electron/patches/chromium/process_singleton.patch
electron-roller[bot] 1a0991a9b9
chore: bump chromium to 122.0.6261.6 (main) (#40949)
* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6239.2

* chore: update patches

* refactor: extensions replaced StringPiece with string_view

Ref: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5171926

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6240.0

* chore: update patches

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6241.5

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6245.0

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6247.0

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6249.0

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6251.0

* 5192010: Rename {absl => std}::optional in //chrome/

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5192010

* 5109767: CodeHealth: Fix leaked raw_ptr in Linux ProcessSingleton

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5109767

* 5105227: [media_preview] Show requested device in permission bubble

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5105227

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6253.0

* chore: update patches

* 5180720: Polish tiled browser window UI on Linux | https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5180720

* chore: update patches

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6255.0

* chore: update patches

* 5186276: [autopip] Make "allow once" per navigation | https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5186276

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6257.0

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6259.0

* chore: update patches

* 5190661: Automated T* -> raw_ptr<T> rewrite "refresh" | https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5190661

* 5206106: Make sure RenderFrameHosts are active when printing | https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5206106

* 5202674: Reland "Automated T* -> raw_ptr<T> rewrite 'refresh'"

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5202674

* fixup CodeHealth: Fix leaked raw_ptr in Linux ProcessSingleton

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5109767

* fixup 5206106: Make sure RenderFrameHosts are active when printing

* Make legacy ToV8() helpers private to ScriptPromiseResolver, their only user

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5207474

* fixup CodeHealth: Fix leaked raw_ptr in Linux ProcessSingleton

* fixup 5186276: [autopip] Make "allow once" per navigation

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5186276

* chore: update patches after rebase

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6260.0

* 5191363: Mark LOG(FATAL) [[noreturn]]

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5191363

* fixup 5186276: [autopip] Make "allow once" per navigation

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5186276

* fixup Make legacy ToV8() helpers private to ScriptPromiseResolver

 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5207474

* chore: update patches

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6261.0

* chore: update patches

* chore: restore patch that was mistakenly removed

* 5181931: Improve LoginHandler (Part 9 / N)

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5181931

* Dispatch SiteInstanceGotProcess() only when both process and site are set.

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5142354

* 5171446: [AsyncSB] Pass navigation_id into CreateURLLoaderThrottles

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5171446

* 5213708: Move DownloadTargetInfo into components/download

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5213708

* extensions: Add a loader for Controlled Frame embedder scripts

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5202765

* [CSC][Zoom] Add initial_zoom_level to DisplayMediaInformation

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5168626

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 123.0.6262.0

* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 122.0.6261.6

* fix: suppress clang -Wimplicit-const-int-float-conversion

* fixup 5191363: Mark LOG(FATAL) [[noreturn]] for Windows

 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5191363

* 5167921: Remove Widget::IsTranslucentWindowOpacitySupported

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5167921

Also
5148392: PinnedState: Support pinned state in PlatformWindowState | https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5148392

* fixup: 5180720: Polish tiled browser window UI on Linux

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5180720

* 5170669: clipboard: Migrate DOMException constructors to RejectWith-

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5170669

* 5178824: [Fullscreen] Record UKM data

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5178824

* chore: update patches after rebase

---------

Co-authored-by: electron-roller[bot] <84116207+electron-roller[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <samuel.r.attard@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: PatchUp <73610968+patchup[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Shelley Vohr <shelley.vohr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: VerteDinde <vertedinde@electronjs.org>
Co-authored-by: John Kleinschmidt <jkleinsc@electronjs.org>
2024-01-25 12:46:30 -05:00

249 lines
10 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Raymond Zhao <raymondzhao@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 08:24:10 -0700
Subject: extend ProcessSingleton
This patch applies Electron ProcessSingleton changes onto the Chromium
files.
This patch adds a few changes to the Chromium code:
1. It adds a parameter `program_name` to the Windows constructor, making
the generated mutex name on the Windows-side program-dependent,
rather than shared between all Electron applications.
2. It adds an `IsAppSandboxed` check for macOS so that
sandboxed applications generate shorter temp paths.
3. It adds a `ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx` call to the Windows
implementation, along with a parameter `is_app_sandboxed` in the
constructor, to handle the case when the primary app is run with
admin permissions.
diff --git a/chrome/browser/process_singleton.h b/chrome/browser/process_singleton.h
index b05c0157ecca222452fb38e3b28c9d7cc6bcfbfd..02d9eabfef9521722340739bf86df3dfc30018d7 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/process_singleton.h
+++ b/chrome/browser/process_singleton.h
@@ -102,12 +102,19 @@ class ProcessSingleton {
base::RepeatingCallback<bool(const base::CommandLine& command_line,
const base::FilePath& current_directory)>;
+#if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
+ ProcessSingleton(const std::string& program_name,
+ const base::FilePath& user_data_dir,
+ bool is_sandboxed,
+ const NotificationCallback& notification_callback);
+#else
ProcessSingleton(const base::FilePath& user_data_dir,
const NotificationCallback& notification_callback);
ProcessSingleton(const ProcessSingleton&) = delete;
ProcessSingleton& operator=(const ProcessSingleton&) = delete;
+#endif
~ProcessSingleton();
// Notify another process, if available. Otherwise sets ourselves as the
@@ -176,6 +183,8 @@ class ProcessSingleton {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
bool EscapeVirtualization(const base::FilePath& user_data_dir);
+ std::string program_name_; // Used for mutexName.
+ bool is_app_sandboxed_; // Whether the Electron app is sandboxed.
HWND remote_window_; // The HWND_MESSAGE of another browser.
base::win::MessageWindow window_; // The message-only window.
bool is_virtualized_; // Stuck inside Microsoft Softricity VM environment.
diff --git a/chrome/browser/process_singleton_posix.cc b/chrome/browser/process_singleton_posix.cc
index f2913f2d78edb2547ae21816b34936d38f1870a9..298c9c81fa110ad7900d0bd6822136bb57f0382e 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/process_singleton_posix.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/process_singleton_posix.cc
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <memory>
#include <set>
#include <string>
+#include <tuple>
#include <type_traits>
#include "base/base_paths.h"
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@
#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
#include "base/task/sequenced_task_runner_helpers.h"
#include "base/task/single_thread_task_runner.h"
+#include "base/threading/thread_restrictions.h"
#include "base/threading/platform_thread.h"
#include "base/time/time.h"
#include "base/timer/timer.h"
@@ -97,7 +99,7 @@
#include "ui/base/l10n/l10n_util.h"
#include "ui/base/resource/scoped_startup_resource_bundle.h"
-#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS)
+#if 0
#include "chrome/browser/ui/process_singleton_dialog_linux.h"
#endif
@@ -343,6 +345,8 @@ bool SymlinkPath(const base::FilePath& target, const base::FilePath& path) {
bool DisplayProfileInUseError(const base::FilePath& lock_path,
const std::string& hostname,
int pid) {
+ return true;
+#if 0
// Ensure there is an instance of ResourceBundle that is initialized for
// localized string resource accesses.
ui::ScopedStartupResourceBundle ensure_startup_resource_bundle;
@@ -366,6 +370,7 @@ bool DisplayProfileInUseError(const base::FilePath& lock_path,
NOTREACHED();
return false;
+#endif
}
bool IsChromeProcess(pid_t pid) {
@@ -378,6 +383,21 @@ bool IsChromeProcess(pid_t pid) {
base::FilePath(chrome::kBrowserProcessExecutableName));
}
+bool IsAppSandboxed() {
+#if BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
+ // NB: There is no sane API for this, we have to just guess by
+ // reading tea leaves
+ base::FilePath home_dir;
+ if (!base::PathService::Get(base::DIR_HOME, &home_dir)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return home_dir.value().find("Library/Containers") != std::string::npos;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
+}
+
// A helper class to hold onto a socket.
class ScopedSocket {
public:
@@ -781,6 +801,10 @@ ProcessSingleton::~ProcessSingleton() {
if (watcher_) {
watcher_->OnEminentProcessSingletonDestruction();
}
+ // Manually free resources with IO explicitly allowed.
+ base::ScopedAllowBlocking allow_blocking;
+ watcher_ = nullptr;
+ std::ignore = socket_dir_.Delete();
}
ProcessSingleton::NotifyResult ProcessSingleton::NotifyOtherProcess() {
@@ -1047,11 +1071,32 @@ bool ProcessSingleton::Create() {
// Create the socket file somewhere in /tmp which is usually mounted as a
// normal filesystem. Some network filesystems (notably AFS) are screwy and
// do not support Unix domain sockets.
- if (!socket_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create socket directory.";
+ base::FilePath tmp_dir;
+ if (!base::GetTempDir(&tmp_dir)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get temporary directory.";
return false;
}
+ if (IsAppSandboxed()) {
+ // For sandboxed applications, the tmp dir could be too long to fit
+ // addr->sun_path, so we need to make it as short as possible.
+ if (!socket_dir_.Set(tmp_dir.Append("S"))) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set socket directory.";
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Create the socket file somewhere in /tmp which is usually mounted as a
+ // normal filesystem. Some network filesystems (notably AFS) are screwy and
+ // do not support Unix domain sockets.
+ // Prefer CreateUniqueTempDirUnderPath rather than CreateUniqueTempDir as
+ // the latter will calculate unique paths based on bundle ids which can
+ // increase the socket path length than what is allowed.
+ if (!socket_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDirUnderPath(tmp_dir)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create socket directory.";
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
// Check that the directory was created with the correct permissions.
int dir_mode = 0;
CHECK(base::GetPosixFilePermissions(socket_dir_.GetPath(), &dir_mode) &&
diff --git a/chrome/browser/process_singleton_win.cc b/chrome/browser/process_singleton_win.cc
index 071f3c05b8f899857531f2f08c05c7f2551eb4d0..11f35769cc53b4aa111a319d155a3916f0040fa7 100644
--- a/chrome/browser/process_singleton_win.cc
+++ b/chrome/browser/process_singleton_win.cc
@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
#include "base/win/wmi.h"
#include "chrome/browser/process_singleton_internal.h"
#include "chrome/browser/shell_integration.h"
+#if 0
#include "chrome/browser/ui/simple_message_box.h"
+#endif
#include "chrome/browser/win/chrome_process_finder.h"
#include "chrome/common/chrome_constants.h"
#include "chrome/common/chrome_paths.h"
@@ -163,6 +165,7 @@ bool ProcessLaunchNotification(
}
bool DisplayShouldKillMessageBox() {
+#if 0
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "ProcessSingleton:DisplayShouldKillMessageBox");
// Ensure there is an instance of ResourceBundle that is initialized for
@@ -173,6 +176,10 @@ bool DisplayShouldKillMessageBox() {
NULL, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PRODUCT_NAME),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_BROWSER_HUNGBROWSER_MESSAGE)) !=
chrome::MESSAGE_BOX_RESULT_NO;
+#endif
+ // This is called when the secondary process can't ping the primary
+ // process.
+ return false;
}
// Function was copied from Process::Terminate.
@@ -255,9 +262,13 @@ bool ProcessSingleton::EscapeVirtualization(
}
ProcessSingleton::ProcessSingleton(
+ const std::string& program_name,
const base::FilePath& user_data_dir,
+ bool is_app_sandboxed,
const NotificationCallback& notification_callback)
: notification_callback_(notification_callback),
+ program_name_(program_name),
+ is_app_sandboxed_(is_app_sandboxed),
is_virtualized_(false),
lock_file_(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE),
user_data_dir_(user_data_dir),
@@ -377,7 +388,7 @@ ProcessSingleton::NotifyOtherProcessOrCreate() {
bool ProcessSingleton::Create() {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "ProcessSingleton::Create");
- static const wchar_t kMutexName[] = L"Local\\ChromeProcessSingletonStartup!";
+ std::wstring mutexName = base::UTF8ToWide("Local\\" + program_name_ + "ProcessSingletonStartup");
remote_window_ = chrome::FindRunningChromeWindow(user_data_dir_);
if (!remote_window_ && !EscapeVirtualization(user_data_dir_)) {
@@ -386,7 +397,7 @@ bool ProcessSingleton::Create() {
// access. As documented, it's clearer to NOT request ownership on creation
// since it isn't guaranteed we will get it. It is better to create it
// without ownership and explicitly get the ownership afterward.
- base::win::ScopedHandle only_me(::CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, kMutexName));
+ base::win::ScopedHandle only_me(::CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, mutexName.c_str()));
if (!only_me.IsValid()) {
DPLOG(FATAL) << "CreateMutex failed";
return false;
@@ -425,6 +436,17 @@ bool ProcessSingleton::Create() {
window_.CreateNamed(base::BindRepeating(&ProcessLaunchNotification,
notification_callback_),
user_data_dir_.value());
+
+ // When the app is sandboxed, firstly, the app should not be in
+ // admin mode, and even if it somehow is, messages from an unelevated
+ // instance should not be able to be sent to it.
+ if (!is_app_sandboxed_) {
+ // NB: Ensure that if the primary app gets started as elevated
+ // admin inadvertently, secondary windows running not as elevated
+ // will still be able to send messages.
+ ::ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx(window_.hwnd(), WM_COPYDATA, MSGFLT_ALLOW,
+ NULL);
+ }
CHECK(result && window_.hwnd());
}
}