📝 Fix some errors
This commit is contained in:
Felix Rieseberg
parent
b32a7d4cb4
commit
ce969c9326
1 changed files with 183 additions and 183 deletions
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ effort are always very welcome.
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A security issue exists whenever you receive code from a remote destination and
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execute it locally. As an example, consider a remote website being displayed
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inside a [`BrowserWindow`](browser-window). If an attacker somehow manages to
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inside a [`BrowserWindow`][browser-window]. If an attacker somehow manages to
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change said content (either by attacking the source directly, or by sitting
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between your app and the actual destination), they will be able to execute
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native code on the user's machine.
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@ -52,29 +52,29 @@ native code on the user's machine.
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> :warning: Under no circumstances should you load and execute remote code with
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Node.js integration enabled. Instead, use only local files (packaged together
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with your application) to execute Node.js code. To display remote content, use
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the [`webview`](web-view) tag and make sure to disable the `nodeIntegration`.
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the [`webview`][web-view] tag and make sure to disable the `nodeIntegration`.
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#### Checklist: Security Recommendations
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This is not bulletproof, but at the least, you should attempt the following:
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* [Only load secure content](#only-load-secure-content)
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* [Disable the Node.js integration in all renderers that display remote content](#disable-node.js-integration-for-remote-content)
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* [Enable context isolation in all renderers that display remote content](#enable-context-isolation-for-remote-content)
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* [Use `ses.setPermissionRequestHandler()` in all sessions that load remote content](#handle-session-permission-requests-from-remote-content)
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* [Do not disable `webSecurity`](#do-not-disable-websecurity)
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* [Define a `Content-Security-Policy`](#define-a-content-security-policy)
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1) [Only load secure content](#only-load-secure-content)
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2) [Disable the Node.js integration in all renderers that display remote content](#disable-node.js-integration-for-remote-content)
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3) [Enable context isolation in all renderers that display remote content](#enable-context-isolation-for-remote-content)
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4) [Use `ses.setPermissionRequestHandler()` in all sessions that load remote content](#handle-session-permission-requests-from-remote-content)
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5) [Do not disable `webSecurity`](#do-not-disable-websecurity)
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6) [Define a `Content-Security-Policy`](#define-a-content-security-policy)
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and use restrictive rules (i.e. `script-src 'self'`)
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* [Override and disable `eval`](#override-and-disable-eval)
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7) [Override and disable `eval`](#override-and-disable-eval)
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, which allows strings to be executed as code.
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* [Do not set `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true`](#do-not-set-allowRunningInsecureContent-to-true)
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* [Do not enable experimental features](#do-not-enable-experimental-features)
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* [Do not use `blinkFeatures`](#do-not-use-blinkfeatures)
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* [WebViews: Do not use `allowpopups`](#do-not-use-allowpopups)
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* [WebViews: Verify the options and params of all `<webview>` tags](#verify-webview-options-before-creation)
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8) [Do not set `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true`](#do-not-set-allowRunningInsecureContent-to-true)
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9) [Do not enable experimental features](#do-not-enable-experimental-features)
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10) [Do not use `blinkFeatures`](#do-not-use-blinkfeatures)
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11) [WebViews: Do not use `allowpopups`](#do-not-use-allowpopups)
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12) [WebViews: Verify the options and params of all `<webview>` tags](#verify-webview-options-before-creation)
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## Only Load Secure Content
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## 1) Only Load Secure Content
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Any resources not included with your application should be loaded using a
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secure protocol like `HTTPS`. In other words, do not use insecure protocols
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@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ browserWindow.loadURL('https://my-website.com')
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```
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## Disable Node.js Integration for Remote Content
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## 2) Disable Node.js Integration for Remote Content
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It is paramount that you disable Node.js integration in any renderer
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([`BrowserWindow`](browser-window), [`BrowserView`](browser-view), or
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[`WebView`](web-view)) that loads remote content. The goal is to limit the
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([`BrowserWindow`][browser-window], [`BrowserView`][browser-view], or
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[`WebView`][web-view]) that loads remote content. The goal is to limit the
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powers you grant to remote content, thus making it dramatically more difficult
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for an attacker to harm your users should they gain the ability to execute
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JavaScript on your website.
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@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ window.readConfig = function () {
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```
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## Enable Context Isolation for Remote Content
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## 3) Enable Context Isolation for Remote Content
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Context isolation is an Electron feature that allows developers to run code
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in preload scripts and in Electron APIs in a dedicated JavaScript context. In
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@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
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```
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## Handle Session Permission Requests From Remote Content
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## 4) Handle Session Permission Requests From Remote Content
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You may have seen permission requests while using Chrome: They pop up whenever
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the website attempts to use a feature that the user has to manually approve (
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@ -277,171 +277,13 @@ session
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```
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## Define a Content Security Policy
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A Content Security Policy (CSP) is an additional layer of protection against
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cross-site-scripting attacks and data injection attacks. We recommend that they
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be enabled by any website you load inside Electron.
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### Why?
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CSP allows the server serving content to restrict and control the resources
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Electron can load for that given web page. `https://your-page.com` should
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be allowed to load scripts from the origins you defined while scripts from
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`https://evil.attacker.com` should not be allowed to run. Defining a CSP is an
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easy way to improve your applications security.
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### How?
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Electron respects [the `Content-Security-Policy` HTTP header](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy)
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and the respective `<meta>` tag.
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The following CSP will allow Electron to execute scripts from the current
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website and from `apis.mydomain.com`.
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```txt
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// Bad
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Content-Security-Policy: '*'
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// Good
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Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://apis.mydomain.com
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```
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## Override and Disable `eval`
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`eval()` is a core JavaScript method that allows the execution of JavaScript
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from a string. Disabling it disables your app's ability to evaluate JavaScript
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that is not known in advance.
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### Why?
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The `eval()` method has precisely one mission: To evaluate a series of
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characters as JavaScript and execute it. It is a required method whenever you
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need to evaluate code that is not known ahead of time. While legitimate use
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cases exist, just like any other code generators, `eval()` is difficult to
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harden.
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Generally speaking, it is easier to completely disable `eval()` than to make
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it bulletproof. Thus, if you do not need it, it is a good idea to disable it.
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### How?
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```js
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// ESLint will warn about any use of eval(), even this one
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// eslint-disable-next-line
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window.eval = global.eval = function () {
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throw new Error(`Sorry, this app does not support window.eval().`)
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}
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```
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## Do Not Set `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true`
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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By default, Electron will now allow websites loaded over `HTTPS` to load and
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execute scripts, CSS, or plugins from insecure sources (`HTTP`). Setting the
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property `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true` disables that protection.
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Loading the initial HTML of a website over `HTTPS` and attempting to load
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subsequent resources via `HTTP` is also known as "mixed content".
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### Why?
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Simply put, loading content over `HTTPS` assures the authenticity and integrity
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of the loaded resources while encrypting the traffic itself. See the section on
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[only displaying secure content](#only-display-secure-content) for more details.
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### How?
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```js
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// Bad
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
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webPreferences: {
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allowRunningInsecureContent: true
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}
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})
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```
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```js
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// Good
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({})
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```
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## Do Not Enable Experimental Features
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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Advanced users of Electron can enable experimental Chromium features using the
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`experimentalFeatures` and `experimentalCanvasFeatures` properties.
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### Why?
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Experimental features are, as the name suggests, experimental and have not been
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enabled for all Chromium users. Futhermore, their impact on Electron as a whole
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has likely not been tested.
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Legitimate use cases exist, but unless you know what you are doing, you should
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not enable this property.
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### How?
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```js
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// Bad
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
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webPreferences: {
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experimentalFeatures: true
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}
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})
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```
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```js
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// Good
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({})
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```
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## Do Not Use `blinkFeatures`
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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Blink is the name of the rendering engine behind Chromium. As with
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`experimentalFeatures`, the `blinkFeatures` property allows developers to
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enable features that have been disabled by default.
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### Why?
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Generally speaking, there are likely good reasons if a feature was not enabled
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by default. Legitimate use cases for enabling specific features exist. As a
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developer, you should know exactly why you need to enable a feature, what the
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ramifications are, and how it impacts the security of your application. Under
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no circumstances should you enable features speculatively.
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### How?
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```js
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// Bad
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
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webPreferences: {
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blinkFeatures: ['ExecCommandInJavaScript']
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}
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})
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```
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```js
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// Good
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow()
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```
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## Do Not Disable WebSecurity
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## 5) Do Not Disable WebSecurity
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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You may have already guessed that disabling the `webSecurity` property on a
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renderer process ([`BrowserWindow`](browser-window),
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[`BrowserView`](browser-view), or [`WebView`](web-view)) disables crucial
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renderer process ([`BrowserWindow`][browser-window],
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[`BrowserView`][browser-view], or [`WebView`][web-view]) disables crucial
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security features.
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Do not disable `webSecurity` in production applications.
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@ -476,7 +318,165 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow()
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```
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## Do Not Use `allowpopups`
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## 6) Define a Content Security Policy
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A Content Security Policy (CSP) is an additional layer of protection against
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cross-site-scripting attacks and data injection attacks. We recommend that they
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be enabled by any website you load inside Electron.
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### Why?
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CSP allows the server serving content to restrict and control the resources
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Electron can load for that given web page. `https://your-page.com` should
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be allowed to load scripts from the origins you defined while scripts from
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`https://evil.attacker.com` should not be allowed to run. Defining a CSP is an
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easy way to improve your applications security.
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### How?
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Electron respects [the `Content-Security-Policy` HTTP header](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy)
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and the respective `<meta>` tag.
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The following CSP will allow Electron to execute scripts from the current
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website and from `apis.mydomain.com`.
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```txt
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// Bad
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Content-Security-Policy: '*'
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// Good
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Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://apis.mydomain.com
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```
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## 7) Override and Disable `eval`
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`eval()` is a core JavaScript method that allows the execution of JavaScript
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from a string. Disabling it disables your app's ability to evaluate JavaScript
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that is not known in advance.
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### Why?
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The `eval()` method has precisely one mission: To evaluate a series of
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characters as JavaScript and execute it. It is a required method whenever you
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need to evaluate code that is not known ahead of time. While legitimate use
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cases exist, just like any other code generators, `eval()` is difficult to
|
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harden.
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Generally speaking, it is easier to completely disable `eval()` than to make
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it bulletproof. Thus, if you do not need it, it is a good idea to disable it.
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### How?
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```js
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// ESLint will warn about any use of eval(), even this one
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// eslint-disable-next-line
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window.eval = global.eval = function () {
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throw new Error(`Sorry, this app does not support window.eval().`)
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}
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```
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## 8) Do Not Set `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true`
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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By default, Electron will now allow websites loaded over `HTTPS` to load and
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execute scripts, CSS, or plugins from insecure sources (`HTTP`). Setting the
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property `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true` disables that protection.
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Loading the initial HTML of a website over `HTTPS` and attempting to load
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subsequent resources via `HTTP` is also known as "mixed content".
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### Why?
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Simply put, loading content over `HTTPS` assures the authenticity and integrity
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of the loaded resources while encrypting the traffic itself. See the section on
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[only displaying secure content](#only-display-secure-content) for more details.
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### How?
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```js
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// Bad
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
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webPreferences: {
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allowRunningInsecureContent: true
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}
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})
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```
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```js
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// Good
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({})
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```
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## 9) Do Not Enable Experimental Features
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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Advanced users of Electron can enable experimental Chromium features using the
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`experimentalFeatures` and `experimentalCanvasFeatures` properties.
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### Why?
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Experimental features are, as the name suggests, experimental and have not been
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enabled for all Chromium users. Futhermore, their impact on Electron as a whole
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has likely not been tested.
|
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|
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Legitimate use cases exist, but unless you know what you are doing, you should
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not enable this property.
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### How?
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```js
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// Bad
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
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webPreferences: {
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experimentalFeatures: true
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}
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})
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```
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```js
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// Good
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({})
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```
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## 10) Do Not Use `blinkFeatures`
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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|
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Blink is the name of the rendering engine behind Chromium. As with
|
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`experimentalFeatures`, the `blinkFeatures` property allows developers to
|
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enable features that have been disabled by default.
|
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|
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### Why?
|
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|
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Generally speaking, there are likely good reasons if a feature was not enabled
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by default. Legitimate use cases for enabling specific features exist. As a
|
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developer, you should know exactly why you need to enable a feature, what the
|
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ramifications are, and how it impacts the security of your application. Under
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no circumstances should you enable features speculatively.
|
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|
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### How?
|
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```js
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// Bad
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
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webPreferences: {
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blinkFeatures: ['ExecCommandInJavaScript']
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}
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})
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```
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```js
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// Good
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const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow()
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```
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## 11) Do Not Use `allowpopups`
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_Recommendation is Electron's default_
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|
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|
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@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ you know it needs that feature.
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```
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|
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|
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## Verify WebView Options Before Creation
|
||||
## 12) Verify WebView Options Before Creation
|
||||
|
||||
A WebView created in a renderer process that does not have Node.js integration
|
||||
enabled will not be able to enable integration itself. However, a WebView will
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue