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[[!comment format=mdwn
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username="joey"
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subject="""comment 1"""
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date="2020-02-25T17:47:45Z"
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content="""
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If the goal is just to allow the `http_proxy` to be used even though it
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points to a proxy on the local network, then it could be done
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with some "trustproxy" config, without needing to complicate
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annex.security.allowed-http-addresses.
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I am doubtful about the security of local http proxies though,
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in the threat model that git-annex needs to worry about. When
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`http_proxy` is set, urls get passed to it as-is; git-annex is not
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currently able to interpose any checking that the url is on an allowed
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IP address.
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(git-annex cannot send http://$ipaddr/ to the http proxy,
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because the http server may require a specific hostname.
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And if git-annex only resolved the hostname and rejected ones on invalid
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IPs, then the http proxy would again resolve the hostname, and might
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see a different IP address than git-annex did.)
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So allowing a local http proxy seems just as insecure as
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annex.security.allowed-http-addresses=all.
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"""]]
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[[!comment format=mdwn
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username="joey"
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subject="""comment 2"""
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date="2020-02-25T18:32:02Z"
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content="""
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As to ports, it seems reasonable to support eg
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security.allowed-ip-addresses=127.0.0.1:80 to make sure that the massive
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electron app I have running on some random other port doesn't get abused
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to exfiltrate the contents of my $HOME. As a non-random example. :)
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"""]]
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