fix: allow unsandboxed renderers to request new privileges (#19953)
* fix: allow unsandboxed renderers to request new privileges * add test
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@ -75,3 +75,4 @@ disable_color_correct_rendering.patch
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add_contentgpuclient_precreatemessageloop_callback.patch
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picture-in-picture.patch
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disable_compositor_recycling.patch
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allow_new_privileges_in_unsandboxed_child_processes.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jeremy Apthorp <nornagon@nornagon.net>
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Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 12:02:51 -0700
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Subject: allow new privileges in unsandboxed child processes
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This allows unsandboxed renderers to launch setuid processes on Linux.
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diff --git a/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc b/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc
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index 720b92a1a3a7ab5512f839005b272e4989d2ac65..b1759109627cd00053489dcdd397e942fa9d289f 100644
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--- a/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc
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+++ b/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc
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@@ -54,6 +54,18 @@ bool ChildProcessLauncherHelper::BeforeLaunchOnLauncherThread(
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const int sandbox_fd = SandboxHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetChildSocket();
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options->fds_to_remap.push_back(
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std::make_pair(sandbox_fd, service_manager::GetSandboxFD()));
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+
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+ // (For Electron), if we're launching without zygote, that means we're
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+ // launching an unsandboxed process (since all sandboxed processes are
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+ // forked from the zygote). Relax the allow_new_privs option to permit
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+ // launching suid processes from unsandboxed renderers.
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+ service_manager::ZygoteHandle zygote_handle =
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+ base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kNoZygote)
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+ ? nullptr
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+ : delegate_->GetZygote();
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+ if (!zygote_handle) {
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+ options->allow_new_privs = true;
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+ }
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}
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options->environment = delegate_->GetEnvironment();
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@ -155,6 +155,19 @@ describe('node feature', () => {
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})
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})
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})
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describe('child_process.exec', () => {
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(process.platform === 'linux' ? it : it.skip)('allows executing a setuid binary from non-sandboxed renderer', () => {
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// Chrome uses prctl(2) to set the NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES flag on Linux (see
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// https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/40fde647cc/Documentation/userspace-api/no_new_privs.rst).
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// We disable this for unsandboxed processes, which the remote tests
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// are running in. If this test fails with an error like 'effective uid
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// is not 0', then it's likely that our patch to prevent the flag from
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// being set has become ineffective.
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const stdout = ChildProcess.execSync('sudo --help')
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expect(stdout).to.not.be.empty()
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})
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})
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})
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describe('contexts', () => {
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