* p2phttp: Allow unauthenticated users to lock content by default.
* p2phttp: Added --unauth-nolocking option to prevent unauthenticated
users from locking content.
The rationalle for this is that locking is not really a write operation, so
makes sense to allow in a repository that only allows read-only access. Not
supporting locking in that situation will prevent the user from dropping
content from a special remote they control in cases where the other copy of
the content is on the p2phttp server.
Also, when p2phttp is configured to also allow authenticated access,
lockcontent was resulting in a password prompt for users who had no way to
authenticate. And there is no good way to distinguish between the two types
of users client side.
--unauth-nolocking anticipates that this might be abused, and seems better
than disabling unauthenticated access entirely if a server is being
attacked. It may be that rate limiting locking by IP address or similar
would be an effective measure in such a situation. Or just limiting the
number of locks by anonymous users that can be live at any one time. Since
the impact of such an DOS attempt is limited to preventing dropping content
from the server, it seems not a very appealing target anyway.
p2phttp: Support serving unauthenticated users while requesting
authentication for operations that need it. Eg, --unauth-readonly can be
combined with --authenv.
Drop locking currently needs authentication so it will prompt for that.
That still needs to be addressed somehow.
When getting from a P2P HTTP remote, prompt for credentials when required,
instead of failing.
This feels like it might be a bug in servant-client. withClientM's type
suggests it would not throw a ClientError. But it does in this case.
This fixes a problem with datalad's test suite, where loading the cluster
log happened to cause the git-annex branch commits to take a different
shape, with an additional commit.
It's also faster though, since many commands don't need the cluster log.
Just fill Annex.clusters with a thunk.
Sponsored-by: the NIH-funded NICEMAN (ReproNim TR&D3) project
This was caused by commit fb8ab2469d putting
an isPointerFile check in the wrong place. So if the file was not a pointer
file at that point, but got replaced by one before the file got locked
down, the pointer file would be ingested into the annex.
The fix is simply to move the isPointerFile check to after safeToAdd locks
down the file. Now if the file changes to a pointer file after the
isPointerFile check, ingestion will see that it changed after lockdown,
and will refuse to add it to the annex.
Sponsored-by: the NIH-funded NICEMAN (ReproNim TR&D3) project
