Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL. Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values. Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag. So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out there that might depend on using other si_code values. Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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					 1 changed files with 12 additions and 4 deletions
				
			
		|  | @ -2421,9 +2421,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t, pid, int, sig, | ||||||
| 		return -EFAULT; | 		return -EFAULT; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
 | 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
 | ||||||
| 	   Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info.  */ | 	 * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info. | ||||||
| 	if (info.si_code >= 0) | 	 */ | ||||||
|  | 	if (info.si_code != SI_QUEUE) { | ||||||
|  | 		/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */ | ||||||
|  | 		WARN_ON_ONCE(info.si_code < 0); | ||||||
| 		return -EPERM; | 		return -EPERM; | ||||||
|  | 	} | ||||||
| 	info.si_signo = sig; | 	info.si_signo = sig; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| 	/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups.  */ | 	/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups.  */ | ||||||
|  | @ -2437,9 +2441,13 @@ long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info) | ||||||
| 		return -EINVAL; | 		return -EINVAL; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
 | 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
 | ||||||
| 	   Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info.  */ | 	 * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info. | ||||||
| 	if (info->si_code >= 0) | 	 */ | ||||||
|  | 	if (info->si_code != SI_QUEUE) { | ||||||
|  | 		/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */ | ||||||
|  | 		WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0); | ||||||
| 		return -EPERM; | 		return -EPERM; | ||||||
|  | 	} | ||||||
| 	info->si_signo = sig; | 	info->si_signo = sig; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| 	return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info); | 	return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info); | ||||||
|  |  | ||||||
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	 Julien Tinnes
				Julien Tinnes