for getting files,
or checking if files exist in the web.
This commit was sponsored by Mark Hepburn. Thanks!
I thought at first this was a Windows specific problem, but it's not;
this affects checking any non-bare repository exported via http. Which is
a potentially important use case!
The actual bug was the case where Right False was returned by the first url
short-curcuited later checks. But the whole method used felt like code
I'd no longer write, and the use of undefined was particularly disgusting.
So I rewrote it.
Also added an action display.
This commit was sponsored by Eric Hanchrow. Thanks!
annexLocations uses OS-native directory separators, but for an url,
it needs to use / even on Windows.
This is an ugly workaround. Could parameterize a lot of stuff in
annexLocations to fix it better. I suspect this is probably the only place
it's needed though.
The checkpresent hook can return either True or, False, or fail with a message
if it cannot successfully check the remote. Currently for glacier, when
--trust-glacier is not set, it always returns False. Crucially, in the case
when a file is in glacier, this is telling git-annex it's not there, so copy
re-uploads it. This is not desirable; it breaks using glacier-cli to retreive
that file later, and it wastes money/bandwidth.
What if it instead, when the glacier inventory is missing a
file, it returns False. And when the glacier inventory has a file, unless
--trust-glacier is set, it *fails*.
The result would be:
* `git annex copy --to glacier` would only send things not listed in inventory. If a file is listed in the inventory, `copy`
would complain that --trust-glacier` is not set, and not re-upload the file.
* `git annex drop` would only trust that glacier has a file when --trust-glacier is set. Behavior unchanged.
* `git annex move --to glacier`, when the file is not listed in inventory, would send the file, and delete it locally. Behavior unchanged.
* `git annex move --to glacier`, when the file is listed in inventory, would only trust that glacier has the file when --trust-glacier is set
* `git annex copy --from glacier` / `git annex get`, when the file is located in glacier, would trust the location log, and attempt to get the file from glacier.
Made fromDirect check that a file in the tree has good content (and is not
a broken symlink either) before copying it to another file that has the
same key.
Made replaceFile clean up the temp file if the action that creates it, or
the file replacement action fails.
