docs: update sandbox renderer defaults for Electron 20 (#35379)
* docs: update E20 sandbox rendering defaults * docs: update tutorial * simplify paragraph * dont mention context isolation
This commit is contained in:
parent
4fb4167b8b
commit
34cb360730
2 changed files with 58 additions and 36 deletions
|
@ -12,28 +12,10 @@ the GPU service and the network service.
|
|||
|
||||
See Chromium's [Sandbox design document][sandbox] for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
## Electron's sandboxing policies
|
||||
|
||||
Electron comes with a mixed sandbox environment, meaning sandboxed processes can run
|
||||
alongside privileged ones. By default, renderer processes are not sandboxed, but
|
||||
utility processes are. Note that as in Chromium, the main (browser) process is
|
||||
privileged and cannot be sandboxed.
|
||||
|
||||
Historically, this mixed sandbox approach was established because having Node.js available
|
||||
in the renderer is an extremely powerful tool for app developers. Unfortunately, this
|
||||
feature is also an equally massive security vulnerability.
|
||||
|
||||
Theoretically, unsandboxed renderers are not a problem for desktop applications that
|
||||
only display trusted code, but they make Electron less secure than Chromium for
|
||||
displaying untrusted web content. However, even purportedly trusted code may be
|
||||
dangerous — there are countless attack vectors that malicious actors can use, from
|
||||
cross-site scripting to content injection to man-in-the-middle attacks on remotely loaded
|
||||
websites, just to name a few. For this reason, we recommend enabling renderer sandboxing
|
||||
for the vast majority of cases under an abundance of caution.
|
||||
|
||||
<!--TODO: update this guide when #28466 is either solved or closed -->
|
||||
Note that there is an active discussion in the issue tracker to enable renderer sandboxing
|
||||
by default. See [#28466][issue-28466]) for details.
|
||||
Starting from Electron 20, the sandbox is enabled for renderer processes without any
|
||||
further configuration. If you want to disable the sandbox for a process, see the
|
||||
[Disabling the sandbox for a single process](#disabling-the-sandbox-for-a-single-process)
|
||||
section.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sandbox behaviour in Electron
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -46,12 +28,17 @@ When renderer processes in Electron are sandboxed, they behave in the same way a
|
|||
regular Chrome renderer would. A sandboxed renderer won't have a Node.js
|
||||
environment initialized.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- TODO(erickzhao): when we have a solid guide for IPC, link it here -->
|
||||
Therefore, when the sandbox is enabled, renderer processes can only perform privileged
|
||||
tasks (such as interacting with the filesystem, making changes to the system, or spawning
|
||||
subprocesses) by delegating these tasks to the main process via inter-process
|
||||
communication (IPC).
|
||||
|
||||
:::note
|
||||
|
||||
For more info on inter-process communication, check out our [IPC guide](./ipc.md).
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
### Preload scripts
|
||||
|
||||
In order to allow renderer processes to communicate with the main process, preload
|
||||
|
@ -66,7 +53,7 @@ but can only import a subset of Electron and Node's built-in modules:
|
|||
|
||||
In addition, the preload script also polyfills certain Node.js primitives as globals:
|
||||
|
||||
* [`Buffer`](https://nodejs.org/api/Buffer.html)
|
||||
* [`Buffer`](https://nodejs.org/api/buffer.html)
|
||||
* [`process`](../api/process.md)
|
||||
* [`clearImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_clearimmediate_immediate)
|
||||
* [`setImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_setimmediate_callback_args)
|
||||
|
@ -83,13 +70,17 @@ privileged APIs to untrusted code running in the renderer process unless
|
|||
|
||||
## Configuring the sandbox
|
||||
|
||||
### Enabling the sandbox for a single process
|
||||
For most apps, sandboxing is the best choice. In certain use cases that are incompatible with
|
||||
the sandbox (for instance, when using native node modules in the renderer),
|
||||
it is possible to disable the sandbox for specific processes. This comes with security
|
||||
risks, especially if any untrusted code or content is present in the unsandboxed process.
|
||||
|
||||
In Electron, renderer sandboxing can be enabled on a per-process basis with
|
||||
the `sandbox: true` preference in the [`BrowserWindow`][browser-window] constructor.
|
||||
### Disabling the sandbox for a single process
|
||||
|
||||
```js
|
||||
// main.js
|
||||
In Electron, renderer sandboxing can be disabled on a per-process basis with
|
||||
the `sandbox: false` preference in the [`BrowserWindow`][browser-window] constructor.
|
||||
|
||||
```js title='main.js'
|
||||
app.whenReady().then(() => {
|
||||
const win = new BrowserWindow({
|
||||
webPreferences: {
|
||||
|
@ -100,17 +91,30 @@ app.whenReady().then(() => {
|
|||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Sandboxing is also disabled whenever Node.js integration is enabled in the renderer.
|
||||
This can be done through the BrowserWindow constructor with the `nodeIntegration: true` flag.
|
||||
|
||||
```js title='main.js'
|
||||
app.whenReady().then(() => {
|
||||
const win = new BrowserWindow({
|
||||
webPreferences: {
|
||||
nodeIntegration: true
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
win.loadURL('https://google.com')
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Enabling the sandbox globally
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to force sandboxing for all renderers, you can also use the
|
||||
[`app.enableSandbox`][enable-sandbox] API. Note that this API has to be called before the
|
||||
app's `ready` event.
|
||||
|
||||
```js
|
||||
// main.js
|
||||
```js title='main.js'
|
||||
app.enableSandbox()
|
||||
app.whenReady().then(() => {
|
||||
// no need to pass `sandbox: true` since `app.enableSandbox()` was called.
|
||||
// any sandbox:false calls are overridden since `app.enableSandbox()` was called.
|
||||
const win = new BrowserWindow()
|
||||
win.loadURL('https://google.com')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
@ -139,16 +143,16 @@ issues:
|
|||
have, to inherit everything we can from Chromium, and to respond quickly to
|
||||
security issues, but Electron cannot be as secure as Chromium without the
|
||||
resources that Chromium is able to dedicate.
|
||||
2. Some security features in Chrome (such as Safe Browsing and Certificate
|
||||
1. Some security features in Chrome (such as Safe Browsing and Certificate
|
||||
Transparency) require a centralized authority and dedicated servers, both of
|
||||
which run counter to the goals of the Electron project. As such, we disable
|
||||
those features in Electron, at the cost of the associated security they
|
||||
would otherwise bring.
|
||||
3. There is only one Chromium, whereas there are many thousands of apps built
|
||||
1. There is only one Chromium, whereas there are many thousands of apps built
|
||||
on Electron, all of which behave slightly differently. Accounting for those
|
||||
differences can yield a huge possibility space, and make it challenging to
|
||||
ensure the security of the platform in unusual use cases.
|
||||
4. We can't push security updates to users directly, so we rely on app vendors
|
||||
1. We can't push security updates to users directly, so we rely on app vendors
|
||||
to upgrade the version of Electron underlying their app in order for
|
||||
security updates to reach users.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -38,7 +38,25 @@ called a **preload**.
|
|||
## Augmenting the renderer with a preload script
|
||||
|
||||
A BrowserWindow's preload script runs in a context that has access to both the HTML DOM
|
||||
and a Node.js environment. Preload scripts are injected before a web page loads in the renderer,
|
||||
and a limited subset of Node.js and Electron APIs.
|
||||
|
||||
:::info Preload script sandboxing
|
||||
|
||||
From Electron 20 onwards, preload scripts are **sandboxed** by default and no longer have access
|
||||
to a full Node.js environment. Practically, this means that you have a polyfilled `require`
|
||||
function that only has access to a limited set of APIs.
|
||||
|
||||
| Available API | Details |
|
||||
| ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Electron modules | Renderer process modules |
|
||||
| Node.js modules | [`events`](https://nodejs.org/api/events.html), [`timers`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html), [`url`](https://nodejs.org/api/url.html) |
|
||||
| Polyfilled globals | [`Buffer`](https://nodejs.org/api/buffer.html), [`process`](../api/process.md), [`clearImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_clearimmediate_immediate), [`setImmediate`](https://nodejs.org/api/timers.html#timers_setimmediate_callback_args) |
|
||||
|
||||
For more information, check out the [Process Sandboxing](./sandbox.md) guide.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
Preload scripts are injected before a web page loads in the renderer,
|
||||
similar to a Chrome extension's [content scripts][content-script]. To add features to your renderer
|
||||
that require privileged access, you can define [global] objects through the
|
||||
[contextBridge][contextbridge] API.
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue