docs: update sandbox renderer defaults for Electron 20 (#35379)

* docs: update E20 sandbox rendering defaults

* docs: update tutorial

* simplify paragraph

* dont mention context isolation
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@ -12,28 +12,10 @@ the GPU service and the network service.
See Chromium's [Sandbox design document][sandbox] for more information.
## Electron's sandboxing policies
Electron comes with a mixed sandbox environment, meaning sandboxed processes can run
alongside privileged ones. By default, renderer processes are not sandboxed, but
utility processes are. Note that as in Chromium, the main (browser) process is
privileged and cannot be sandboxed.
Historically, this mixed sandbox approach was established because having Node.js available
in the renderer is an extremely powerful tool for app developers. Unfortunately, this
feature is also an equally massive security vulnerability.
Theoretically, unsandboxed renderers are not a problem for desktop applications that
only display trusted code, but they make Electron less secure than Chromium for
displaying untrusted web content. However, even purportedly trusted code may be
dangerous — there are countless attack vectors that malicious actors can use, from
cross-site scripting to content injection to man-in-the-middle attacks on remotely loaded
websites, just to name a few. For this reason, we recommend enabling renderer sandboxing
for the vast majority of cases under an abundance of caution.
<!--TODO: update this guide when #28466 is either solved or closed -->
Note that there is an active discussion in the issue tracker to enable renderer sandboxing
by default. See [#28466][issue-28466]) for details.
Starting from Electron 20, the sandbox is enabled for renderer processes without any
further configuration. If you want to disable the sandbox for a process, see the
[Disabling the sandbox for a single process](#disabling-the-sandbox-for-a-single-process)
section.
## Sandbox behaviour in Electron
@ -46,12 +28,17 @@ When renderer processes in Electron are sandboxed, they behave in the same way a
regular Chrome renderer would. A sandboxed renderer won't have a Node.js
environment initialized.
<!-- TODO(erickzhao): when we have a solid guide for IPC, link it here -->
Therefore, when the sandbox is enabled, renderer processes can only perform privileged
tasks (such as interacting with the filesystem, making changes to the system, or spawning
subprocesses) by delegating these tasks to the main process via inter-process
communication (IPC).
:::note
For more info on inter-process communication, check out our [IPC guide](./ipc.md).
:::
### Preload scripts
In order to allow renderer processes to communicate with the main process, preload
@ -66,7 +53,7 @@ but can only import a subset of Electron and Node's built-in modules:
In addition, the preload script also polyfills certain Node.js primitives as globals:
* [`Buffer`](https://nodejs.org/api/Buffer.html)
* [`Buffer`](https://nodejs.org/api/buffer.html)
* [`process`](../api/process.md)
* [`clearImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_clearimmediate_immediate)
* [`setImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_setimmediate_callback_args)
@ -83,13 +70,17 @@ privileged APIs to untrusted code running in the renderer process unless
## Configuring the sandbox
### Enabling the sandbox for a single process
For most apps, sandboxing is the best choice. In certain use cases that are incompatible with
the sandbox (for instance, when using native node modules in the renderer),
it is possible to disable the sandbox for specific processes. This comes with security
risks, especially if any untrusted code or content is present in the unsandboxed process.
In Electron, renderer sandboxing can be enabled on a per-process basis with
the `sandbox: true` preference in the [`BrowserWindow`][browser-window] constructor.
### Disabling the sandbox for a single process
```js
// main.js
In Electron, renderer sandboxing can be disabled on a per-process basis with
the `sandbox: false` preference in the [`BrowserWindow`][browser-window] constructor.
```js title='main.js'
app.whenReady().then(() => {
const win = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
@ -100,17 +91,30 @@ app.whenReady().then(() => {
})
```
Sandboxing is also disabled whenever Node.js integration is enabled in the renderer.
This can be done through the BrowserWindow constructor with the `nodeIntegration: true` flag.
```js title='main.js'
app.whenReady().then(() => {
const win = new BrowserWindow({
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true
}
})
win.loadURL('https://google.com')
})
```
### Enabling the sandbox globally
If you want to force sandboxing for all renderers, you can also use the
[`app.enableSandbox`][enable-sandbox] API. Note that this API has to be called before the
app's `ready` event.
```js
// main.js
```js title='main.js'
app.enableSandbox()
app.whenReady().then(() => {
// no need to pass `sandbox: true` since `app.enableSandbox()` was called.
// any sandbox:false calls are overridden since `app.enableSandbox()` was called.
const win = new BrowserWindow()
win.loadURL('https://google.com')
})
@ -139,16 +143,16 @@ issues:
have, to inherit everything we can from Chromium, and to respond quickly to
security issues, but Electron cannot be as secure as Chromium without the
resources that Chromium is able to dedicate.
2. Some security features in Chrome (such as Safe Browsing and Certificate
1. Some security features in Chrome (such as Safe Browsing and Certificate
Transparency) require a centralized authority and dedicated servers, both of
which run counter to the goals of the Electron project. As such, we disable
those features in Electron, at the cost of the associated security they
would otherwise bring.
3. There is only one Chromium, whereas there are many thousands of apps built
1. There is only one Chromium, whereas there are many thousands of apps built
on Electron, all of which behave slightly differently. Accounting for those
differences can yield a huge possibility space, and make it challenging to
ensure the security of the platform in unusual use cases.
4. We can't push security updates to users directly, so we rely on app vendors
1. We can't push security updates to users directly, so we rely on app vendors
to upgrade the version of Electron underlying their app in order for
security updates to reach users.

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@ -38,7 +38,25 @@ called a **preload**.
## Augmenting the renderer with a preload script
A BrowserWindow's preload script runs in a context that has access to both the HTML DOM
and a Node.js environment. Preload scripts are injected before a web page loads in the renderer,
and a limited subset of Node.js and Electron APIs.
:::info Preload script sandboxing
From Electron 20 onwards, preload scripts are **sandboxed** by default and no longer have access
to a full Node.js environment. Practically, this means that you have a polyfilled `require`
function that only has access to a limited set of APIs.
| Available API | Details |
| ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Electron modules | Renderer process modules |
| Node.js modules | [`events`](https://nodejs.org/api/events.html), [`timers`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html), [`url`](https://nodejs.org/api/url.html) |
| Polyfilled globals | [`Buffer`](https://nodejs.org/api/buffer.html), [`process`](../api/process.md), [`clearImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_clearimmediate_immediate), [`setImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_setimmediate_callback_args) |
For more information, check out the [Process Sandboxing](./sandbox.md) guide.
:::
Preload scripts are injected before a web page loads in the renderer,
similar to a Chrome extension's [content scripts][content-script]. To add features to your renderer
that require privileged access, you can define [global] objects through the
[contextBridge][contextbridge] API.