git style quoting for ActionItemOther

Added StringContainingQuotedPath, which is used for ActionItemOther.

In the process, checked every ActionItemOther for those containing
filenames, and made them use quoting.

Sponsored-by: Graham Spencer on Patreon
This commit is contained in:
Joey Hess 2023-04-08 15:48:32 -04:00
parent d689a5b338
commit 2ba1559a8e
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GPG key ID: DB12DB0FF05F8F38
41 changed files with 158 additions and 89 deletions

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@ -12,14 +12,6 @@ working on or in messages.
pipeable, and so should have raw filenames. Note that `find` actually
escapes such filenames when outputting to a terminal, but not a pipe.
It's possible that keys can also contain an escape sequence, eg in the
extension of a SHA-E key. So commands like `git-annex lookupkey`
and `git-annex find` that output keys might need to handle
that, when outputting to a terminal?
`git-annex metadata` could also contain an escape sequence. So could
`git-annex config --get`.
git porcelain also accepts the escaped form of files as input, necessary for
round-tripping though. git-annex currently does not. (git plumbing doesn't
either)
@ -40,3 +32,30 @@ behave more like git.
> Note that core.quotePath controls whether git quotes unicode characters
> (by default it does), so once this gets implemented, some users may want
> to set that config to false. --[[Joey]]
> Update: Most git-annex commands now quote filenames, due to work on
> ActionItem display. `git-annex find`, `git-annex info $file`,
> and everywhere filenames get
> embedded in error messages, warnings, info messages, still need to be done.
----
Also:
It's possible that keys can also contain an escape sequence, eg in the
extension of a SHA-E key. So commands like `git-annex lookupkey`
and `git-annex find` that output keys might need to handle
that, when outputting to a terminal?
Also:
`git-annex metadata` could also contain an escape sequence. So could
`git-annex config --get` and `git-annex schedule` and `git-annex wanted`
and `git-annex required` and `git-annex group`. And so could the
description of a repository. It seems that git-annex could just filter out
control characters from all of these, since they are not filenames, and
any control characters in them are surely malicious.
Also: git-annex importfeed displays urls from the feed, and should filter
out control characters. If such an url even can be parsed?
Also: git-annex initremote with autoenable may be able to cause a remote
with a malicious name to be set up?