pmaports/device/testing/linux-samsung-klte/0010-Backport-shm-add-sealing-API.patch

From 893282e935b9b1eb212eaf556843a47069e7d2a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 00:54:54 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] shm: add sealing API

If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
  - one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
  - one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
  - one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries

If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement.  However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies.  Look at the following two
use-cases:

  1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
     graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
     read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
     scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
     the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
     cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
  2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
     bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
     assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
     want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
     source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
     copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
     local copy.

While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.

This patch introduces the concept of SEALING.  If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever.  Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed.  Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.

An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
  - SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
            in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
  - GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
          in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
  - WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
           are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
           write().
  - SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
          This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
          can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
          don't want.

The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:

  1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
     SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
     allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
     Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
  2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
     SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
     process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
     Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
     peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
     process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).

The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
  F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
               can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
               sealing.
  F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
               access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
               Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
               there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
               Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
               The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
               on the file. You cannot remove seals again.

The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 fs/fcntl.c               |   5 ++
 include/linux/fcntl.h    |  16 +++++
 include/linux/shmem_fs.h |  18 ++++++
 mm/shmem.c               | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 161 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
index b17b568001e..e660ffc9ac8 100644
--- a/fs/fcntl.c
+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
 
 #include <asm/poll.h>
 #include <asm/siginfo.h>
@@ -431,6 +432,10 @@ static long do_fcntl(int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
 	case F_GETPIPE_SZ:
 		err = pipe_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
 		break;
+	case F_ADD_SEALS:
+	case F_GET_SEALS:
+		err = shmem_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
+		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/fcntl.h b/include/linux/fcntl.h
index f550f894ba1..2c39b178797 100644
--- a/include/linux/fcntl.h
+++ b/include/linux/fcntl.h
@@ -27,6 +27,22 @@
 #define F_SETPIPE_SZ	(F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 7)
 #define F_GETPIPE_SZ	(F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 8)
 
+/*
+ * Set/Get seals
+ */
+#define F_ADD_SEALS    (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
+#define F_GET_SEALS    (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
+
+/*
+ * Types of seals
+ */
+#define F_SEAL_SEAL    0x0001  /* prevent further seals from being set */
+#define F_SEAL_SHRINK  0x0002  /* prevent file from shrinking */
+#define F_SEAL_GROW    0x0004  /* prevent file from growing */
+#define F_SEAL_WRITE   0x0008  /* prevent writes */
+/* (1U << 31) is reserved for signed error codes */
+
+
 /*
  * Types of directory notifications that may be requested.
  */
diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
index 79ab2555b3b..c08c0907bf5 100644
--- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #ifndef __SHMEM_FS_H
 #define __SHMEM_FS_H
 
+#include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@
 struct shmem_inode_info {
 	spinlock_t		lock;
 	unsigned long		flags;
+	unsigned int		seals;		/* shmem seals */
 	unsigned long		alloced;	/* data pages alloced to file */
 	union {
 		unsigned long	swapped;	/* subtotal assigned to swap */
@@ -61,4 +63,20 @@ static inline struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page(
 					mapping_gfp_mask(mapping));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
+
+extern int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals);
+extern int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file);
+extern long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+
+#else
+
+static inline long shmem_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+
 #endif
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index 788a30082a9..1a232f8d8cb 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -560,6 +561,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_truncate_range);
 static int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
 	int error;
 
 	error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
@@ -570,6 +572,11 @@ static int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
 		loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
 
+		/* protected by i_mutex */
+		if ((newsize < oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)) ||
+		    (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW)))
+			return -EPERM;
+
 		if (newsize != oldsize) {
 			i_size_write(inode, newsize);
 			inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
@@ -1279,6 +1286,7 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, const struct inode
 		info = SHMEM_I(inode);
 		memset(info, 0, (char *)inode - (char *)info);
 		spin_lock_init(&info->lock);
+		info->seals = F_SEAL_SEAL;
 		info->flags = flags & VM_NORESERVE;
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->swaplist);
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->xattr_list);
@@ -1332,7 +1340,17 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
 			struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
+	struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
 	pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
+
+	/* i_mutex is held by caller */
+	if (unlikely(info->seals)) {
+		if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
+			return -EPERM;
+		if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	return shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -1605,6 +1623,110 @@ static ssize_t shmem_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int shmem_wait_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define F_ALL_SEALS (F_SEAL_SEAL | \
+		     F_SEAL_SHRINK | \
+		     F_SEAL_GROW | \
+		     F_SEAL_WRITE)
+
+int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
+	int error;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEALING
+	 * Sealing allows multiple parties to share a shmem-file but restrict
+	 * access to a specific subset of file operations. Seals can only be
+	 * added, but never removed. This way, mutually untrusted parties can
+	 * share common memory regions with a well-defined policy. A malicious
+	 * peer can thus never perform unwanted operations on a shared object.
+	 *
+	 * Seals are only supported on special shmem-files and always affect
+	 * the whole underlying inode. Once a seal is set, it may prevent some
+	 * kinds of access to the file. Currently, the following seals are
+	 * defined:
+	 *   SEAL_SEAL: Prevent further seals from being set on this file
+	 *   SEAL_SHRINK: Prevent the file from shrinking
+	 *   SEAL_GROW: Prevent the file from growing
+	 *   SEAL_WRITE: Prevent write access to the file
+	 *
+	 * As we don't require any trust relationship between two parties, we
+	 * must prevent seals from being removed. Therefore, sealing a file
+	 * only adds a given set of seals to the file, it never touches
+	 * existing seals. Furthermore, the "setting seals"-operation can be
+	 * sealed itself, which basically prevents any further seal from being
+	 * added.
+	 *
+	 * Semantics of sealing are only defined on volatile files. Only
+	 * anonymous shmem files support sealing. More importantly, seals are
+	 * never written to disk. Therefore, there's no plan to support it on
+	 * other file types.
+	 */
+
+	if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (seals & ~(unsigned int)F_ALL_SEALS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+	if (info->seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: this is the place to actually apply seals to
+	 * file->f_mapping, but this was not backported yet */
+
+	info->seals |= seals;
+	error = 0;
+
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	return error;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_add_seals);
+
+int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file)
+{
+	if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return SHMEM_I(file_inode(file))->seals;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_get_seals);
+
+long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	long error;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_ADD_SEALS:
+		/* disallow upper 32bit */
+		if (arg > UINT_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		error = shmem_add_seals(file, arg);
+		break;
+	case F_GET_SEALS:
+		error = shmem_get_seals(file);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
 static int shmem_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
 {
 	struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(dentry->d_sb);
-- 
2.20.1