From 7adf1f45fa24534e84cf891242043af59d0fd7c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: matrss Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 15:26:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Added a comment --- ...ent_6_4641d3ad4a8a8f17f8df47e02555dfa2._comment | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/todo/generic_p2p_socket_transport/comment_6_4641d3ad4a8a8f17f8df47e02555dfa2._comment diff --git a/doc/todo/generic_p2p_socket_transport/comment_6_4641d3ad4a8a8f17f8df47e02555dfa2._comment b/doc/todo/generic_p2p_socket_transport/comment_6_4641d3ad4a8a8f17f8df47e02555dfa2._comment new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce9a361d40 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/todo/generic_p2p_socket_transport/comment_6_4641d3ad4a8a8f17f8df47e02555dfa2._comment @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +[[!comment format=mdwn + username="matrss" + avatar="http://cdn.libravatar.org/avatar/cd1c0b3be1af288012e49197918395f0" + subject="comment 6" + date="2025-01-27T15:26:15Z" + content=""" +> > If the PSK were fully contained in the remote string then a third-party getting hold of that string could pretend to be the server + +> I agree this would be a problem, but how would a third-party get ahold of the string though? Remote urls don't usually get stored in the git repository, perhaps you were thinking of some other way. + +My thinking was that git remote URLs usually aren't sensitive information that inherently grant access to a repository, so a construct where the remote URL contains the credentials is just unexpected. A careless user might e.g. put it into a `type=git` special remote or treat it in some other way in which one wouldn't treat a password, without considering the implications. I am not aware of a way in which they could be leaked without user intervention, though. + +Having separate credentials explicitly named as such just seems safer. But in the end this would be the responsibility of the one implementing the p2p transport, anyway. +"""]]