When core.sharedRepository is set, annex object files are not made mode
444, since that prevents a user other than the file owner from locking
them. Instead, a mode such as 664 is used in this case.
replaceFile created a temp file, which was guaranteed to not overlap with
another temp file. However, makeAnnexLink then deleted that file, in
preparation for making the symlink in its place. This caused a race, since
some other replaceFile could create a temp file, using the same name!
I was able to reproduce the race easily running git-annex add -J10 in a
directory with 100 files (all with different contents). Some files would
get ingested into the annex, but their annex links would fail to be added.
There could be other situations where this same problem could occur.
Perhaps when the assistant is adding a file, if the user manually also ran
git-annex add. Perhaps in cases not involving adding a file.
The new replaceFile makes a temprary directory, which is guaranteed to be
unique, and doesn't make a temp file in there. makeAnnexLink can thus
create the symlink without problem and the race is avoided.
Audited all calls to replaceFile to make sure that the old behavior of
providing an empty temp file was not relied on.
The general problem of asking for a temp file and deleting it as part of
the process of using it could reach beyond replaceFile. Did some quick
audits and didn't find other cases of it. Probably only symlink creation
stuff would tend to make that mistake, mostly.
Instead, only display transport error if the configlist output doesn't
include an annex.uuid line, even an empty one.
A recent change made git-annex init try to get all the remote uuids, and so
the transport error would be displayed by it. It was also displayed when
eg, copying files to a remote that had no uuid yet.
sync, merge, assistant: When git merge failed for a reason other than a
conflicted merge, such as a crippled filesystem not allowing particular
characters in filenames, git-annex would make a merge commit that could
omit such files or otherwise be bad. Fixed by aborting the whole merge
process when git merge fails for any reason other than a merge conflict.
Implemented with no additional overhead of compares etc.
This is safe to do for presence logs because of their locality of change;
a given repo's presence logs are only ever changed in that repo, or in a
repo that has just been actively changing the content of that repo.
So, we don't need to worry about a split-brain situation where there'd
be disagreement about the location of a key in a repo. And so, it's ok to
not update the timestamp when that's the only change that would be made
due to logging presence info.
sideAction is for things not generally related to the current action being
performed. And, it adds a newline after the side action. This was not the
right thing to use for stuff like "checksum", where doing a checksum is
part of the git annex get process, and indeed we want it to display
"(checksum...) ok"
By definition, a trusted repository is trusted to always have its location
tracking log accurate. Thus, it should never be in a position where content
is being dropped from it concurrently, as that would result in the location
tracking log not being accurate.
This avoids a failure where eg, we start with RecentlyVerifiedCopies
for all remotes, and so didn't do any active verification, which is
required.
Also, dedup the list of VerifiedCopies when checking if we have enough,
in case 2 copies of a UUID slip in.
See doc/bugs/concurrent_drop--from_presence_checking_failures.mdwn for
discussion about why 1 locked copy is all we can require, and how this
fixes concurrent dropping bugs.
Note that, since nothing yet generates a VerifiedCopyLock yet, this commit
breaks dropping temporarily.
There should be no behavior changes in this commit, it just adds a more
expressive data type and adjusts code that had been passing around a [UUID]
or sometimes a Maybe Remote to instead use [VerifiedCopy].
Although, since some functions were taking two different [UUID] lists,
there's some potential for me to have gotten it horribly wrong.
Also, rename lockContent to lockContentExclusive
inAnnexSafe should perhaps be eliminated, and instead use
`lockContentShared inAnnex`. However, I'm waiting on that, as there are
only 2 call sites for inAnnexSafe and it's fiddly.
In c6632ee5c8, it actually only handled
uploading objects to a shared repository. To avoid verification when
downloading objects from a shared repository, was a lot harder.
On the plus side, if the process of downloading a file from a remote
is able to verify its content on the side, the remote can indicate this
now, and avoid the extra post-download verification.
As of yet, I don't have any remotes (except Git) using this ability.
Some more work would be needed to support it in special remotes.
It would make sense for tahoe to implicitly verify things downloaded from it;
as long as you trust your tahoe server (which typically runs locally),
there's cryptographic integrity. OTOH, despite bup being based on shas,
a bup repo under an attacker's control could have the git ref used for an
object changed, and so a bup repo shouldn't implicitly verify. Indeed,
tahoe seems unique in being trustworthy enough to implicitly verify.
* When annex objects are received into git repositories, their checksums are
verified then too.
* To get the old, faster, behavior of not verifying checksums, set
annex.verify=false, or remote.<name>.annex-verify=false.
* setkey, rekey: These commands also now verify that the provided file
matches the key, unless annex.verify=false.
* reinject: Already verified content; this can now be disabled by
setting annex.verify=false.
recvkey and reinject already did verification, so removed now duplicate
code from them. fsck still does its own verification, which is ok since it
does not use getViaTmp, so verification doesn't happen twice when using fsck
--from.
I couldn't find a good way to make an *empty* index file (zero byte file
won't do), so I punted and just don't make index.lock when there's no index
yet. This means some other git process could race and write an index file
at the same time as the merge is ongoing, in theory. Only happens in new
repos though.
