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Joey Hess 2017-05-09 17:04:39 -04:00
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[[!comment format=mdwn
username="joey"
subject="""comment 1"""
date="2017-05-09T20:45:17Z"
content="""
`git-annex init` will try to auto-enable special remotes that have
been configured with autoenable=true.
So if someone can push to the repository on trustedserver, they can
set up such a special remote and cause your later clones of it to enable
the special remote. Sync will then push content to their special remote.
They could also check in additional annexed file to the git repository,
and put their contents on their special remote, and sync would then
download the contents from there.
Of course, someone who can do this has to have write access to the
git repository on trustedserver, and if they can write to the git repository,
they can also send annexed file to there, unless you've prevented that
somehow.
I had not really considered the autoenable=true as a potential security
problem, so it's good to think about it that way. I don't know if we have a
real security problem here though. It seems to rely on the attacker
having write access to the trustedserver so far.
I suppose the attacker could instead convince you to pull from a clone that
they control, and after you've pulled once, clones made from your
repository (or trustedserver after you push to there) will then autoenable
their special remote unexpectedly. Perhaps the goal then is to get git
annex sync to unexpectedly send file contents there, so they can collect
all your annexed files. Pulling from their repository once thus turns into
sending them all your annexed files going forward.
So I am starting to see this as a security problem..
Note that pulling from someone untrusted can also change other settings in
the git-annex branch (since it's automatically merged), which can probably
screw up the repository fairly well in other ways, like setting numcopies
to 0 and messing with preferred content expressions such that git-annex
wants to drop all files, or copy files to repositories where you don't want
them to go, etc.
"""]]