| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | /*
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  |  *  linux/fs/proc/kmsg.c | 
					
						
							|  |  |  |  * | 
					
						
							|  |  |  |  *  Copyright (C) 1992  by Linus Torvalds | 
					
						
							|  |  |  |  * | 
					
						
							|  |  |  |  */ | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <linux/types.h>
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <linux/errno.h>
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <linux/time.h>
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <linux/kernel.h>
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <linux/poll.h>
 | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2008-10-04 14:39:12 +04:00
										 |  |  | #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | #include <linux/fs.h>
 | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2010-02-03 15:36:43 -08:00
										 |  |  | #include <linux/syslog.h>
 | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #include <asm/io.h>
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait; | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | { | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
											  
											
												kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections.  Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions.  With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
 - /proc/kmsg allows:
  - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
    single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
  - everything, after an open.
 - syslog syscall allows:
  - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
  - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
    dmesg_restrict==0.
  - nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
 - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
 - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
   destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
 - /dev/kmsg allows:
  - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
  - reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
											
										 
											2013-06-12 14:04:39 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); | 
					
						
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											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | } | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | { | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
											  
											
												kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections.  Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions.  With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
 - /proc/kmsg allows:
  - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
    single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
  - everything, after an open.
 - syslog syscall allows:
  - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
  - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
    dmesg_restrict==0.
  - nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
 - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
 - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
   destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
 - /dev/kmsg allows:
  - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
  - reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
											
										 
											2013-06-12 14:04:39 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	(void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); | 
					
						
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											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	return 0; | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | } | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | { | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2010-02-03 15:36:43 -08:00
										 |  |  | 	if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
											  
											
												kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections.  Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions.  With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
 - /proc/kmsg allows:
  - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
    single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
  - everything, after an open.
 - syslog syscall allows:
  - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
  - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
    dmesg_restrict==0.
  - nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
 - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
 - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
   destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
 - /dev/kmsg allows:
  - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
  - reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
											
										 
											2013-06-12 14:04:39 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	    !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC)) | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | 		return -EAGAIN; | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
											  
											
												kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections.  Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions.  With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
 - /proc/kmsg allows:
  - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
    single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
  - everything, after an open.
 - syslog syscall allows:
  - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
  - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
    dmesg_restrict==0.
  - nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
 - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
 - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
   destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
 - /dev/kmsg allows:
  - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
  - reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
											
										 
											2013-06-12 14:04:39 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | } | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | { | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait); | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
											  
											
												kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections.  Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions.  With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
 - /proc/kmsg allows:
  - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
    single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
  - everything, after an open.
 - syslog syscall allows:
  - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
  - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
    dmesg_restrict==0.
  - nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
 - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
 - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
   destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
 - /dev/kmsg allows:
  - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
  - reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
											
										 
											2013-06-12 14:04:39 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC)) | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | 		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	return 0; | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | } | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2008-10-04 14:39:12 +04:00
										 |  |  | static const struct file_operations proc_kmsg_operations = { | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | 	.read		= kmsg_read, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	.poll		= kmsg_poll, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	.open		= kmsg_open, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	.release	= kmsg_release, | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2010-03-30 02:24:54 +02:00
										 |  |  | 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek, | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
										 |  |  | }; | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2008-10-04 14:39:12 +04:00
										 |  |  | 
 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | static int __init proc_kmsg_init(void) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | { | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	proc_create("kmsg", S_IRUSR, NULL, &proc_kmsg_operations); | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | 	return 0; | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | } | 
					
						
							| 
									
										
										
										
											2014-01-23 15:55:45 -08:00
										 |  |  | fs_initcall(proc_kmsg_init); |