linux-uconsole/include/linux/nospec.h

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array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references (cherry picked from commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40) array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-23 11:42:00 +01:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved.
// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved.
// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
#include <asm/barrier.h>
array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references (cherry picked from commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40) array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-23 11:42:00 +01:00
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
* @index: array element index
* @size: number of elements in array
*
* When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be
* set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of
* zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size).
*/
#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec
static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
unsigned long size)
{
/*
* Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler
* thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take
* into account the value of @index under speculation.
*/
OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index);
return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
}
#endif
/*
* array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
*
* For a code sequence like:
*
* if (index < size) {
* index = array_index_nospec(index, size);
* val = array[index];
* }
*
* ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
* array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
* size).
*/
#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \
({ \
typeof(index) _i = (index); \
typeof(size) _s = (size); \
nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() commit 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da upstream. There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in array_index_nospec_mask_check(): * It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized @index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like in the 64-bit case. * In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new kernel enabling. * The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to array_index_nospec(). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 13:20:42 -08:00
unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references (cherry picked from commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40) array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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\
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
\
nospec: Allow index argument to have const-qualified type commit b98c6a160a057d5686a8c54c79cc6c8c94a7d0c8 upstream. The last expression in a statement expression need not be a bare variable, quoting gcc docs The last thing in the compound statement should be an expression followed by a semicolon; the value of this subexpression serves as the value of the entire construct. and we already use that in e.g. the min/max macros which end with a ternary expression. This way, we can allow index to have const-qualified type, which will in some cases avoid the need for introducing a local copy of index of non-const qualified type. That, in turn, can prevent readers not familiar with the internals of array_index_nospec from wondering about the seemingly redundant extra variable, and I think that's worthwhile considering how confusing the whole _nospec business is. The expression _i&_mask has type unsigned long (since that is the type of _mask, and the BUILD_BUG_ONs guarantee that _i will get promoted to that), so in order not to change the type of the whole expression, add a cast back to typeof(_i). Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604837.17395.10812767547837568328.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16 13:20:48 -08:00
(typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \
array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references (cherry picked from commit f3804203306e098dae9ca51540fcd5eb700d7f40) array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414229.33451.18411580953862676575.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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})
#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */