Commands that want to use it have to run their seek action inside
allowConcurrentOutput. Which seems reasonable; perhaps some future command
will want to support the -J flag but not use regions.
The region state moved from Annex to MessageState. This makes sense
organizationally, and note that some uses of onLocal use a different Annex
state, but pass the MessageState into it, which is what is needed.
sideAction is for things not generally related to the current action being
performed. And, it adds a newline after the side action. This was not the
right thing to use for stuff like "checksum", where doing a checksum is
part of the git annex get process, and indeed we want it to display
"(checksum...) ok"
There should be no behavior changes in this commit, it just adds a more
expressive data type and adjusts code that had been passing around a [UUID]
or sometimes a Maybe Remote to instead use [VerifiedCopy].
Although, since some functions were taking two different [UUID] lists,
there's some potential for me to have gotten it horribly wrong.
Also, rename lockContent to lockContentExclusive
inAnnexSafe should perhaps be eliminated, and instead use
`lockContentShared inAnnex`. However, I'm waiting on that, as there are
only 2 call sites for inAnnexSafe and it's fiddly.
In c6632ee5c8, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
Seems easy, but git ls-files can't list the right subset of files.
So, I wrote a whole new parser for git status output, and converted the
status command to use that.
There are a few other small behavior changes. The order changed. Unlocked
files show as T. In indirect mode, deleted files were not shown before, and
that's fixed. Regular files checked directly into git and modified
were not shown before, and are now.
Fix typo in commit 160d4b9 ("convert Unused, and remove some dead code
for old style option parsing", 2015-07-10), the "git-annex unused
--used-refspec" option was incorrectly changed to --unused-refspec.
Ben Boeckel had a patch, but..
Actually, that was not the only place that used ScheduleIncremental when
built w/o database. Since the data type doesn't need database stuff,
I've instead fixed this build problem by exposing the
ScheduleIncremental constructor to database-less builds.
Note that I had one in Annex.Action.startup too, but it resulted in a weird
message printed by ssh, "channel 2: bad ext data". I don't know why, but
it only happened when transferinfo was run, so I wonder
if 983a95f021 introduced a fragility somehow.
This was potentially a hole in the readonly mode armor even before my last
commit. If the user could push a git-annex branch to a repo, they could get
git-annex-shell to initialize the repo. After my last commit, the user
didn't even need to be allowed to push a branch to init the repo, so
this hole certianly needs to be closed now.
