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linux-pinenote/include/linux/selinux.h

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[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-02-24 15:44:05 -06:00
/*
* SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
*
* Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
[PATCH] Reworked patch for labels on user space messages The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches. This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match the inode and ipc patches since its similar. [updated: > Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the > user sid patch. ] Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-03 09:08:13 -04:00
* Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-02-24 15:44:05 -06:00
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_H
#define _LINUX_SELINUX_H
struct selinux_audit_rule;
struct audit_context;
[PATCH] change lspp ipc auditing Hi, The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the inode audit change patch already being applied. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05:00
struct kern_ipc_perm;
[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-02-24 15:44:05 -06:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
Creds: creds->security can be NULL is selinux is disabled __validate_process_creds should check if selinux is actually enabled before running tests on the selinux portion of the credentials struct. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-12 22:54:10 -04:00
/**
* selinux_is_enabled - is SELinux enabled?
*/
bool selinux_is_enabled(void);
[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-02-24 15:44:05 -06:00
#else
SELinux: inline selinux_is_enabled in !CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX Without this patch building a kernel emits millions of warning like: include/linux/selinux.h:92: warning: ?selinux_is_enabled? defined but not used When it is build without CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX. This is harmless, but the function should be inlined, so it gets compiled out. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14 20:59:48 -04:00
static inline bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
Creds: creds->security can be NULL is selinux is disabled __validate_process_creds should check if selinux is actually enabled before running tests on the selinux portion of the credentials struct. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-12 22:54:10 -04:00
{
return false;
}
[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-02-24 15:44:05 -06:00
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX */
#endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_H */
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