feat: support mixed-sandbox mode on linux (#15870)
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4 changed files with 98 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -245,10 +245,12 @@ void WebContentsPreferences::AppendCommandLineSwitches(
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// If the `sandbox` option was passed to the BrowserWindow's webPreferences,
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// pass `--enable-sandbox` to the renderer so it won't have any node.js
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// integration.
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if (IsEnabled(options::kSandbox))
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if (IsEnabled(options::kSandbox)) {
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command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSandbox);
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else if (!command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSandbox))
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} else if (!command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSandbox)) {
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command_line->AppendSwitch(service_manager::switches::kNoSandbox);
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command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kNoZygote);
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}
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// Check if nativeWindowOpen is enabled.
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if (IsEnabled(options::kNativeWindowOpen))
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@ -73,3 +73,4 @@ cross_site_document_resource_handler.patch
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content_allow_embedder_to_prevent_locking_scheme_registry.patch
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fix_trackpad_scrolling.patch
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mac_fix_form_control_rendering_on_10_14_mojave.patch
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support_mixed_sandbox_with_zygote.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jeremy Apthorp <nornagon@nornagon.net>
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Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 13:20:27 -0800
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Subject: support mixed-sandbox with zygote
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On Linux, Chromium launches all new renderer processes via a "zygote"
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process which has the sandbox pre-initialized (see
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//docs/linux_zygote.md). In order to support mixed-sandbox mode, in
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which some renderers are launched with the sandbox engaged and others
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without it, we need the option to launch non-sandboxed renderers without
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going through the zygote.
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Chromium already supports a `--no-zygote` flag, but it turns off the
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zygote completely, and thus also disables sandboxing. This patch allows
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the `--no-zygote` flag to affect renderer processes on a case-by-case
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basis, checking immediately prior to launch whether to go through the
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zygote or not based on the command-line of the to-be-launched renderer.
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This patch could conceivably be upstreamed, as it does not affect
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production Chromium (which does not use the `--no-zygote` flag).
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However, the patch would need to be reviewed by the security team, as it
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does touch a security-sensitive class.
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diff --git a/content/browser/renderer_host/render_process_host_impl.cc b/content/browser/renderer_host/render_process_host_impl.cc
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index 05e0ee79e5ad..9a4522f59e6f 100644
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--- a/content/browser/renderer_host/render_process_host_impl.cc
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+++ b/content/browser/renderer_host/render_process_host_impl.cc
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@@ -466,6 +466,10 @@ class RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate
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: public SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate {
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public:
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RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate() {}
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+#if BUILDFLAG(USE_ZYGOTE_HANDLE)
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+ RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate(bool use_zygote):
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+ use_zygote_(use_zygote) {}
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+#endif
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~RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate() override {}
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@@ -485,6 +489,9 @@ class RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate
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#if BUILDFLAG(USE_ZYGOTE_HANDLE)
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service_manager::ZygoteHandle GetZygote() override {
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+ if (!use_zygote_) {
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+ return nullptr;
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+ }
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const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
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*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
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base::CommandLine::StringType renderer_prefix =
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@@ -498,6 +505,11 @@ class RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate
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service_manager::SandboxType GetSandboxType() override {
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return service_manager::SANDBOX_TYPE_RENDERER;
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}
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+
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+ private:
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+#if BUILDFLAG(USE_ZYGOTE_HANDLE)
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+ bool use_zygote_ = true;
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+#endif
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};
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const char kSessionStorageHolderKey[] = "kSessionStorageHolderKey";
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@@ -1731,11 +1743,18 @@ bool RenderProcessHostImpl::Init() {
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cmd_line->PrependWrapper(renderer_prefix);
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AppendRendererCommandLine(cmd_line.get());
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+#if BUILDFLAG(USE_ZYGOTE_HANDLE)
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+ bool use_zygote = !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoZygote);
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+ auto delegate = std::make_unique<RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate>(use_zygote);
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+#else
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+ auto delegate = std::make_unique<RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate>();
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+#endif
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+
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// Spawn the child process asynchronously to avoid blocking the UI thread.
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// As long as there's no renderer prefix, we can use the zygote process
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// at this stage.
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child_process_launcher_ = std::make_unique<ChildProcessLauncher>(
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- std::make_unique<RendererSandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate>(),
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+ std::move(delegate),
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std::move(cmd_line), GetID(), this, std::move(mojo_invitation_),
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base::BindRepeating(&RenderProcessHostImpl::OnMojoError, id_));
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channel_->Pause();
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@ -914,13 +914,21 @@ describe('app module', () => {
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const socketPath = process.platform === 'win32' ? '\\\\.\\pipe\\electron-mixed-sandbox' : '/tmp/electron-mixed-sandbox'
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beforeEach(function (done) {
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// XXX(alexeykuzmin): Calling `.skip()` inside a `before` hook
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// doesn't affect nested `describe`s.
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// FIXME Get these specs running on Linux
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if (process.platform === 'linux') {
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if (process.platform === 'linux' && (process.arch === 'arm64' || process.arch === 'arm')) {
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// Our ARM tests are run on VSTS rather than CircleCI, and the Docker
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// setup on VSTS disallows syscalls that Chrome requires for setting up
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// sandboxing.
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// See:
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// - https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp/#significant-syscalls-blocked-by-the-default-profile
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// - https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/70.0.3538.124/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc#292
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// - https://github.com/docker/docker-ce/blob/ba7dfc59ccfe97c79ee0d1379894b35417b40bca/components/engine/profiles/seccomp/seccomp_default.go#L497
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// - https://blog.jessfraz.com/post/how-to-use-new-docker-seccomp-profiles/
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//
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// Adding `--cap-add SYS_ADMIN` or `--security-opt seccomp=unconfined`
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// to the Docker invocation allows the syscalls that Chrome needs, but
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// are probably more permissive than we'd like.
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this.skip()
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}
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fs.unlink(socketPath, () => {
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server = net.createServer()
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server.listen(socketPath)
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