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docs/tutorial/security.md
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@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
# Security, Native Capabilities, and Your Responsibility
---
title: Security
description: A set of guidelines for building secure Electron apps
slug: security
hide_title: true
toc_max_heading_level: 3
---
# Security
As web developers, we usually enjoy the strong security net of the browser -
:::info Reporting security issues
For information on how to properly disclose an Electron vulnerability,
see [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/electron/electron/tree/main/SECURITY.md).
For upstream Chromium vulnerabilities: Electron keeps up to date with alternating
Chromium releases. For more information, see the
[Electron Release Timelines](../tutorial/electron-timelines.md) document.
:::
## Preface
As web developers, we usually enjoy the strong security net of the browser —
the risks associated with the code we write are relatively small. Our websites
are granted limited powers in a sandbox, and we trust that our users enjoy a
browser built by a large team of engineers that is able to quickly respond to
@ -17,20 +35,12 @@ With that in mind, be aware that displaying arbitrary content from untrusted
sources poses a severe security risk that Electron is not intended to handle.
In fact, the most popular Electron apps (Atom, Slack, Visual Studio Code, etc)
display primarily local content (or trusted, secure remote content without Node
integration) – if your application executes code from an online source, it is
integration) — if your application executes code from an online source, it is
your responsibility to ensure that the code is not malicious.
## Reporting Security Issues
## General guidelines
For information on how to properly disclose an Electron vulnerability,
see [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/electron/electron/tree/main/SECURITY.md)
## Chromium Security Issues and Upgrades
Electron keeps up to date with alternating Chromium releases. For more information,
see the [Electron Release Cadence blog post](https://electronjs.org/blog/12-week-cadence).
## Security Is Everyone's Responsibility
### Security is everyone's responsibility
It is important to remember that the security of your Electron application is
the result of the overall security of the framework foundation
@ -56,7 +66,7 @@ is your own code. Common web vulnerabilities, such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
have a higher security impact on Electron applications hence it is highly recommended
to adopt secure software development best practices and perform security testing.
## Isolation For Untrusted Content
### Isolation for untrusted content
A security issue exists whenever you receive code from an untrusted source (e.g.
a remote server) and execute it locally. As an example, consider a remote
@ -65,72 +75,74 @@ an attacker somehow manages to change said content (either by attacking the
source directly, or by sitting between your app and the actual destination), they
will be able to execute native code on the user's machine.
> :warning: Under no circumstances should you load and execute remote code with
:::warning
Under no circumstances should you load and execute remote code with
Node.js integration enabled. Instead, use only local files (packaged together
with your application) to execute Node.js code. To display remote content, use
the [`<webview>`][webview-tag] tag or [`BrowserView`][browser-view], make sure
to disable the `nodeIntegration` and enable `contextIsolation`.
:::
## Electron Security Warnings
From Electron 2.0 on, developers will see warnings and recommendations printed
to the developer console. They only show up when the binary's name is Electron,
indicating that a developer is currently looking at the console.
:::info Electron security warnings
Security warnings and recommendations are printed to the developer console.
They only show up when the binary's name is Electron, indicating that a developer
is currently looking at the console.
You can force-enable or force-disable these warnings by setting
`ELECTRON_ENABLE_SECURITY_WARNINGS` or `ELECTRON_DISABLE_SECURITY_WARNINGS` on
either `process.env` or the `window` object.
:::
## Checklist: Security Recommendations
## Checklist: Security recommendations
You should at least follow these steps to improve the security of your application:
1. [Only load secure content](#1-only-load-secure-content)
2. [Disable the Node.js integration in all renderers that display remote content](#2-do-not-enable-nodejs-integration-for-remote-content)
3. [Enable context isolation in all renderers that display remote content](#3-enable-context-isolation-for-remote-content)
4. [Enable sandboxing](#4-enable-sandboxing)
4. [Enable process sandboxing](#4-enable-process-sandboxing)
5. [Use `ses.setPermissionRequestHandler()` in all sessions that load remote content](#5-handle-session-permission-requests-from-remote-content)
6. [Do not disable `webSecurity`](#6-do-not-disable-websecurity)
7. [Define a `Content-Security-Policy`](#7-define-a-content-security-policy) and use restrictive rules (i.e. `script-src 'self'`)
8. [Do not set `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true`](#8-do-not-set-allowrunninginsecurecontent-to-true)
8. [Do not enable `allowRunningInsecureContent`](#8-do-not-enable-allowrunninginsecurecontent)
9. [Do not enable experimental features](#9-do-not-enable-experimental-features)
10. [Do not use `enableBlinkFeatures`](#10-do-not-use-enableblinkfeatures)
11. [`<webview>`: Do not use `allowpopups`](#11-do-not-use-allowpopups)
11. [`<webview>`: Do not use `allowpopups`](#11-do-not-use-allowpopups-for-webviews)
12. [`<webview>`: Verify options and params](#12-verify-webview-options-before-creation)
13. [Disable or limit navigation](#13-disable-or-limit-navigation)
14. [Disable or limit creation of new windows](#14-disable-or-limit-creation-of-new-windows)
15. [Do not use `openExternal` with untrusted content](#15-do-not-use-openexternal-with-untrusted-content)
15. [Do not use `shell.openExternal` with untrusted content](#15-do-not-use-shellopenexternal-with-untrusted-content)
16. [Use a current version of Electron](#16-use-a-current-version-of-electron)
To automate the detection of misconfigurations and insecure patterns, it is
possible to use
[electronegativity](https://github.com/doyensec/electronegativity). For
[Electronegativity](https://github.com/doyensec/electronegativity). For
additional details on potential weaknesses and implementation bugs when
developing applications using Electron, please refer to this [guide for
developers and auditors](https://doyensec.com/resources/us-17-Carettoni-Electronegativity-A-Study-Of-Electron-Security-wp.pdf)
developers and auditors](https://doyensec.com/resources/us-17-Carettoni-Electronegativity-A-Study-Of-Electron-Security-wp.pdf).
## 1) Only Load Secure Content
### 1. Only load secure content
Any resources not included with your application should be loaded using a
secure protocol like `HTTPS`. In other words, do not use insecure protocols
like `HTTP`. Similarly, we recommend the use of `WSS` over `WS`, `FTPS` over
`FTP`, and so on.
### Why?
#### Why?
`HTTPS` has three main benefits:
1) It authenticates the remote server, ensuring your app connects to the correct
1. It authenticates the remote server, ensuring your app connects to the correct
host instead of an impersonator.
2) It ensures data integrity, asserting that the data was not modified while in
1. It ensures data integrity, asserting that the data was not modified while in
transit between your application and the host.
3) It encrypts the traffic between your user and the destination host, making it
1. It encrypts the traffic between your user and the destination host, making it
more difficult to eavesdrop on the information sent between your app and
the host.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
browserWindow.loadURL('http://example.com')
@ -138,7 +150,7 @@ browserWindow.loadURL('http://example.com')
browserWindow.loadURL('https://example.com')
```
```html
```html title='index.html (Renderer Process)'
<!-- Bad -->
<script crossorigin src="http://example.com/react.js"></script>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="http://example.com/style.css">
@ -148,9 +160,11 @@ browserWindow.loadURL('https://example.com')
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://example.com/style.css">
```
## 2) Do not enable Node.js Integration for Remote Content
### 2. Do not enable Node.js integration for remote content
_This recommendation is the default behavior in Electron since 5.0.0._
:::info
This recommendation is the default behavior in Electron since 5.0.0.
:::
It is paramount that you do not enable Node.js integration in any renderer
([`BrowserWindow`][browser-window], [`BrowserView`][browser-view], or
@ -163,7 +177,7 @@ After this, you can grant additional permissions for specific hosts. For example
if you are opening a BrowserWindow pointed at `https://example.com/`, you can
give that website exactly the abilities it needs, but no more.
### Why?
#### Why?
A cross-site-scripting (XSS) attack is more dangerous if an attacker can jump
out of the renderer process and execute code on the user's computer.
@ -172,12 +186,13 @@ power is usually limited to messing with the website that they are executed on.
Disabling Node.js integration helps prevent an XSS from being escalated into a
so-called "Remote Code Execution" (RCE) attack.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
contextIsolation: false,
nodeIntegration: true,
nodeIntegrationInWorker: true
}
@ -186,7 +201,7 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
mainWindow.loadURL('https://example.com')
```
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Good
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
@ -197,7 +212,7 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
mainWindow.loadURL('https://example.com')
```
```html
```html title='index.html (Renderer Process)'
<!-- Bad -->
<webview nodeIntegration src="page.html"></webview>
@ -208,21 +223,13 @@ mainWindow.loadURL('https://example.com')
When disabling Node.js integration, you can still expose APIs to your website that
do consume Node.js modules or features. Preload scripts continue to have access
to `require` and other Node.js features, allowing developers to expose a custom
API to remotely loaded content.
API to remotely loaded content via the [contextBridge API](../api/context-bridge.md).
In the following example preload script, the later loaded website will have
access to a `window.readConfig()` method, but no Node.js features.
### 3. Enable Context Isolation for remote content
```js
const { readFileSync } = require('fs')
window.readConfig = () => {
const data = readFileSync('./config.json')
return data
}
```
## 3) Enable Context Isolation for Remote Content
:::info
This recommendation is the default behavior in Electron since 12.0.0.
:::
Context isolation is an Electron feature that allows developers to run code
in preload scripts and in Electron APIs in a dedicated JavaScript context. In
@ -235,48 +242,42 @@ to enable this behavior.
Even when `nodeIntegration: false` is used, to truly enforce strong isolation
and prevent the use of Node primitives `contextIsolation` **must** also be used.
### Why & How?
:::info
For more information on what `contextIsolation` is and how to enable it please
see our dedicated [Context Isolation](context-isolation.md) document.
:::info
## 4) Enable Sandboxing
### 4. Enable process sandboxing
[Sandboxing](sandbox.md) is a Chromium feature that uses the operating system to
[Sandboxing](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/design/sandbox.md)
is a Chromium feature that uses the operating system to
significantly limit what renderer processes have access to. You should enable
the sandbox in all renderers. Loading, reading or processing any untrusted
content in an unsandboxed process, including the main process, is not advised.
### How?
:::info
For more information on what `contextIsolation` is and how to enable it please
see our dedicated [Process Sandboxing](sandbox.md) document.
:::info
When creating a window, pass the `sandbox: true` option in `webPreferences`:
### 5. Handle session permission requests from remote content
```js
const win = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
sandbox: true
}
})
```
## 5) Handle Session Permission Requests From Remote Content
You may have seen permission requests while using Chrome: They pop up whenever
You may have seen permission requests while using Chrome: they pop up whenever
the website attempts to use a feature that the user has to manually approve (
like notifications).
The API is based on the [Chromium permissions API](https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/permissions)
and implements the same types of permissions.
### Why?
#### Why?
By default, Electron will automatically approve all permission requests unless
the developer has manually configured a custom handler. While a solid default,
security-conscious developers might want to assume the very opposite.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
const { session } = require('electron')
session
@ -297,9 +298,11 @@ session
})
```
## 6) Do Not Disable WebSecurity
### 6. Do not disable `webSecurity`
_Recommendation is Electron's default_
:::info
This recommendation is Electron's default.
:::
You may have already guessed that disabling the `webSecurity` property on a
renderer process ([`BrowserWindow`][browser-window],
@ -308,15 +311,15 @@ security features.
Do not disable `webSecurity` in production applications.
### Why?
#### Why?
Disabling `webSecurity` will disable the same-origin policy and set
`allowRunningInsecureContent` property to `true`. In other words, it allows
the execution of insecure code from different domains.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
@ -325,12 +328,12 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
})
```
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Good
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow()
```
```html
```html title='index.html (Renderer Process)'
<!-- Bad -->
<webview disablewebsecurity src="page.html"></webview>
@ -338,13 +341,13 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow()
<webview src="page.html"></webview>
```
## 7) Define a Content Security Policy
### 7. Define a Content Security Policy
A Content Security Policy (CSP) is an additional layer of protection against
cross-site-scripting attacks and data injection attacks. We recommend that they
be enabled by any website you load inside Electron.
### Why?
#### Why?
CSP allows the server serving content to restrict and control the resources
Electron can load for that given web page. `https://example.com` should
@ -352,6 +355,8 @@ be allowed to load scripts from the origins you defined while scripts from
`https://evil.attacker.com` should not be allowed to run. Defining a CSP is an
easy way to improve your application's security.
#### How?
The following CSP will allow Electron to execute scripts from the current
website and from `apis.example.com`.
@ -363,14 +368,14 @@ Content-Security-Policy: '*'
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://apis.example.com
```
### CSP HTTP Header
#### CSP HTTP headers
Electron respects the [`Content-Security-Policy` HTTP header](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy)
which can be set using Electron's
[`webRequest.onHeadersReceived`](../api/web-request.md#webrequestonheadersreceivedfilter-listener)
handler:
```javascript
```javascript title='main.js (Main Process)'
const { session } = require('electron')
session.defaultSession.webRequest.onHeadersReceived((details, callback) => {
@ -383,20 +388,22 @@ session.defaultSession.webRequest.onHeadersReceived((details, callback) => {
})
```
### CSP Meta Tag
#### CSP meta tag
CSP's preferred delivery mechanism is an HTTP header, however it is not possible
CSP's preferred delivery mechanism is an HTTP header. However, it is not possible
to use this method when loading a resource using the `file://` protocol. It can
be useful in some cases, such as using the `file://` protocol, to set a policy
on a page directly in the markup using a `<meta>` tag:
be useful in some cases to set a policy on a page directly in the markup using a
`<meta>` tag:
```html
```html title='index.html (Renderer Process)'
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'">
```
## 8) Do Not Set `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true`
### 8. Do not enable `allowRunningInsecureContent`
_Recommendation is Electron's default_
:::info
This recommendation is Electron's default.
:::
By default, Electron will not allow websites loaded over `HTTPS` to load and
execute scripts, CSS, or plugins from insecure sources (`HTTP`). Setting the
@ -405,15 +412,15 @@ property `allowRunningInsecureContent` to `true` disables that protection.
Loading the initial HTML of a website over `HTTPS` and attempting to load
subsequent resources via `HTTP` is also known as "mixed content".
### Why?
#### Why?
Loading content over `HTTPS` assures the authenticity and integrity
of the loaded resources while encrypting the traffic itself. See the section on
[only displaying secure content](#1-only-load-secure-content) for more details.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
@ -422,19 +429,21 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
})
```
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Good
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({})
```
## 9) Do Not Enable Experimental Features
### 9. Do not enable experimental features
_Recommendation is Electron's default_
:::info
This recommendation is Electron's default.
:::
Advanced users of Electron can enable experimental Chromium features using the
`experimentalFeatures` property.
### Why?
#### Why?
Experimental features are, as the name suggests, experimental and have not been
enabled for all Chromium users. Furthermore, their impact on Electron as a whole
@ -443,9 +452,9 @@ has likely not been tested.
Legitimate use cases exist, but unless you know what you are doing, you should
not enable this property.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
@ -454,20 +463,22 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
})
```
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Good
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({})
```
## 10) Do Not Use `enableBlinkFeatures`
### 10. Do not use `enableBlinkFeatures`
_Recommendation is Electron's default_
:::info
This recommendation is Electron's default.
:::
Blink is the name of the rendering engine behind Chromium. As with
`experimentalFeatures`, the `enableBlinkFeatures` property allows developers to
enable features that have been disabled by default.
### Why?
#### Why?
Generally speaking, there are likely good reasons if a feature was not enabled
by default. Legitimate use cases for enabling specific features exist. As a
@ -475,9 +486,9 @@ developer, you should know exactly why you need to enable a feature, what the
ramifications are, and how it impacts the security of your application. Under
no circumstances should you enable features speculatively.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
@ -486,14 +497,16 @@ const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
})
```
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Good
const mainWindow = new BrowserWindow()
```
## 11) Do Not Use `allowpopups`
### 11. Do not use `allowpopups` for WebViews
_Recommendation is Electron's default_
:::info
This recommendation is Electron's default.
:::
If you are using [`<webview>`][webview-tag], you might need the pages and scripts
loaded in your `<webview>` tag to open new windows. The `allowpopups` attribute
@ -501,16 +514,16 @@ enables them to create new [`BrowserWindows`][browser-window] using the
`window.open()` method. `<webview>` tags are otherwise not allowed to create new
windows.
### Why?
#### Why?
If you do not need popups, you are better off not allowing the creation of
new [`BrowserWindows`][browser-window] by default. This follows the principle
of minimally required access: Don't let a website create new popups unless
you know it needs that feature.
### How?
#### How?
```html
```html title='index.html (Renderer Process)'
<!-- Bad -->
<webview allowpopups src="page.html"></webview>
@ -518,7 +531,7 @@ you know it needs that feature.
<webview src="page.html"></webview>
```
## 12) Verify WebView Options Before Creation
### 12. Verify WebView options before creation
A WebView created in a renderer process that does not have Node.js integration
enabled will not be able to enable integration itself. However, a WebView will
@ -528,7 +541,7 @@ It is a good idea to control the creation of new [`<webview>`][webview-tag] tags
from the main process and to verify that their webPreferences do not disable
security features.
### Why?
#### Why?
Since `<webview>` live in the DOM, they can be created by a script running on your
website even if Node.js integration is otherwise disabled.
@ -538,13 +551,13 @@ a renderer process. In most cases, developers do not need to disable any of
those features - and you should therefore not allow different configurations
for newly created [`<webview>`][webview-tag] tags.
### How?
#### How?
Before a [`<webview>`][webview-tag] tag is attached, Electron will fire the
`will-attach-webview` event on the hosting `webContents`. Use the event to
prevent the creation of `webViews` with possibly insecure options.
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => {
contents.on('will-attach-webview', (event, webPreferences, params) => {
// Strip away preload scripts if unused or verify their location is legitimate
@ -562,16 +575,16 @@ app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => {
})
```
Again, this list merely minimizes the risk, it does not remove it. If your goal
Again, this list merely minimizes the risk, but does not remove it. If your goal
is to display a website, a browser will be a more secure option.
## 13) Disable or limit navigation
### 13. Disable or limit navigation
If your app has no need to navigate or only needs to navigate to known pages,
it is a good idea to limit navigation outright to that known scope, disallowing
any other kinds of navigation.
### Why?
#### Why?
Navigation is a common attack vector. If an attacker can convince your app to
navigate away from its current page, they can possibly force your app to open
@ -584,7 +597,7 @@ A common attack pattern is that the attacker convinces your app's users to
interact with the app in such a way that it navigates to one of the attacker's
pages. This is usually done via links, plugins, or other user-generated content.
### How?
#### How?
If your app has no need for navigation, you can call `event.preventDefault()`
in a [`will-navigate`][will-navigate] handler. If you know which pages your app
@ -595,7 +608,7 @@ We recommend that you use Node's parser for URLs. Simple string comparisons can
sometimes be fooled - a `startsWith('https://example.com')` test would let
`https://example.com.attacker.com` through.
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
const URL = require('url').URL
app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => {
@ -609,12 +622,12 @@ app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => {
})
```
## 14) Disable or limit creation of new windows
### 14. Disable or limit creation of new windows
If you have a known set of windows, it's a good idea to limit the creation of
additional windows in your app.
### Why?
#### Why?
Much like navigation, the creation of new `webContents` is a common attack
vector. Attackers attempt to convince your app to create new windows, frames,
@ -627,7 +640,7 @@ security at no cost. This is commonly the case for apps that open one
`BrowserWindow` and do not need to open an arbitrary number of additional
windows at runtime.
### How?
#### How?
[`webContents`][web-contents] will delegate to its [window open
handler][window-open-handler] before creating new windows. The handler will
@ -635,7 +648,7 @@ receive, amongst other parameters, the `url` the window was requested to open
and the options used to create it. We recommend that you register a handler to
monitor the creation of windows, and deny any unexpected window creation.
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
const { shell } = require('electron')
app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => {
@ -656,40 +669,40 @@ app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => {
})
```
## 15) Do not use `openExternal` with untrusted content
### 15. Do not use `shell.openExternal` with untrusted content
Shell's [`openExternal`][open-external] allows opening a given protocol URI with
the desktop's native utilities. On macOS, for instance, this function is similar
to the `open` terminal command utility and will open the specific application
based on the URI and filetype association.
The shell module's [`openExternal`][open-external] API allows opening a given
protocol URI with the desktop's native utilities. On macOS, for instance, this
function is similar to the `open` terminal command utility and will open the
specific application based on the URI and filetype association.
### Why?
#### Why?
Improper use of [`openExternal`][open-external] can be leveraged to compromise
the user's host. When openExternal is used with untrusted content, it can be
leveraged to execute arbitrary commands.
### How?
#### How?
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Bad
const { shell } = require('electron')
shell.openExternal(USER_CONTROLLED_DATA_HERE)
```
```js
```js title='main.js (Main Process)'
// Good
const { shell } = require('electron')
shell.openExternal('https://example.com/index.html')
```
## 16) Use a current version of Electron
### 16. Use a current version of Electron
You should strive for always using the latest available version of Electron.
Whenever a new major version is released, you should attempt to update your
app as quickly as possible.
### Why?
#### Why?
An application built with an older version of Electron, Chromium, and Node.js
is an easier target than an application that is using more recent versions of
@ -705,6 +718,13 @@ to fix issues before publishing them. Your application will be more secure if
it is running a recent version of Electron (and thus, Chromium and Node.js) for
which potential security issues are not as widely known.
#### How?
Migrate your app one major version at a time, while referring to Electron's
[Breaking Changes][breaking-changes] document to see if any code needs to
be updated.
[breaking-changes]: ../breaking-changes.md
[browser-window]: ../api/browser-window.md
[browser-view]: ../api/browser-view.md
[webview-tag]: ../api/webview-tag.md
@ -712,5 +732,4 @@ which potential security issues are not as widely known.
[window-open-handler]: ../api/web-contents.md#contentssetwindowopenhandlerhandler
[will-navigate]: ../api/web-contents.md#event-will-navigate
[open-external]: ../api/shell.md#shellopenexternalurl-options
[sandbox]: ../tutorial/sandbox.md
[responsible-disclosure]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsible_disclosure