encryption design document
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@ -3,3 +3,6 @@ While using HMAC instead of "plain" hash functions is inherently more secure, it
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Also, ttbomk, HMAC needs two keys, not one. Are you re-using the same key twice?
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Compability for old buckets and support for different ones can be maintained by introducing a new option and simply copying over the encryption key's identifier into this new option should it be missing.
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> See [[design/encryption]]. I don't think this bug needs to be kept
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> open. [[done]] --[[Joey]]
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doc/design.mdwn
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doc/design.mdwn
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git-annex's high-level design is mostly inherent in the data that it
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stores in git, and alongside git. See [[internals]] for details.
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See [[encryption]] for design of encryption elements.
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doc/design/encryption.mdwn
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doc/design/encryption.mdwn
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git-annex mostly does not use encryption. Anyone with access to a git
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repository can see all the filenames in it, its history, and can access
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any annexed file contents.
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Encryption is needed when using [[special_remotes]] like Amazon S3, where
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file content is sent to an untrusted party who does not have access to the
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git repository.
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Such an encrypted remote uses strong encryption on the contents of files,
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as well as the filenames. The size of the encrypted files, and access
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patterns of the data, should be the only clues to what type of is stored in
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such a remote.
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## encryption backends
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It makes sense to support multiple encryption backends. So, there
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should be a way to tell what backend is responsible for a given filename
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in an encrypted remote. (And since special remotes can also store files
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unencrypted, differentiate from those as well.)
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At a high level, an encryption backend needs to support these operations:
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* Given a key/value backend key, produce and return an encrypted key.
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The same naming scheme git-annex uses for keys in regular key/value
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[[backends]] can be used. So a filename for a key might be
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"GPG-s12345--armoureddatahere"
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* Given a streaming source of file content, encrypt it, and send it in
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a stream to an action that consumes the encrypted content.
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* Given a streaming source of encrypted content, decrypt it, and send
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it in a stream to an anction that consumes the decrypted content.
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* Initialize itself.
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* Clean up.
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* Configure an encryption key to use.
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The rest of this page will describe a single encryption backend using GPG.
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Probably only one will be needed, but who knows? Maybe that backend will
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turn out badly designed, or some other encryptor needed. Designing
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with more than one encryption backend in mind helps future-proofing.
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## encryption key management
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[[!template id=note text="""
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The basis of this scheme was originally developed by Lars Wirzenius et al
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[for Obnam](http://braawi.org/obnam/encryption/).
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"""]]
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Data is encrypted by gpg, using a symmetric cipher. The passphrase of the
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cipher is itself checked into your git repository, encrypted using one or
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more gpg public keys. This scheme allows new gpg private keys to be given
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access to content that has already been stored in the remote.
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Different encrypted remotes need to be able to each use different ciphers.
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There does not seem to be a benefit to allowing multiple cipers to be
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used within a single remote, and it would add a lot of complexity.
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Instead, if you want a new cipher, create a new S3 bucket, or whatever.
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There does not seem to be much benefit to using the same cipher for
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two different enrypted remotes.
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So, the encrypted cipher could just be stored with the rest of a remote's
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configuration in `.git-annex/remotes.log` (see [[internals]]). When `git
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annex intiremote` makes a remote, it can generate a random symmetric
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cipher, and encrypt it with the specified gpg key. To allow another gpg
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public key access, update the encrypted cipher to be encrypted to both gpg
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keys.
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## filename enumeration
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If the names of files are encrypted, this makes it harder for
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git-annex (let alone untrusted third parties!) to get a list
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of the files that are stored on a given enrypted remote. This has been
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a concern, and it has been considered to use a hash like HMAC, rather
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than gpg encrypting filenames, to make it easier. (For git-annex, but
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possibly also for attackers!) But, does git-annex really ever need to do
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such an enumeration?
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Apparently not. `git annex unused --from remote` can now check for
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unused data that is stored on a remote, and it does so based only on
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location log data for the remote. This assumes that the location log is
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kept accurately.
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What about `git annex fsck --from remote`? Such a command should be able to,
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for each file in the repository, contact the encrypted remote to check
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if it has the file. This can be done without enumeration, although it will
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mean running gpg once per file fscked, to get the encrypted filename.
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### risks
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A risk of this scheme is that, once the symmetric cipher has been obtained, it
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allows full access to all the encrypted content. This scheme does not allow
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revoking a given gpg key access to the cipher, since anyone with such a key
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could have already decrypted the cipher and stored a copy.
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If git-annex stores the decrypted symmetric cipher in memory, then there
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is a risk that it could be intercepted from there by an attacker. Gpg
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amelorates these type of risks by using locked memory.
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This design does not support obfuscating the size of files by chunking
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them, as that would have added a lot of complexity, for dubious benefits.
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If the untrusted party running the encrypted remote wants to know file sizes,
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they could correlate chunks that are accessed together. Enctypting data
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changes the original file size enough to avoid it being used as a direct
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fingerprint at least.
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@ -37,19 +37,4 @@ only be used for public data.
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** Encryption is not yet supported. **
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When encryption is enabled, all files stored in the bucket are
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encrypted with gpg. Additionally, the filenames themselves are encrypted
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(using HMAC). The size of the encrypted files, and
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access patterns of the data, should be the only clues to what type of
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data you are storing in S3.
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[[!template id=note text="""
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This scheme was originally developed by Lars Wirzenius et al
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[for Obnam](http://braawi.org/obnam/encryption/).
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"""]]
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The data stored in S3 is encrypted by gpg with a symmetric cipher. The
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passphrase of the cipher is itself checked into your git repository,
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encrypted using one or more gpg public keys. This scheme allows new private
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keys to be given access to a bucket's content, after the bucket is created
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and is in use. The symmetric cipher is also hashed together with filenames
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used in the bucket, in order to obfuscate the filenames.
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See [[design/encryption]].
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