From b614f36873f2054b721534d362129fbe1f3d68db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: anarcat Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2017 16:38:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] i believe you meant -o here, not -e. -e is escape character, while -o is to change options. --- doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn b/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn index cdae023913..056d049e66 100644 --- a/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn +++ b/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn @@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ git-annex was vulnerable to the same class of security hole as git's CVE-2017-1000117. In several cases, git-annex parses a repository url, and uses it to generate a ssh command, with the hostname to ssh to coming from the url. If the hostname it parses is something like -"-eProxyCommand=evil", this could result in arbitrary local code execution +"-oProxyCommand=evil", this could result in arbitrary local code execution via ssh. I have not bothered to try to exploit the problem, and some details of URL parsing may prevent the exploit working in some cases. Exploiting this would involve the attacker tricking the victim into adding -a remote something like "ssh://-eProxyCommand=evil/blah". +a remote something like "ssh://-oProxyCommand=evil/blah". One possible avenue for an attacker that avoids exposing the URL to the user is to use initremote with a ssh remote, so embedding the URL in the